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1 Introduction
One of the most significant labor market developments in the last
decade and a half has been the sharp rise in wage inequality in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and many other countries. For
example, Karoly (1988) estimated the variance in the logarithm of
annual earnings for white males working at least 35 hours a week and
50 weeks a year at 0.282 in 1969, 0.264 in 1979, and 0.376 in 1987.
The 42 percent increase from 1979 to 1987 brought that measure of
wage inequality to levels unseen in the United States since the 1930s
(Goldin and Margo 1992).
A change of such magnitude has not escaped the attention of econ
omists, particularly given the social and political consequences of ris
ing wage inequality. A substantial body of literature on the subject,
with contributions by almost every prominent labor economist, has
emerged over the past decade. That literature, reviewed briefly in the
next section, has sharpened our understanding of many dimensions of
the changing wage structure in the United States and other countries. 1
However, there are still many questions about the causes of the abrupt
change in wage inequality during the 1980s. For example, debate con
tinues about the relative importance of institutional factors (like the
decline in union contract coverage) and market forces (like techno
logical change and increased international competition) in accounting
for changes in the wage structure.
This study takes a substantially different perspective on the prob
lem from that prevailing in the literature. It differs in three ways. First,
it focuses on changes in the wage structure in a sample of local labor
markets. Although the relevant labor market is local for most work
ers (at least in the short run) and although during the 1980s there were
marked regional differences in economic performance, most earlier
studies have looked at the national labor market.
Second, it examines changes in the structure of the wages paid for
specific jobs. Most studies have used micro data from the Current Pop
ulation Survey (CPS), which records the wages and salaries reported
by individual workers. In the CPS data, however, it is difficult to sep-

2

Introduction

arate the wage effects of labor-supply decisions about the hours of
work, or multiple job-holding, or the wage effects of overtime pay,
bonuses, and other wage supplements, from the wage paid for an hour
of labor. This study uses data drawn from the Area Wage Surveys,
which reported the distribution of wages paid by establishments for a
number of job titles in a local labor market.
Third, it focuses on jobs and the skills required as the primary
determinants of wages. The approach complements the more tradi
tional human capital wage model, which emphasizes the personal char
acteristics of workers (Groshen 1996). One important aspect of the
rise in wage inequality appears to be a coincident rise in the wage
advantage accruing to highly skilled workers. Focusing on jobs allows
us to examine the rise in the wage advantage by using data on several
required skills that are more related to job performance than are school
ing and potential experience, the two variables at the heart of the human
capital approach.
By studying changes in the distribution of wages for specific jobs
in a sample of local labor markets, we may find answers to the fol
lowing questions:
1) Are trends in the structure of wages in local labor markets
similar to the trends in the structure of wages revealed in nation
wide studies?
2) Do local labor markets differ in the extent and pattern of the
rise in wage inequality?
3) Have changes in the availability of benefits accompanied
changes in the wage structure?
4) How have the wage returns on skills changed?
5) What is the relative importance of changes in union contract
coverage and in the minimum wage in explaining changes in
the wage structure?
WHAT DO WE KNOW?
The following brief summary of the literature on the rise in wage
inequality during the 1980s seeks not to offer critiques, but rather to
catalogue what is known about the rise in wage inequality and to iden-
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tify issues that need further attention. A convenient starting point is
the careful review of the literature by Levy and Murnane (1992).
Levy and Murnane identified several points about the rise in wage
inequality during the 1980s. Among the more significant of these are
the following:
1) For both men and women, the rise in wage inequality appears
to have been driven largely by variation in wages, not by vari
ation in the hours worked.
2) The rise in wage inequality, coupled with stagnant growth in
real median wages, has resulted in a "hollowing out" of the
middle range of the wage distribution.
3) Wage inequality between age groups and between groups with
different levels of education was stable in the 1970s and rose
sharply in the 1980s.
4) Wage inequality among workers of the same age and sex and
with the same education has risen steadily since 1970.
5) Despite the considerable attention paid to de-industrialization,
shifts of workers across industries and across occupations
account for only a small portion of the rise in wage inequality
during the 1980s.
In accounting for the rise in wage inequality overall, Levy and
Murnane emphasized the importance of increases in inequality between
and within groups stratified by skill level. Their analysis of wage
inequality between groups points to a sharp rise in the wage advan
tage of more-educated, more-experienced, and generally more-skilled
workers as the primary cause of greater inequality between groups. In
turn, they traced the rise in skill advantage to a steady rise in the
demand for skilled workers, perhaps due to technological change.
Additionally, there is the hypothesis that greater international compe
tition during the 1980s eroded the demand for less-skilled workers,
even as increased immigration added to the supply. Levy and Mur
nane concluded that such supply-and-demand explanations of rising
wage differences were generally consistent with much of the data avail
able at the time of their review.
In their review of the literature on the causes of wage inequality
within a group, however, Levy and Murnane found less convincing
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evidence in support of any one theory. While some researchers point
to increasing returns on unmeasured skills in conjunction with rising
returns on schooling as a possible explanation for rising wage inequal
ity within a group, attempts to add extra skill measures to the basic
human capital model did not strengthen the model's power. The evi
dence on widening plant-level wage differentials looks like a more
promising avenue to explore. However, Levy and Murnane concluded
their review by listing the growth of inequality within a group as an
important piece of the puzzle.
A number of studies have been published since Levy and Mur
nane's review. The sections that follow summarize the contributions
of those studies.
Returns on Skills
Almost all studies of changes in the relative wages of workers with
different levels of education or experience find evidence of increases
in the wage returns on higher labor market skills (for example, Buchinsky 1994; Card and Lemieux 1996). Differences in the returns on edu
cation have been found to play a big role in explaining international
differences in the trend toward greater wage inequality (Gottschalk and
Smeeding 1997). Wage inequality increased more in the United States
and the United Kingdom than in Holland during the 1980s. In the
United States and United Kingdom, a rising demand for workers with
more education outstripped increases in the supply and drove up the
relative wage for college-educated workers. In Holland, however,
the supply of college-educated workers rose more rapidly than did the
demand, and the college wage advantage in that country fell during
the 1980s. These different patterns of change in the market for col
lege-educated workers were significantly related to differences in
trends in wage inequality for the three countries.
Additional Skill Variables
One problem with many studies of the returns on skill is that skill
is measured solely by education and potential labor market experience.
It's clear that the range of potentially relevant skills goes well beyond
those two characteristics. This has led some labor economists to exam
ine the wage effect of additional measures of skill to see whether evi
dence exists for a general increase in returns on skill and to identify
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worker traits that might help explain why wage inequality has risen
for those with a given level of education.
Grogger and Hide (1995) examined the role of skills acquired prior
to entering college and the role of the specific skills associated with
various college majors to see the effects of each on the relative earn
ings of workers with different levels of college education. Skills
learned prior to college were measured by high school grades and by
performance on standardized tests. Data were taken from the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 and from the
High School and Beyond Survey of high school graduates in 1980.
Grogger and Hide found that mathematics ability, as measured by stan
dardized test scores prior to college entry, had a statistically signifi
cant effect on workers' earnings, especially for women, and that the
inclusion of that measure substantially eliminated any signs of an
increased return on further education for women, but not for men, in
the two high school classes. They also found that changes in the dis
tribution of men across college majors during the 1980s tended toward
highly skilled fields of study and helped to account for about 25 per
cent of the men's higher returns on additional years of college in the
1980 cohort.
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) used the same data as Grogger
and Hide to examine the effect of mathematics ability on workers'
wages six years after high school graduation. An individual's score on
the standardized mathematics test had a statistically significant positive
relationship with wages. A comparison of the classes of 1972 and 1980
showed higher returns on schooling and on mathematics skill for men.
For women, however, only the wage return on mathematics skill was
higher for the class of 1980. Both classes had similar estimated wage
returns on schooling. These two studies suggest that estimates of a ris
ing college wage advantage may partially reflect changes over time in
the composition of college students, by math ability and by major.
Constantine and Neumark (1996) added data on job training to a
basic human capital model estimated separately for 1983 and 1991 CPS
samples. As expected, more training was positively related to higher
wages. However, they reported no evidence that the wage returns ontraining were higher in 1991 than in 1983, and the inclusion of training
variables in the model had little impact on the finding that the estimated
wage returns on schooling were higher in the 1991 sample.
The results of the three studies suggest that changes in the returns
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on skills are more complex than suggested by the estimates of the
returns on schooling and potential experience found in the basic human
capital model.2 Individual cognitive skills, the skill content of the
schooling chosen, and the amount of training received are all impor
tant determinants of the wage distribution. The results of the three
studies also seem to confirm Levy and Murnane's conclusion that the
skill measures generally available in data sets like the CPS are too
broad to adequately test hypotheses about the rising demand for skilled
workers during the 1980s.

Wage Instability
A difficulty with basing inferences about the wage structure on
what workers report in earnings surveys such as the CPS is that changes
in the earnings distribution can reflect changes in the economic situa
tion of individual workers as well as changes in the wages for a given
set of jobs. The severity of the recessions of the early 1980s and the
prevalence of "downsizing," even during the economic recoveries of
the late 1980s and 1990s, suggests that increased worker turnover and
job turnover in a turbulent labor market might be an important factor
contributing to increases in measured wage inequality.
Studies by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Gittleman and Joyce
(1996) examined changes in the variance in wages over time in
matched samples of workers. They decomposed the variance into per
manent and transitory components, where the permanent component
(the variance of individual earnings averaged over a number of years)
is meant to capture changes in the wage structure. Both studies found
that the increase in wage inequality during the 1980s reflected roughly
equal increases in the variances of both the permanent and the transi
tory components of wages. In addition, Haveman and Buron (1994)
concluded that changes in the utilization of earnings capacity may have
played a more important role in accounting for increased wage inequal
ity than is commonly thought. This suggests that special care must be
taken to separate the sources of transitory wage instability from fac
tors associated with fundamental changes in the wage distribution.

International Trade
Because the rise in wage inequality in the 1980s coincided with a
period of sharp increases in the U.S. trade deficit, it is tempting to
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probe for links between the two. The examination of the effects of
trade on the domestic wage distribution has generated considerable
interest and debate. In part this reflects the anti-free-trade position of
many who blame imports for deindustrialization and the hollowing out
of the U.S. wage distribution.
Wood (1995) has been a strong proponent of the view that the
opening of trade with less-developed countries during the 1980s had
a large effect on the relative wage of skilled versus unskilled workers.
Trade with less developed countries is seen as effectively raising the
supply of less-skilled laborers in developed countries and as lowering
their relative wage. Wood's factor-content analyses of trade generated
support for that hypothesis. Several other studies have examined the
impact of trade on the wage differential favoring the skilled.
For example, Borjas and Ramey (1995) identified a positive cointegrating relationship between the college/high school wage differ
ential and the durable-goods trade deficit during the 1980s. By way
of contrast, they did not find evidence that the college wage advantage
was co-integrated with changes in the labor supply, unionization,
research and development spending, or the nondurable goods trade
deficit. Buckberg and Thomas (1996) also used the co-integration
approach to find statistical evidence for a common movement over
time in the college/high school wage differential and in changes in
employment in durable goods manufacturing. They argued that
changes in the number of jobs in that sector during the 1980s were
highly sensitive to foreign trade.3 Feenstra and Hanson (1996) found
that both outsourcing (which they defined as the purchase of imported
intermediate products) and import competition in final-goods markets
are important in explaining changes in the wages of nonproduction
workers relative to those of production workers across manufacturing
industries between 1979 and 1990.4
Two other studies on the effects of trade relied on regional data
for panel estimates of the effect on wage inequality. Borjas and Ramey
(1995) found that the fraction of local employment in trade-affected
concentrated industries was positively related to the college/high
school wage differential in a sample of over 40 metropolitan areas in
1976 and 1990. They also calculated that the drop in employment in
the subject industries during the period can explain as much as 14 per
cent of the rise in the college wage differential observed in their sam
ple. Karoly and Klerman (1994) estimated the effect of durable goods

8

Introduction

imports relative to GNP in a model explaining the variance of the log
arithm of real wages in a sample of 20 state and multistate regions
from 1973 to 1988.5 Their results, which controlled for unemploy
ment, unionization, industry structure, age distribution, and regional
fixed effects, showed that the import ratio had an important positive
relationship with the variance of wages.
However, Karoly and Klerman worried that the correlation might
be spurious because their trade measure varied only over time and the
wage variance itself had a negative trend. Indeed, the problem of bas
ing inferences of causality on the strongly trended time-series data led
Sachs and Shatz (1996, p. 239) to conclude, "There is still no con
vincing quantitative account of the role of trade in the widening wage
inequality, though theory and circumstantial evidence certainly sup
port the linkage of trade and widening inequalities."
The main argument against international trade as a major deter
minant of rising wage inequality is that the percentage of U.S. employ
ment accounted for by trade-affected manufacturing industries is too
small to matter for the economy-wide changes in the wage structure
during the 1980s (Burtless 1995). Topel (1997) pointed out that
because the drop in the relative wage of unskilled workers has not been
accompanied by a greater quantity demanded for them, factors other
than a trade-induced increase in the supply of unskilled labor must be
at work. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) undertook a careful analy
sis of the potential impact of both immigration and international trade
on the relative earnings differentials associated with differences in edu
cation. They found that trade with developed countries has had no
effect on the relative supply of unskilled workers and that the supply
effect of trade with less-developed countries is quite modest, even
given different assumptions about the domestic adjustment to trade.
Neither trade nor immigration seems to explain much about the rise
in the college wage advantage after 1980. Immigration did appear to
be significant in explaining the precipitous drop in the relative earn
ings of high school dropouts during the 1980s.
A final piece of evidence on the impact of trade on the U.S. wage
structure can be gleaned by comparing changes in wages in developed
and less-developed countries. If comparative advantage is related to
endowments of skilled and unskilled labor, factor-price equalization
should work to raise the relative wages of less-skilled workers in lessdeveloped countries while lowering those wages in developed coun-
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tries. Interestingly, an examination of labor market developments in
the United States, Canada, and Mexico after the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reveals few differences.
In particular, wage inequality trends in Mexico appear to have paral
leled those in the United States. The Commission for Labor Cooper
ation (1997) reported the following Gini coefficients for the post-tax
and post-transfer distribution of household income in Mexico: 0.43 in
1984, 0.47 in 1989, and 0.48 in 1994. Comparable figures for the
United States are 0.40 in 1984, 0.42 in 1989, and 0.43 in 1994. The
similarities add weight to Topel's (1997) contention that factor-price
equalization has not been an important feature of recent wage struc
ture changes in developed countries.

Technological Change
Some researchers have argued that we have only circumstantial evi
dence and theoretical support for arguing that technological change
affects the wage distribution (Bound 1996). The issue is compounded
by the difficulty of measuring technological change6 and by the casestudy evidence that new technology often results in the de-skilling of
the workforce (Head 1996). Many economists, however, believe that
technological change is the most logical explanation for the rise over
time in both the wage advantage for workers with more education and
skills and the relative use of skilled workers by U.S. businesses.
Some direct evidence on the issue comes from studies by Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994) and by Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenan
(1996) on the determinants of changes in the relative wages of nonproduction workers across manufacturing industries in the United
States and the United Kingdom. Both studies reported that this gross
measure of change in the skill differential was closely correlated with
technological change (as measured by changes in capital, research and
development, and computer intensity) across manufacturing industries
and over time.
Krueger (1993) provided evidence on the wage effect of computer
use on the job. He found that workers who used computers at work
enjoyed wage levels in 1984 that were 18.5 percent higher than would
have been predicted by a human capital model. Krueger also found
that the wage advantage associated with computer use rose to 20.6 per
cent by 1989. Added evidence for a positive relationship between
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computer use and the demand for more highly skilled workers came
from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997). Because much of the increase
in technology during the 1980s can be associated with the acquisition
of new computers and software by business firms, these results are
taken as evidence that technological change has added to the demand
for workers whose skills are suited to using the new technologies.
Other studies, however, question the importance of technological
change in explaining the rise in wage inequality in the 1980s. Mishel
and Bernstein (1996) examined the relationship between the skills
demanded and the technology used across industries and compared the
1980s with the 1970s. They measured the mix of skills by the share
of industry workers in fixed wage ranges and measured technological
change by the computers and other equipment per worker and the share
of scientists and engineers in the industry's workforce. Mishel and
Bernstein found that the pace of technological change slowed during
the 1980s and that, relative to the 1970s, technological change appeared
to be less adverse for the bottom half of the wage distribution and less
favorable for the highest-paid quartile in the 1980s. They also found
that the employment share of workers in the quartile just above the
median fell during the 1980s in the industries with the most rapid tech
nological change.
Along with the argument that the timing of the most rapid tech
nological change was incongruent with that of the fastest rise in wage
inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997), other evidence also con
tradicts the findings of Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994). Cappelli (1996) studied data from the 1984 EQW (National Center on the
Educational Quality of the Workforce) National Employers Survey,
which included measures of organizational technological change and
data on the intensity of capital and computer use at the establishment
level. He found that the ratio of the annual pay of production work
ers to that of supervisors was positively correlated with having a total
quality management (TQM) program, with capital intensity, with the
percentage of supervisors using computers, and with rising skill stan
dards for production jobs. As with the attempts to quantify the tradeinequality relationship, the data may not permit an examination of what
appears to be a highly complex relationship between technological
change and changes in the structure of wages.
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Skill Upgrading
As indicated, the rise in wage advantage associated with skilled
work has been accompanied by a rise in the skill mix of the U.S. work
force. Employers are hiring relatively more skilled workers today than
they did in the past, even though the labor market forces them to pay
a significantly higher wage to skilled workers, which suggests the
importance of shifts in labor demand.7 While it seems obvious that
such change in the skill mix of jobs would be related to technological
change, the evidence yields mixed results. As with the evidence on
the relationship between technology and wage inequality, the com
bined effect of a highly complex relationship between the skill mix
and technological change and limited data for measuring technologi
cal change restricts our ability to measure the impact of technological
change on skill upgrading.
For example, Howell and Wolff (1991 and 1992) and Wolff (1995)
showed that differences in the pace of skill upgrading across indus
tries were closely correlated with differences in capital intensity, com
puter use, and investment in research and development. The two stud
ies also suggest that skill upgrading was most pronounced during the
1970s and may have slowed significantly during the rise in wage
inequality in the 1980s.
Cappelli (1993, 1996) found some evidence that skill upgrading
was correlated with the adoption of new office technology and with
the introduction of total quality management and just-in-time produc
tion in manufacturing firms. However, he also found that significant
skill downgrading occurred as a result of technological change in the
computer support, office equipment, and telephone operator job cate
gories. Head (1996) also cited many examples of skill downgrading
in response to new technology, and Levy and Murnane's (1996) study
of the introduction of computers in a bank department suggested that
the changes in labor demand stemmed more from changes in the
demand for the service than from changes in the skills required.
Institutions

Another group of studies focused on the role played by trade
unions and by the minimum wage in the widening of wage inequal-
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ity. During the 1980s, the relative drop in union membership, evident
since the early 1960s, accelerated significantly. By the end of the
decade, fewer than 20 percent of U.S. workers were covered by union
contracts. Since unions have been found to have an equalizing effect
on the wage distribution, the drop in union contract coverage has been
seen as a possible cause of the widening wage gap. Indeed, Freeman
(1993) calculated that the drop in union membership might account
for as much as 40 percent of the rise in the college/high school wage
differential in the United States. Machin (1997) estimated that the
drop in union membership explained 40 percent of the 1983-1991 rise
in the variance of the logarithm of annual wages in the United King
dom. Karoly and Klerman's (1994) study of cross-state data for
1973-1988 found that falling rates of unionization led to higher vari
ance in real wages. Freeman (1996) has argued that differences in
collective bargaining institutions are the best explanation for the sharp
differences in wage inequality between countries. Since Karoly and
Klerman's study is the only one to estimate the effect of unions while
controlling for other determinants of the variance in wages, it is not
clear how robust these estimates are (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997).
In the United States, the legal minimum wage also fell consider
ably in inflation-adjusted terms during the rise in wage inequality of
the 1980s. Since the minimum wage establishes a legal floor for the
wage distribution, the drop in its real value should have led to greater
inequality, at least at the low-wage end of the distribution. Simula
tions by Horrigan and Mincy (1993) showed that keeping the real
minimum wage constant during the 1980s would have had only mod
est effects on wage inequality among men. On the other hand,
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) estimated that the drop in the
real minimum wage might account for 25 percent of the 1979-1988
rise in wage inequality among men and close to 30 percent of the rise
in wage inequality among women. DiNardo and Lemieux (1997)
noted that differences between the United States and Canada in both
the drop in union membership and the fall in the minimum wage can
account for two-thirds of the difference between those countries in the
rise in wage inequality between 1981 and 1988. The relative impor
tance of changes in unionization and in the minimum wage as deter
minants of growing wage inequality remains an important question
for further study.
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Race and Sex
The composition of the U.S. workforce by race and sex has
changed substantially over time. From 1970 to 1997, the percentage
of women in civilian employment rose from 38 percent to 46 percent,
while the percentage of non whites rose from 11 percent to 15 percent.
These changes could be expected to have augmented the rise in wage
inequality since the wage level of both the median female and the
median non white worker falls well below the median for white males.
And, to the extent that male/female and white/nonwhite wage ratios
reflect skill differences, the strong rise in returns on skills would be
expected to widen the wage gap for women and nonwhites.
In fact, those possibilities did not materialize. Schweitzer (1997)
concluded that the importance of race and sex differentials in overall
wage inequality dropped significantly from 1973 to 1991. Moreover,
the trend toward rising overall wage inequality was accompanied by
a drop in the male/female wage differential in both the United States
(Blau and Kahn 1994) and the United Kingdom (Blackaby et al. 1997).
There is also evidence of a stable racial wage differential in the United
States during the 1980s (Card and Lemieux 1994).
The change in the demographic composition of the workforce has
been accompanied by a rise in the relative experience and occupational
standing of women and nonwhites. Blau and Kahn (1994) also found
that the unexplained portion of the male/female wage differential has
diminished over time. They attributed that to the combined effect of
increased relative unmeasured skills, reduced labor market discrimi
nation, and a shift in labor demand to patterns favoring women, espe
cially those with lower skill levels. Thus the much-studied demo
graphic differences in the U.S. labor market have not proven to be
important in explaining the changes in the overall distribution of wages.
Within-Group Inequality

The increase in wage inequality in the United States and other
countries has resulted both from changes in the relative wages across
skill groups and from changes in the distribution of wages among work
ers with a given skill. In parallel with the evidence for rising wage
returns on schooling, experience, and other measured forms of worker
skill, the evidence for rising within-group inequality has been inter-
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preted by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and others as the result of
rising returns on unmeasured skills. Two recent studies looked at
changes in wage inequality for specific occupational groups.
Ferrall' s (1995) study of the rise in wage inequality among engineers
from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s found that it was largely explained
by a rise in the wage differentials associated with higher levels of super
visory responsibility within firms. The rise was further traced to a shift
in the demand, away from mid-career, middle-level engineers toward
both younger, low-wage and older, higher-wage engineers.8 This twist
in the demand for engineers by skill level (which might reflect corporate
downsizing) reveals more complexity in changing returns on skill than
that seen in the evidence for schooling or for overall experience.
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) examined the pay structure
for managers in a single firm from 1969 to 1988. They identified three
sources of inequality within that group. First, the mean real starting
salary for cohorts of new managers was sensitive to the business cycle,
falling markedly from 1974 to 1976, from 1979 to 1980, and from
1981 to 1982. This is important because differences in the mean
salaries of different cohorts were highly correlated with differences in
starting salaries. Second, individual real-wage levels within each
cohort diverged significantly with tenure, reflecting rapid real-wage
increases for high performance and promotions and the lack of realwage protection for poor performers. Third, they noted that wage vari
ances within all cohorts began to rise at a faster rate after 1980.
These papers illustrate how changing wage relationships within
groups of homogenous workers can give rise to rising wage inequal
ity. They also support the findings of Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)
and Groshen (199la, 1991b) that changes in the wage distribution
within plants and firms can account for a substantial portion of changes
in the wage structure for all workers.

THE SAMPLE OF LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
Our approach to the study of changes in wage inequality in local
labor markets, much like the study by Karoly and Klerman (1994)
already discussed, uses data for a panel of local labor markets tracked
from 1974 to 1991. Substantial changes in the boundaries for an urban
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area often make it difficult to compare data over time. For that rea
son, the primary criterion used to select the areas for the sample was
that the Area Wage Survey (AWS) boundaries be substantially unal
tered for the period under study. The sample is also restricted to large
urban areas because these had more extensive occupational coverage
in the AWS and are more frequently included in other data sources,
such as the Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
than are smaller metropolitan areas.
Using these criteria, there are 20 large urban labor markets in the
sample. These include the following 13 urban areas which had
unchanged AWS boundaries: Anaheim, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleve
land, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Miami, Milwaukee, Nassau-Suffolk,
Philadelphia, San Diego, San Jose, and Seattle. The sample also
includes five metropolitan labor markets which added one or more
counties during the period studied but where the added counties
accounted for 5 percent or less of the area's population in 1990. These
are Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, Minneapolis, and St. Louis. Finally,
the sample includes Houston and New York, even though their AWS
boundaries were altered by the deletion of one county during the
period. In each case, the population of the deleted county amounted
to less than 10 percent of the area's 1990 population. The 20 areas
then constitute the inter-urban, cross-section part of the data panel.
The time-series part of the panel reflects the fact that the AWS pro
gram consisted of two different employer surveys. About every third
or fourth year, employers were visited by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis
tics field agents who collected information on benefits and union con
tract coverage along with detailed occupational wage data. In the years
between those employer visits, the Bureau used telephone and mail sur
veys to collect just the wage information. Since the interest here is in
gradual structural changes, and since benefit and unionization data are
of interest, the panel data set includes data only for the years in which
Bureau field agents visited employers. The analysis begins with 1974,
because a number of changes in the AWS methodology began in 1973,
and it ends in 1991, because in that year the substantially altered Occu
pational Compensation Survey supplanted the Area Wage Survey.
Table 1.1 lists the years in the time series for each of the 20 metropoli
tan labor markets. The unbalanced panel that results has 111 observa
tions, with data from each year from 1974 to 1991 across the 20 metro
politan labor markets. (See Appendix A for details.)

16 Introduction

Table 1.1 Metropolitan Areas and Survey Years in the Panel
Data Set

Metropolitan area
Anaheim
Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Houston
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nassau-Suffolk
New York
Philadelphia
St. Louis
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle

Years
1975
1975
1975
1974
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1974
1975
1974

1978
1978
1978
1977
1977
1977
1976
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1977
1978
1977

1981
1981
1981
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1980
1981
1979

1984
1984
1984
1983
1982
1983
1982
1983
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
1983
1984
1982

1988
1987
1987
1986
1985
1986
1985
1986
1988
1986
1987
1987
1987
1987
1989
1988
1989
1986
1988
1985

1991
1991
1989
1990
1989
1990
1989
1990
1991
1991

1989
1988

The local labor markets in the sample are fairly well dispersed
around the country. Three areas are in the Northeast census division,
eight are in the Midwest division, four are in the South, and five in
the West. The 20 areas in the sample are also fairly well dispersed in
terms of the economic performance of their manufacturing sectors dur
ing the 1980s. A recent study by Noponen, Markusen, and Driessen
(1997) provides a shift-share analysis of changes in employment in
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1978 to 1986 and
gives measures of the sensitivity of the local mix of manufacturing to
exports, imports, and productivity growth. Their cluster analysis of
the data led them to a fourfold classification of metropolitan areas.
They identify "trade winners" as MSAs with a manufacturing mix that
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generated strong performance in domestic and export markets and saw
high growth in productivity. The trade winners included Anaheim,
Minneapolis, Nassau-Suffolk, San Diego, and San Jose, all in the sam
ple of local labor markets.
Four areas in the sample fall into Noponen, Markusen, and
Driessen's "trade loser" category, areas where the manufacturing mix
exhibited weak domestic and export performance. The four areas are
Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, and Milwaukee. Five areas from the sam
ple—Indianapolis, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and Seattle—
are included in the strong domestic market category of their study.
The remaining areas in the sample—Atlanta, Chicago, Cincinnati,
Miami, and St. Louis—are identified as MSAs having import-resistant
industry mixes. The sample of 20 local labor markets is evenly spread
among their four categories of metropolitan area manufacturing per
formance. The categories are not, however, closely related to the cen
sus divisions for the areas in our sample. One can find Rust-Belt and
Sun-Belt areas in each of their four clusters.

THE AREA WAGE SURVEY DATA
The AWS program began in the late 1940s and collected infor
mation on wages and benefits for jobs common to a wide range of
industries where local economic conditions were important determi
nants of pay.9 Over the years, the AWS expanded to cover more job
titles and more places. In 1991, it was replaced by the Occupational
Compensation Survey. The AWS covered firms in six private-sector
industries: 1) manufacturing, 2) transportation, communication and
public utilities, 3) wholesale trade, 4) retail trade, 5) finance, insur
ance, and real estate, and 6) services. Small firms, generally those with
fewer than 50 employees, were excluded from the surveys. The site
visits sampled firms by industry and by number of employees. In
reports of combined data, firms were weighted according to their prob
ability of selection in order to generate unbiased estimates.
The job titles included in the AWS were grouped into four occu
pations: 1) office-clerical workers, 2) professional and technical
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employees, 3) maintenance, toolroom, and power-plant workers, and
4) material movement and custodial workers. For brevity, this study
refers to the four occupational groups as the office-clerical, profes
sional-technical, skilled maintenance, and material movement groups.
Table 1.2 lists the job titles included in each occupational group.
Although workers in just 41 job titles are included in the data for the
study, those job titles represent a substantial portion of the total
employment in firms surveyed in the AWS. For example, in the
December 1989 Area Wage Survey for Los Angeles, the total number
of workers in those job titles was 172,096. That represented almost

Table 1.2 Job Titles for the Four Area Wage Survey
Occupation Groups
Office-Clerical

Skilled Maintenance

Secretary
Stenographer
Typist
Word processor
Key entry operator
Accounting clerk
Payroll clerk
File clerk
Messenger
Receptionist
Switchboard operator

Carpenter
Electrician
Painter
Machinist
Maintenance mechanic
Pipefitter
Millwright
Motor vehicle mechanic
General maintenance worker
Machine-tool operator
Tool and die maker
Stationary engineer

Professional-Technical

Material Movement

Computer systems analyst
Computer programmer
Computer operator
Drafter
Electronics technician
Registered industrial nurse

Truck driver
Shipper and receiver
Warehouseman
Order filler
Shipping packer
Material handling laborer
Forklift operator
Guard
Janitor
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one-third of Los Angeles' 521,813 workers, which included execu
tives, managers, full-time production and office workers, and seasonal
and part-time workers employed in the surveyed establishments. There
is also evidence that wages for those jobs are representative of wages
in closely related jobs that were not covered by the AWS (Special
Reports Group 1975).
The AWS allocated job titles through a uniform set of job descrip
tions designed to account for inter-firm differences in duties. The AWS
also collected wage data for full-time workers who worked a regular
weekly schedule. The data excluded overtime pay; weekend, holiday,
and late-shift premiums; and bonuses and lump-sum payments. It
reported regular straight-time weekly salaries and standard workweek
hours for the office-clerical and professional-technical groups, so it is
possible to estimate hourly wage rates for workers in those jobs.
The AWS data offer some advantages for studying changes in the
wage structure in local labor markets. One important advantage is that
the AWS collected data on-site on the wages for full-time workers in
specific jobs. Thus there is less need for concern about the potential
impact of job turnover or of errors in worker-reported earnings
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994). A second advantage is that the AWS
data covered large numbers of workers drawn from stratified samples
representative of medium and large firms in specific industries in each
locality. While the CPS could be used to construct local-area samples,
its sample sizes for each area are small, and the survey itself is designed
to be nationally, not locally, representative.
The main disadvantage of the AWS data is that it did not include
information on workers' personal characteristics or on the character
istics of their employers. While the AWS data precludes estimating a
human capital model, there is a growing recognition that job-related
wage determinants, such as the occupation or the size of the firm, add
substantially to the usefulness of the human capital model (Groshen
1996). The sample here uses job-skill requirements from the Dictio
nary of Occupational Titles to examine the effects of skill on wages.
Groshen (1996) noted that since the AWS program covered workers
in jobs common to a wide variety of employers, the AWS wage data
may be less affected by employer-specific wage determinants than
would be the case for jobs that are found only in a limited range of
firms and industries.
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THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK
Chapters 2 and 3 present a descriptive analysis of changes over
time in the structure of wages in the panel of 20 metropolitan labor
markets. Chapter 2 concentrates on trends in the variance of the log
arithm of real hourly wage rates and on trends in the real wage dif
ferentials between the 75th and 50th percentiles and the 50th and 25th
percentiles of the wage distribution. In general, Chapter 2 concludes
that changes in the local wage structure over time follow patterns sim
ilar to those found in earlier studies of national data. Chapter 3 looks
at trends in the availability of benefits (for example, health insurance
and pensions) and at the extent of union contract coverage across the
20 labor markets over time. Changes in benefit coverage were not as
extensive as changes in wage rates and appear to have been closely
related to union contract coverage.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine determinants of the level and distribu
tion of wages. Chapter 4 tests the hypothesis that returns on skills rose
during the 1980s. It uses regressions for the average real hourly wages
for specific job titles and for the measures of skills required for those
jobs, comparing results for the late 1970s with those for the late 1980s.
While evidence exists for a general rise in returns on skills, the results
vary considerably for training, job level, cognitive skills, and machinerelated skills. Chapter 5 examines the role of labor market forces,
union contract coverage, and the real minimum wage in explaining the
changes in wage structure. The results suggest that changes in wage
inequality both between and within occupational groups were closely
related to all three variables. The study ends with a summary chapter
that examines some policy implications of the research.

Notes
1. Throughout this text, wage inequality means the degree to which hourly wage
rates are unequally distributed among individual workers. Wage dispersion is a
synonym for wage inequality. Wage structure refers to the way hourly wages
vary among workers due to their occupation, industry, skill level, etc. Changes
in the wage structure are an important cause of increased wage inequality.
2. Cognitive skills reflect a person's ability in language, mathematics, reasoning,
and problem solving. While cognitive skills are related to years of schooling,
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they also vary considerably among individuals having a given level of educa
tional attainment.
However, an interesting analysis by McConnell and Quiros (1998) reported a sta
tistically significant reduction in the volatility of U.S. real GDP growth after 1984.
They traced this to a reduced volatility in the production of durable consumer
goods associated with a decline in the inventory ratio in the industry.
Bernard and Jensen (1997) also found that changes in the relative wages and
employment of nonproduction workers in U.S. manufacturing were affected by
trade. In their study, however, export sales rather than import competition proved
to be important.
Throughout this book, the use of the term logarithm refers to natural logarithms.
While it might be expected that the labor market effects of trade are easier to
measure than those related to technological change, considerable debate has
emerged over the relevance of factor-content versus relative prices as a tradeimpact variable and over the appropriate method of calculating the factor-con
tent of trade. See Burtless (1995) and Wood (1995).
Gregg and Manning (1997) emphasized that in the long run the skill-supply
response determines relative wages and employment. While the skill supply
depends in part on incentives for workers investing in new skills, they argue that
such decisions are also very responsive to public policy.
This pattern was also found by Gittleman and Howell (1995) in their study of
shifts in employment across job clusters that were closely linked to skill require
ments.
The description of the AWS survey program and its methods is based on Scofea
(1986), Hotchkiss (1990), and Barkume (1996), and on the Scope and Method
of Survey Appendix to the published AWS Reports. See also the BLS Measures
of Compensation (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1986).

2 Trends in the Urban
Wage Structure
In this chapter, I use data drawn from Area Wage Surveys to
describe changes in the structure of wages in the sample of 20 urban
labor markets from 1974 to 1991. I examine the wage structure in
terms of the central tendency and degree of inequality in the local dis
tribution of real hourly wages. Data on the median real hourly wage,
the variance of the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage, and the
difference between the logarithm of the real hourly wage at the 75th,
50th, and 25th percentiles of the wage distribution are used to describe
changes in the wage structure. Before considering the extent to which
changes in local wage structures can be contrasted with the national
data discussed in Chapter 1, this chapter examines data on changes in
the occupational mix of employment.

EMPLOYMENT TRENDS

Table 2.1 presents data on the total number of workers in the firms
surveyed and on the distribution of workers among the four occupa
tional groups for the initial and final years for each metropolitan area in
the sample. Local labor markets are arranged in Table 2.1 by census
division to facilitate regional comparisons. The first point to note about
the data in Table 2.1 is that the sample sizes are relatively large. The
smallest is the 16,107 workers covered by the 1974 AWS in San Diego.
A comparison of the samples for the initial and final years for each
area reveals definite regional patterns. Between the mid 1970s and the
end of the 1980s, 9 of the 11 areas in the Northeast and Midwest divi
sions showed a drop in the number of workers in firms covered by the
AWS. Only Nassau-Suffolk and Indianapolis showed an increase in
the number of workers covered. In contrast, with the exception of Bal
timore, all areas in the South and West divisions showed an increase
in the number of workers in firms surveyed by the AWS. The extent
to which the changes represent changes in the sample design rather
23

Table 2.1

Sample Size and Occupational Distribution Changes
Share of sample (%)

Metropolitan
area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975
1987
1975
New York
1989
1976
Philadelphia
1988
Midwest
1974
Chicago
1986
1974
Cincinnati
1989
1974
Cleveland
1990
1976
Detroit
1989
1975
Indianapolis
1988
1975
Milwaukee
1991
1975
Minneapolis
1991

Sample
size

Officeclerical

Professionaltechnical

Skilled
maintenance

Material
movement

28,607
42,505
251,489
165,257
110,119
98,604

39.9
34.3
46.5
33.8
33.9
27.7

12.2
18.0
8.0
10.2
9.4
16.0

7.8
6.2
4.1
5.7
15.7
12.0

40.1
41.5
41.3
50.3
41.0
44.2

255,074
168,360
41,057
31,980
61,526
34,295
129,888
93,524
34,979
29,764
39,699
39,883
70,221
51,329

34.0
31.9
31.4
27.6
31.2
25.1
23.9
19.9
31.7
29.3
31.1
23.2
35.1
32.6

7.5
13.4
6.0
14.2
8.4
16.5
9.0
16.5
7.2
15.1
9.7
17.8
11.0
21.7

13.2
13.4
13.4
18.0
19.0
20.4
24.0
23.5
16.8
17.0
17.8
15.6
8.6
8.6

45.3
41.2
49.1
40.2
4.4
37.9
43.0
40.1
44.3
38.5
41.4
43.4
45.3
37.0

St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
Houston
Miami
West
Anaheim
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle

1976
1989

70,564
60,821

32.0
28.9

6.9
14.1

18.4
16.9

42.7
40.0

1975
1991
1975
1991
1974
1990
1975
1990

54,741
65,161
55,645
40,034
63,133
66,807
31,215
36,715

37.7
28.1
26.8
22.3
31.8
25.7
35.1
33.6

7.9
17.4
8.7
13.5
8.6
13.9
6.9
10.3

7.9
7.0
12.4
8.8
12.8
9.8
5.5
6.8

46.6
47.5
52.0
55.2
46.7
50.6
52.5
49.3

1975
1988
1975
1989
1974
1989
1975
1988
1974
1988

26,735
39,865
162,823
172,096
16,107
29,630
22,539
38,573
26,243
32,004

38.0
37.7
40.1
30.5
41.7
30.0
35.5
33.2
41.7
32.7

13.9
16.8
9.4
10.8
19.4
15.4
22.5
27.0
12.9
17.0

7.8
7.9
8.5
7.8
7.4
6.0
11.4
3.3
10.0
8.0

40.3
37.5
42.0
50.8
31.5

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Area Wage Surveys.

48.6
30.5
36.5
35.4
42.2
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than changes in the number of jobs cannot be determined, but the pat
terns are consistent with the shift in economic activity from the older,
industrial Northeast toward the Southwest during the period.
While there is considerable variation among localities in the occu
pational distribution of employment, in all cases the samples are more
heavily weighted toward job titles in the office-clerical and material
movement groups. Changes in the distribution generally match the con
clusion, summarized in Chapter 1, that employers have shifted toward
hiring more educated workers. That shift is clearly seen in the data for
office-clerical and professional-technical jobs. In all 20 local labor mar
kets, the percentage of workers in office-clerical jobs dropped over time,
while in 19 of the 20, the percentage in professional-technical jobs rose.
In Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, St. Louis, and Atlanta, the per
centage in the mainly computer-oriented professional-technical jobs
more than doubled. The five western metropolitan areas generally expe
rienced the smallest shift toward professional-technical jobs.
Changes in the blue-collar mix were more complex than those for
office-clerical and professional-technical workers. While the evidence
shows a pronounced relative increase over time in the employment of
skilled white-collar technical workers, the percentage of skilled main
tenance workers fell in 12 areas, rose in 7, and remained unchanged
in Minneapolis. Four of the seven areas that registered an increase in
the percentage of skilled maintenance workers were in the Midwest,
and the greatest drops were in the South and West.
The changes in the relative importance of material movement work
ers in AWS-surveyed firms varied widely across the four census divi
sions. The percentage employed in these jobs rose in the three areas in
the Northeast, fell in seven of the eight areas in the Midwest, and rose in
three of the four areas in the South and four of the five in the West. Job
growth appears to have led to a relative increase in less-skilled blue-col
lar jobs relative to skilled maintenance jobs. The opposite shift appears
to be the case for local labor markets where employment fell in estab
lishments covered by the AWS.
MEDIAN REAL WAGE TRENDS
This study now turns to the trends in the median real hourly wage
for workers in the 41 occupations in each of the 20 metropolitan areas.
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Hourly wages for workers in the clerical and technical groups are com
puted by dividing the weekly wages by the weighted average of the
usual weekly hours worked across the job titles for each occupation.
Hourly wages are also deflated by the local consumer price index. 1
Because of the mix of occupations in the study, the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) is used.
Because there is no local CPI-W for Indianapolis, real hourly wages
for that area are calculated by using the CPI-W for the North Central
region, and because the Miami CPI-W begins in 1978, the CPI-W for
the South is used to determine real wages in Miami for 1975. In all
cases, the CPI-W for the month or semiannual period closest to the
AWS survey month is used to deflate the wage data.
Table 2.2 presents data for the median real hourly wage for work
ers in the 20 local labor markets in the sample, grouped alphabetically
by census division. For comparison, Table 2.2 also presents national
data, drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS), for the real
median hourly wages and salaries for all wage and salary workers.
The data from the CPS for 1975 to 1989 is taken from Karoly (1993).
The CPS real median wage follows a generally pro-cyclical pat
tern: rising by 1.2 percent from 1975 to 1978, falling by 4.05 percent
during the recession of 1978 to 1982, and rising by 5.4 percent from
1982 to 1989. The rather slight 1.2 percent rate of increase in median
real wages (as measured by the CPS) over the decade and a half after
1975 would appear to result from the significant drop in real wages
during the severe recessions of the early 1980s, recessions which
interrupted a span of rising real wages. Given the considerable effort
by labor economists to measure the cyclical behavior of the aggregate
real wage, it is of considerable note that a glance at the data is enough
to suggest a distinctly pro-cyclical pattern, albeit one that is of mark
edly lower frequency in the time series than the typical business cycle
indicators.
The generally pro-cyclical pattern—rising real wages in the late
1970s, falling real wages during the 1980 and 1981-1982 recessions,
and rising real wages in the recovery—can also be seen in the AWS
data for several local labor markets in the sample, even though the
periodic nature of the local time-series data obscures annual wage
changes. Almost all areas show a significant drop in the real median
wage during the early 1980s. Only Seattle and Cincinnati, where the
real median wage fell from 1977 to 1979 but rose from 1979 to 1982,

Table 2.2 Median Real Hourly Wage Rates, All Workers ($)
Metropolitan area
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk
New York
Philadelphia
Midwest
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
Houston
Miami
West
Anaheim
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle
U.S.A. (CPS data)

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

11.34

7.97

9.48

7.58

11.53

8.15
8.55

8.54
8.28

7.41
7.39

6.84

8.75

9.30

10.00
6.88

9.16
6.89

6.92

7.77

9.09
6.86

6.76

6.66

9.19
6.64

6.68

8.30
11.76
8.19
8.43
8.60

8.25
8.54
8.44
7.36
6.81

7.50
6.86

6.76
5.77

7.85
6.09
8.22
8.43

8.99
7.63

7.16

9.32
6.66

1991

8.95

8.56

8.03
8.46

1990

8.30

11.73

6.35

1989

7.91

8.65

7.67

7.05

8.85

1988

7.16
8.27
7.95

6.99
7.38

7.31

1987

8.98

8.19
7.02
7.87

1986

8.70
8.58
8.61

8.18
8.66
7.94

6.65

1985

8.60

8.39

8.51

6.80

9.54

7.10

8.39

6.25

8.70

1984

8.11

8.99

7.20
8.53

7.53

1983

7.71

11.90
8.70
9.83
9.07

1982

6.89
7.75
8.41

9.13
8.96
9.36

7.46
7.61

1981

8.13

8.65

8.42
9.50
8.96

1980

7.16
8.48

7.41
7.98
8.66
8.43
9.25

1979

9.32
6.70

6.95

6.90

9.27
9.16
6.99

6.98

Wage Surveys, author's calculations.
SOURCE: The national data are from the Current Population Survey, reported by Karoly (1993). Local area data are from the Area
See Appendix B for details on estimation techniques.
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fail to follow the pattern. A look at the 11 areas with AWS data for
1978 and 1981 shows a negative rate of change in the real median
wage between those two years for every area, a rate ranging from -4.6
percent for Nassau-Suffolk to -12.4 percent for Minneapolis. The
recession-caused drop in real wages was not limited to the Rust Belt.
Real median wages fell by 3.6 percent in Houston from 1977 to 1980,
by 7.7 percent in Anaheim from 1978 to 1981, by 2.9 percent in Atlanta
from 1977 to 1984, and by 6 percent in Miami from 1978 to 1981.
Thus, both national (CPS) and local (AWS) data point to the reces
sions of the early 1980s as playing a very significant role in the changes
in the real median wage since 1974.
Unlike the pattern in the CPS real median wage, the local (AWS)
real median wage generally did not rise enough during the recovery
of 1984 to 1989 to offset the effects of the recession of the 1980s.
Every area but Anaheim, Chicago, Detroit, and New York saw lower
real median wages at the end of the 1980s than in the mid 1970s. In
Baltimore and Milwaukee, real median wages fell throughout the
1980s, even during the long expansion that began in 1984.
Evidence for a pro-cyclical movement in real median wages also
appears in the eight labor markets with AWS data for 1990 or 1991.
Real median wages fell from 1986 to 1990 in Cleveland, Houston, and
San Diego, and from 1987 to 1990 or 1991 in Atlanta, Baltimore, Mil
waukee, and Minneapolis. The 1990-1991 recession, exacerbated in
Houston by a major decline in the oil industry after 1986, appears to
have lowered median real wages for workers in the sample for those
eight labor markets in a fashion similar to the downturns of 1980 and
1981-1982.

TRENDS IN WAGE INEQUALITY

While there are many metrics used to assess the characteristics of
the distribution of wages, this study follows the recent literature and
focuses on two. The variance of the logarithm of real hourly wages
is used to measure the overall degree of wage inequality in each area
and year in the sample. This study also looks at the extent to which
changes in the wage inequality reflect differences in the relative wages
between workers at the upper and lower reaches of that distribution.
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It uses the differences between the logarithm of the real hourly wage
of workers at the 75th and 50th percentiles and at the 50th and 25th
percentiles in the analysis.
Table 2.3 presents data on the variance of the logarithm of the real
hourly wage for each city/year observation. Unlike the patterns noted
in the data for the median real wage, the variances reported in Table
2.3 show a steady rise for each local labor market. The only excep
tion to that pattern is a slight drop for several areas at the end of the
time series.
The increase in wage inequality is quite substantial. The mean of
the annual rate of increase in the variance is 3.4 percent across the 20
areas. The annual rate of change in the variance, calculated from the
initial to the final available year, is 4 percent or higher for Cleveland,
Houston, Seattle, New York, San Jose, San Diego, Detroit, and
St. Louis. As measured by the annual rate of change, the variance
increased the least in Anaheim, Baltimore, and Nassau-Suffolk. While
individual areas show obvious differences in the change in the variance,
no broad regional patterns appear in the data of Table 2.3.
The variances based on the AWS data for workers in the 41 occu
pations in the sample are comparable, in magnitude and trend, to
national data on workers in all occupations drawn from the Current Pop
ulation Survey. Karoly and Klerman (1994) calculated the variance in
the logarithm of the real wage for male workers from the May outgo
ing-rotation groups in the CPS. Their estimated variances for the nation
and for ten of the most populous states (which include many of the areas
in this study's sample) for 1973 and 1989 are shown in Table 2.4
Real hourly wages in this study's sample of local labor markets
are slightly less dispersed about the mean than in the national and state
data shown above. This undoubtedly reflects the much narrower range
of occupations in the local data and also reflects the assumption that
all workers are at the midpoint of reported wage cells in the AWS.
Between 1973 and 1988, the annual rate of increase in the variance
was 2.5 percent for the United States and averaged 3.11 percent for
the 10 states. The latter rate falls just below the 3.4 percent average
for the annual rate of change across the 20 areas studied here. The
rise in the 1980s variance of the logarithm of real wages shown in
Table 2.3 does not appear to be particular to the AWS data, but rather
seems to parallel the findings from broader national samples.

Table 2.3

The Variance of the Logarithm of Real Hourly Wage Rates, All Workers

Metropolitan
area

1974

Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk
New York
Philadelphia
Midwest
0.0975
Chicago
0.1205
Cincinnati
0.1163
Cleveland
Detroit
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
0.1562
Houston
Miami
West
Anaheim
Los Angeles
0.1104
San Diego
San Jose
0.0943
Seattle

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

0.1289
0.1238

0.1347
0.1342

0.1256
0.1368

0.1499
0.1486

0.1148
0.1488

0.2370

0.3113
0.1821

0.2008
0.1571
0.1808
0.2001

0.1893
0.2248

0.1251
0.1504

0.2003
0.2024

0.1856
0.2493

0.1924

0.1508

0.1907
0.1601

0.2205
0.1596

0.1230

0.2165

0.1881
0.1397

0.1142

0.2379

0.2365
0.1636

0.1904
0.2336

0.1300

0.1270

3.4
4.5
3.8

0.1993

0.2341

0.1233

0.0899

1991

0.1889
0.1880

0.1848

0.1700

0.1755

1990

0.1787

0.2104
0.1897
0.1348

0.1817
0.2126

1989

0.1649

0.1702

0.1883
0.1597
0.1432

0.1717
0.1784

0.1249
0.1584

1988

0.1550

0.1508

0.1631

0.1356

1987

0.1965
0.1472

0.1451
0.1731
0.1450
0.1331

1986

0.1411

0.1449

0.1005

0.1535
0.1229
0.1167

1985

0.1716
0.1825

0.1734

0.1464

0.1152

1984
0.1641

0.1330

0.1157
0.1433
0.1409

1983

0.1875

0.1544

0.1143

1982

0.1541
0.1299

0.1334
0.1089

0.1076
0.0895

1981

0.1676

0.152
0.1718

Annual
rate of
change (%)

3.9
3.0
4.5
4.3
2.7
2.8
2.0
4.1
3.0
1.5
4.4
2.6
1.5
2.6
4.0
4.1
4.4

SOURCE: Authors' calculations from the Area Wage Surveys. See Appendix B for details. The annual rate of change is calculated for the initial to the final year for each
metropolitan area.
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Table 2.4 Variance in ln(Real Wage) for Males
Location

1973

1989

United States
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
Florida
Texas
California

0.199
0.176
0.164
0.145
0.152
0.164
0.164
0.152
0.202
0.257
0.194

0.288
0.289
0.261
0.250
0.244
0.279
0.268
0.264
0.273
0.328
0.324

SOURCE: Karoly and Klerman (1994).

Table 2.5 presents data on trends in differences in the logarithm
of the real hourly wage between workers at the 75th and 50th (75-50)
percentiles and at the 50th and 25th (50-25) percentiles of the wage
distribution for each city. For ease of presentation, Table 2.5 includes
only data for the initial and final year for each area. For comparison,
the last row of the table also includes the 1975 and 1989 75-50 and
50-25 wage gaps for all wage and salary workers in the national CPS
data in Karoly (1993).
The indication from Table 2.5 is again one of a general widening
of the wage gap in each labor market under study. The real wage gap
between workers at the upper quartile and the median (the 75-50 dif
ferential) rose in 16 of the 20 areas. It is noteworthy that among the
five areas without an increase in the 75-50 differential are the con
tiguous east coast MSAs of New York and Nassau-Suffolk and the
contiguous west coast MSAs of Los Angeles and Anaheim. Relative
wage trends in the local labor markets for highly paid workers in these
very large conurbations appear to have been substantially different than
those in most other areas and the country as a whole. However, the
entries for the initial and final years in Table 2.5 for New York, Nas
sau-Suffolk, Los Angeles, Anaheim, and Minneapolis obscure the fact
that the 75-50 wage differential in these areas first rose and then fell
during the intervening years. There does not appear to be a distinct

Table 2.5 Percentile Wage Differentials, All Workers
50-25 Differential

75-50 Differential
Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988
National (CPS data) 1975/1989

Initial year

Final year

Annual rate
of change (%)

0
-0.79
0.57

0.22
0.16
0.27

0.26
0.32
0.37

1.29
5.07
2.66

0.30
0.27
0.38
0.20
0.41
0.33
0.27
0.33

0.57
1.07
2.91
1.60
1.92
1.50
-0.23
3.17

0.20
0.25
0.28
0.28
0.33
0.28
0.26
0.35

0.31
0.33
0.41
0.49
0.35
0.40
0.33
0.43

3.71
1.87
2.41
4.07
0.45
2.25
1.50
1.60

0.28
0.32
0.31
0.24

0.36
0.38
0.46
0.30

1.58
1.08
2.49
1.50

0.22
0.33
0.30
0.24

0.33
0.37
0.62
0.27

2.56
0.72
4.64
0.78

0.29
0.25
0.21
0.21
0.25
0.41

0.26
0.25
0.35
0.26
0.35
0.45

-0.84
0
3.46
1.66
2.43
0.67

0.21
0.30
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.45

0.27
0.40
0.45
0.27
0.31
0.48

1.95
2.08
4.27
0.91
0.99
0.46

Initial year

Final year

0.26
0.19
0.28

0.26
0.17
0.30

0.28
0.23
0.24
0.16
0.32
0.26
0.28
0.22

Annual rate
of change (%)

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Area Wage Surveys. National data are from Karoly (1993). The differentials
measure the difference between the ln(real wage) at the 75th (50th) percentile minus the ln(real wage) at the 50th (25th)
percentile.
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regional pattern among those areas showing increases in the 75-50
wage gap. Large increases are seen for Cleveland and St. Louis in the
Midwest, Houston in the South, and San Diego and Seattle in the West.
Table 2.5 also points to a substantial deterioration in the relative
wage of workers in the lower quartile of the wage distribution. The
50-25 wage differential increased in all 20 urban areas and doubled in
New York and Houston. In 13 areas, the increases in the 50-25 gap
exceeded the rise in the 75-50 gap, suggesting that the rise in wage
inequality in many areas was due more to a relative decrease at the low
est quartile than to a rise at the highest. That conclusion applies partic
ularly to New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Anaheim,
and Los Angeles. For Indianapolis, Seattle, and St. Louis, on the other
hand, the rise in the 75-50 differential greatly exceeded the increase in
the 50-25 differential. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Baltimore, San Diego,
and San Jose showed a fairly symmetrical rise in inequality, with both
wage gaps rising by approximately equal amounts. Symmetry is also
seen in the national CPS data, although the increases in the local wage
gaps are much larger than those in the CPS series.

VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
A useful feature of the variance of the logarithm of the real wage
as a measure of wage dispersion is the relative ease with which the
variance can be decomposed into the variance within and the variance
between groups. As shown in the following formula (Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce 1993), the overall variance in each year can be partitioned
into the weighted average of the wage variance within each group and
into the weighted average of the group relative wage differential:
Eq. 2.1

a' =

, oJ +
i

ft (Wit - Wf
i

where p.( is the fraction of workers in group / for time period t, and
Wit is the logarithm of the average wage of workers in group / for
time t. Substantial evidence, summarized in Chapter 1, suggests that
much of the rise in wage inequality took place within specific groups.
In this study, the natural decomposition runs along the lines of the four
major occupational groups in the AWS. In the variance decomposi-
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Table 2.6 Variance Decomposition for All Occupational Groups
Within- AWithingroup/
group
Between- Within- (%of AOverall
group overall)
(%)
Overall
group
Variance

Metropolitan
area/years
Northeast
NassauSuffolk
New York
Philadelphia
Midwest
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
Houston
Miami

1975
1987
1975
1989
1976
1988

0.1076
0.1411
0.0895
0.1649
0.1143
0.1787

0.0262
0.0462
0.0206
0.0456
0.0306
0.0491

0.0814
0.0949
0.0689
0.1192
0.0837
0.1296

75.7
67.3
77.0
72.3
73.2
72.5

40.3

1974
1986
1974
1989
1974
1990
1976
1989
1975
1988
1975
1991
1975
1991
1976
1989

0.0975
0.1550
0.1205
0.1889
0.1163
0.2379
0.1152
0.1993
0.1535
0.2165
0.1229
0.1907
0.1167
0.1601
0.1356
0.2370

0.0287
0.0441
0.0268
0.0616
0.0391
0.1115
0.0412
0.0650
0.0455
0.0687
0.0404
0.0645
0.0382
0.0613
0.0377
0.0754

0.0688
0.1109
0.0937
0.1273
0.0772
0.1263
0.0741
0.1342
0.1079
0.1478
0.0825
0.1262
0.0784
0.0988
0.0978
0.1616

70.5
71.5
77.8
67.4
66.4
53.1
64.3
67.4
70.3
68.3
67.1
66.2
67.2
61.7
72.2
68.2

73.3

1975
1991
1975
1991
1974
1990
1975
1990

0.1249
0.2003
0.1584
0.2024
0.1562
0.3113
0.1233
0.1821

0.0258
0.0817
0.0371
0.0771
0.0550
0.1749
0.0304
0.0800

0.0991
0.1185
0.1212
0.1253
0.1012
0.1364
0.0929
0.1020

79.3
59.2
76.5
61.9
64.8
43.8
75.4
56.0

66.7
71.3

49.1
40.4
71.6
63.3
64.2
46.8
62.8
25.8
9.2
22.7
15.4
(continued)
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Table 2.6

(continued)
Within- AWithingroup
group/
Between- Within- (%of AOverall
Overall
(%)
group
group overall)
Variance

Metropolitan
area/years
West
Anaheim
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle

1975
1988
1975
1988
1974
1989
1975
1988
1974
1988

0.1289
0.1885
0.1238
0.1808
0.1104
0.2001
0.0899
0.1520
0.0943
0.1719

0.0249
0.0758
0.0260
0.0529
0.0312
0.0750
0.0301
0.0549
0.0398
0.0430

0.1040
0.1127
0.0978
0.1280
0.0792
0.1251
0.0598
0.0970
0.0545
0.1289

80.7
59.8
79.0
70.8
71.7
62.5
66.5
56.7
57.8
75.0

14.5
57.1
51.2
60.0
95.9

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Area Wage Surveys. See the text for details.

tion in Table 2.6, the variance of the ln(real wage) is divided into the
weighted average of the variance within the office-clerical, profes
sional-technical, skilled maintenance, and material movement groups
and into the weighted average of the relative wage between these
groups. Table 2.6 also focuses on the data for the initial and final years
for each area.
In general, the data in Table 2.6 are consistent with the results of
earlier studies. The variance within occupational groups accounts for
about two-thirds to three-quarters of the overall variance for most areas
for the initial and final years. (The main exception is Houston, in 1990,
where wage variance between occupations is slightly greater than the
variance within occupations.) The indication is that the overall wage
inequality for a given period primarily reflects the variance in wages
within the groups, not variance in average wage levels between groups.
A look at the change in the overall variance in the log of the real
wage from the mid 1970s to late 1980s, however, shows a different pic
ture for a number of local labor markets in the sample. Clearly, changes
both within and between groups occurred during that period. The final
column in Table 2.6 shows the percentage of the change in the overall
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variance associated with the change in the variance within occupational
groups. In Nassau-Suffolk, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Atlanta, Baltimore,
Houston, Miami, and Anaheim, most of the rise in the overall variance
came from changes in the relative wage between groups, not from
changes in the variance within groups. Changes in the wage structure
between the four groups appear to have been more important in the
South and West. The wide range among urban areas suggests that a
closer look at changes in the variance within groups and at changes in
relative wage rates between groups is warranted.

WAGE INEQUALITY WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Table 2.7 shows the variance of the log of the real hourly wage
among workers within the four occupational groups in the AWS data
for the initial and final year available for each metropolitan area. The
variance is highest among workers in the less-skilled material move
ment group and lowest for those in skilled maintenance. Increased
wage inequality appears across the board. Only six cells in Table 2.7
show a decrease in the variance over time: the estimated variance for
office-clerical workers in Anaheim, Minneapolis, and San Diego and
for professional-technical workers in Milwaukee decreased slightly
between the initial and final years, and for material movement work
ers in Baltimore and Miami there was a slightly larger decrease.
There also appear to be considerable differences between occupa
tional groups and among metropolitan labor markets in the levels of and
the changes in the variance of real wage rates. This would suggest that
in testing hypotheses about the causes of the changes in the wage vari
ance, we can exploit those differences by examining the determinants
of changes in the wage variance over time within a panel of occupa
tional groups and metropolitan areas. Chapter 5 takes this approach.

RELATIVE WAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
As shown in the variance decompositions, changes in the average
wage between the four occupational groups accounted for a substan-
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Table 2.7 Variance in In(Real Hourly Wage) by Occupational Group
Metropolitan
area/years
Northeast
NassauSuffolk
New York
Philadelphia
Midwest
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
Houston
Miami

Officeclerical

ProfessionalSkilled
Material
technical maintenance movement

1975
1987
1975
1989
1976
1988

0.0473
0.0682
0.0569
0.1016
0.0731
0.0814

0.0700
0.0929
0.0812
0.0970
0.0795
0.0948

0.0224
0.0540
0.0355
0.0517
0.0287
0.0550

0.1303
0.1804
0.0833
0.1432
0.1144
0.1927

1974
1986
1974
1989
1974
1990
1976
1989
1975
1988
1975
1991
1975
1991
1976
1989

0.0484
0.0799
0.0574
0.0733
0.0595
0.0887
0.1024
0.1148
0.0861
0.0887
0.0584
0.0669
0.0576
0.0570
0.0797
0.1021

0.0692
0.0775
0.0668
0.0896
0.0785
0.0974
0.0854
0.0974
0.0986
0.1087
0.0765
0.0728
0.0653
0.0668
0.0811
0.1001

0.0246
0.0527
0.0222
0.0566
0.0254
0.0494
0.0082
0.0206
0.0331
0.0665
0.0234
0.0486
0.0200
0.0403
0.0248
0.0521

0.0969
0.1648
0.1397
0.2092
0.1142
0.2052
0.0925
0.2256
0.1534
0.2441
0.1272
0.2076
0.1088
0.1680
0.1455
0.2724

1975
1991
1975
1991
1974
1990
1975
1990

0.0547
0.0711
0.0721
0.0834
0.0648
0.0840
0.0565
0.0726

0.0783
0.0869
0.0711
0.0866
0.0702
0.1013
0.0806
0.1371

0.0412
0.0669
0.0347
0.0511
0.0286
0.0955
0.0776
0.0977

0.1482
0.1657
0.1758
0.1635
0.1516
0.1806
0.1206
0.1154
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Table 2.7

(continued)
Officeclerical

Metropolitan
area/years
West
Anaheim
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle
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1975
1988
1975
1989
1974
1989
1975
1988
1974
1988

0.0636
0.0575
0.0622
0.0689
0.0657
0.0628
0.0477
0.0600
0.0527
0.0667

ProfessionalSkilled
Material
technical maintenance movement
0.0662
0.0884
0.0667
0.0779
0.0493
0.0808
0.0525
0.0754
0.0486
0.0770

0.0230
0.0675
0.0296
0.0635
0.0168
0.0270
0.0119
0.0875
0.0110
0.0799

0.1708
0.1885
0.1525
0.1860
0.1300
0.1897
0.0971
0.1293
0.0710
0.2072

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Area Wage Surveys.

tial portion of the increased wage variance over time in a number of
urban areas. Table 2.8 takes a closer look at changes in the relative
occupational wages for the sample of local labor markets. The table
entries show the mean real hourly wage rate for workers in the officeclerical, professional-technical, and skilled maintenance groups as a
percentage of the mean real hourly wage for workers in the material
movement group in the initial and final years for each area.
The data in Table 2.8 suggest three major changes in the structure
of relative occupational wages from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s.
First, with the exception of professional-technical workers in Nas
sau-Suffolk and skilled maintenance workers in Miami, the relative
wage of the three groups rose in every area during the period. Sec
ond, that rise was perhaps most striking in the case of office-clerical
workers. In nine areas, clerical workers went from earning less, on
average, than material movement workers to earning more, on aver
age. Finally, in the mid 1970s, skilled maintenance workers had the
highest relative wage in 16 of the metropolitan areas, but by the end
of the 1980s, professional-technical workers had the highest relative
average real wage in 16 of the 20 areas.
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Table 2.8 Relative Wages,8 by Occupational Group (%)
Officeclerical

Professionaltechnical

Skilled
maintenance

1975
1987
1975
1989
1976
1988

97.9
98.9
105.7
125.4
80.1
106.8

148.4
140.4
165.7
197.6
124.0
172.8

147.7
144.8
142.5
150.6
128.5
159.3

1974
1986
1974
1989
1974
1990
1976
1989
1975
1988
1975
1991
1975
1991
1976
1989

87.3
95.8
91.7
114.8
87.9
113.9
85.3
104.0
85.0
97.2
84.0
99.3
75.2
106.9
84.5
112.1

133.3
155.3
130.0
189.5
132.8
210.7
147.9
163.5
138.4
169.8
122.0
169.9
121.8
177.9
128.6
186.6

142.7
159.3
148.7
166.9
149.6
207.0
140.3
174.8
154.3
173.6
149.2
172.0
136.0
167.9
145.0
185.3

1975
1991
1975
1991
1974
1990
1975
1990

106.9
127.4
102.4
125.6
122.7
172.4
118.2
141.2

152.5
213.7
151.3
209.4
173.7
296.5
169.7
247.9

165.2
166.8
167.9
185.9
191.1
243.2
174.7
150.6

1975
1988

102.2
121.0

146.8
173.5

150.5
163.5

Metropolitan
area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk
New York
Philadelphia
Midwest
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
St. Louis
South
Atlanta
Baltimore
Houston
Miami
West
Anaheim
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Table 2.8 (continued)
Metropolitan
area/years
West (continued)
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle

1975
1989
1974
1989
1975
1988
1974
1988

Officeclerical

Professionaltechnical

Skilled
maintenance

99.3
121.8
92.5
125.4
86.8
118.1
68.5
95.4

149.2
190.0
136.2
206.3
125.6
179.3
96.7
165.8

154.3
177.6
153.8
195.6
139.9
157.5
114.9
124.4

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Area Wage Surveys.
a The numbers are the average real hourly wage in a given occupational group, as a
percentage of the average real hourly wage of workers in the Material Movement
group.

The data show a slightly different picture of changes in the rela
tive wage of different groups than that seen in studies that measure
skill differentials by changes in the average wage of college-educated
workers relative to that of high school graduates or by changes in the
relative wage of nonproduction versus production workers. Here, the
evidence shows rising relative wages for clerical as well as for pro
fessional-technical workers. Since in the AWS data the latter are
largely computer- and electronics-oriented workers, it is very possible
that changes in the demand for computer skills and a growing demand
for college-educated workers is behind the changes in their relative
wages. But the simultaneous rise in the relative wage for clerical work
ers raises the question of the extent to which changing skill and edu
cational requirements are driving these changes in wage inequality.
In addition, the relative wage of skilled maintenance workers rose
considerably in most of the local labor markets, even if not as rapidly
as the relative wage of professional-technical workers. And, the fact
that the relative wage of skilled maintenance workers rose in many
areas where their relative employment was falling casts some doubt
on the widely accepted view that a steadily rising demand for skilled
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workers, driven largely by technological change, increased both the
relative wage for and the relative employment of skilled workers.
Given the findings in this chapter, that view has to be qualified in the
case of skilled maintenance workers.

SUMMARY

This chapter has examined trends in the level and in the distribu
tion of wages of workers in 41 jobs in four major occupational groups
for 20 large metropolitan labor markets from 1974 to 1991. While
there are considerable differences among the 20 areas and, often,
between the four census divisions, the local labor market data taken
from the Area Wage Surveys generally follows time patterns similar
to those found in national data from the Current Population Survey.
The median real hourly wage tended to be pro-cyclical, rising in the
late 1970s, falling in the recessions of the early 1980s, rising again in
the post-1984 recovery, and falling in the recession of 1990-1991.
Wage inequality, measured by the variance in the logarithm of the real
hourly wage and by the 75-50 and 50-25 log wage differences, rose
steadily during the decade and a half under consideration.
The similarity in the findings from the AWS and the CPS is of
considerable interest because the AWS data comes from surveys that
over-sampled large employers and refer to the wages of full-time work
ers in a limited number of detailed job titles. Because the CPS data
comes from surveys of individuals, and hourly wages are estimated
from responses about annual earnings and hours worked, it is difficult
to distinguish changes in wage practices from changes in the job pat
terns of individual workers. The AWS data suggests that there have
indeed been substantial changes in the structure of real wages and that
those changes are fairly widespread. The data examined in this chap
ter also reveal considerable differences among local labor markets in
the timing and extent of changes in the wage structure. Metropolitan
areas differ in the extent to which changes in wage inequality reflect
changes in the relative wage of workers at the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution. The data also show considerable differences
among metropolitan areas in the relative importance of wage variance
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within occupations as a source of increased wage inequality. The local
labor markets in the sample show different patterns of change in the
wage variance within occupations and in the relative wage between
groups. These inter-urban differences are important in that the crosssection differences in wage structure changes between occupational
groups and among urban areas, coupled with changes over time, pro
vide a potentially rich data set, one that could prove more useful for
evaluating some hypotheses than data bases that are restricted to infor
mation encompassing only differences in the wage structure over time.

Note
1. The CPI is the only inflation measure available for metropolitan areas. While
considerable attention has been paid to measurement errors and biases in the CPI
(Boskin et al. 1997), it is not clear that the available substitutes provide signifi
cantly more-reliable inflation indicators (Steindel 1997).

3 Trends in Benefit
and Union Contract Coverage
This chapter considers trends in benefits and trends in union con
tract coverage. While nonwage benefits are an important part of worker
compensation, few studies have examined the relationship between
changes in benefit provisions and the rise in wage inequality. House
man (1995) found that coverage by employer-provided health insur
ance and pension plans decreased the most between 1979 and 1993
for workers with the least education, which suggests that the trend in
benefits worked to reinforce trends in the wage structure during the
1980s. Benedict and Shaw (1995) found that the dispersion of wages
plus pension benefits was 2 percent higher than that of wages alone,
because of the positive correlation between wage level, pension cov
erage, and pension value across workers. The national decline in union
membership and contract coverage during the 1980s is widely docu
mented and its impact on the wage distribution has been examined
in a number of papers (for example, Freeman 1993). Here, I examine
data on benefit coverage and union contract coverage from the Area
Wage Surveys.
The AWS reported benefit and union contract coverage separately
for full-time workers in the highly aggregated office worker and plant
or production worker groups. While the office worker group closely
matches the office-clerical group used to report wage data, the pro
duction worker group includes job titles beyond those in the skilled
maintenance and material movement groups. For example, the pro
duction worker group includes fabricating, processing, assembling, and
inspection, in addition to maintenance, shipping, receiving, warehous
ing, cleaning, and security work. The AWS excluded administrative,
executive, professional, and part-time workers from both the office and
the production worker groups. The differences in reporting mean that
the trends analyzed here cannot be linked directly to the trends dis
cussed in Chapter 2. However, general developments in benefit and
union contract coverage are of interest in their own right and might
provide insight into changes in the structure of nonwage compensa-
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tion that complements our understanding of changes in the wage
structure.

HOLIDAY AND VACATION TIME
Table 3.1 presents data on changes in time off from work for hol
idays and vacations for full-time office and plant workers. It shows
the average number of days off for paid holidays, as reported by the
employers surveyed in the AWS. The number of holidays shows lit
tle change, the most important perhaps being an increase in the num
ber of holidays for office workers in the South and West, an increase
that brought those workers on par with their counterparts in the North
east and Midwest. The increase can be seen in the regional averages
of the mean number of holidays. In the Northeast and Midwest, plant
workers averaged 9.7 holidays in the mid 1970s and 9.6 holidays at
the end of the 1980s; office workers in those two regions averaged 9.9
days and 9.8 days, respectively. Neither change is at all significant.
In the South and West, plant workers averaged 8.4 holidays in both
the mid 1970s and at the end of the 1980s, while the average number
of holidays for office workers increased by half a day, from 9.0 to 9.5.
Table 3.1 also shows vacation time for workers with five years on
the job, in particular the percentage of workers with vacations of two
or fewer weeks per year. The data suggest a general improvement in
the amount of vacation time, with the percentage falling in every case
but that of production workers in San Diego. The change from the
initial to final year in the percentage of workers having limited vaca
tion averaged -24.4 percentage points for office workers and -11.6
points for production workers. Significant improvements in vacation
time for plant workers were registered in Nassau-Suffolk, Cleveland,
Minneapolis, and Seattle. For office workers, the biggest changes were
in Nassau-Suffolk, Chicago, Minneapolis, Houston, and Seattle.
The results in Table 3.1 appear to be in line with those in Chapter 2,
which show a rise in the relative pay of clerical workers vis-a-vis mate
rial movement workers. Table 3.1 also shows that benefits for office
workers rose relative to those for skilled and unskilled plant workers.
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Table 3.1 Holidays and Vacation Time for Full-Time Plant
and Office Workers
Average number
of holidays
Initial year
Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988

Two or fewer weeks
of vacation3 (%)

Final year

Initial year

Final year

Plant

Office

Plant

Office Plant Office Plant Office

9.6
10.1
9.6

10.7
10.9
10.3

10.0
10.3
9.2

10.4
10.2
9.5

60
40
65

58
30
59

37
37
62

24
25
41

9.4b
9.0b
9.8
11.3
9.6
10.0
8.6
9.6

9.4b
9.3b
9.3
11.0
9.4
9.9
8.9
9.5

9.6
9.0
9.2
10.6
9.6
10.0
8.6
9.8

9.6
9.9
9.7
10.8
9.6
9.4
9.4
9.7

67
71
65
32
62
65
76
68

71
64
60
48
75
62
73
73

56
60
45
25
50
62
44
65

41
57
35
32
48
36
24
56

7.8
8.6
7.7b
6.9

8.9
9.3
8.7b
7.9

8.3
8.3
7.6
7.2

9.3
9.3
9.0
8.9

69
74
75
69

64
69
71
64

55
64
53
62

47
43
29
45

8.7
8.8
8.6
9.3
9.0b

9.4
9.2
9.0
9.5
9.5b

8.5
8.9
8.7
9.6
9.0

9.7
9.9
9.7
10.1
9.8

64
55
52
40
73

52
51
42
41
81

47
43
53
37
42

25
31
31
24
27

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys.
a The vacation data is for workers with five years on the job with the current employer.
b 1977 data is the earliest available.
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HEALTH INSURANCE
The extent to which workers are covered by employer-provided
health insurance has been a significant part of the national debate on
the reform of the health care industry. Table 3.2 presents data on the
percentage of office and plant workers offered health insurance bene
fits and the percentage offered health insurance benefits that were fully
paid for by the employer. The first point to note about this informa
tion is the very high rate of health insurance coverage provided by the
employers surveyed by the AWS program in the 20 metropolitan areas.
In contrast, Houseman's (1995) analysis of national data from the Cur
rent Population Survey showed that 36.8 percent of all workers in 1980
had no health insurance and that by 1989 this figure had risen to 42.7
percent. Only in the case of production workers in Miami in 1990
does the data reported in Table 3.2 come close to the rates of noncoverage found by Houseman, which undoubtedly reflects the fact that
the firms included in the AWS are generally large ones that might be
expected to offer a fuller array of benefits than smaller firms. Also,
as we will see, the potential impact of unions on the workers in our
sample is significantly higher than in the economy as a whole.
In our sample, the percentage of workers offered health insurance
dropped slightly from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s. The average
change in coverage was -6.5 percentage points for production work
ers and -2.4 points for office workers. While this might appear to be
slim evidence for a substantial erosion of health insurance benefits, it
should be noted that a few areas exhibited substantially larger changes
than these overall averages. The percentage point change was -32 for
Miami production workers, -22 for San Diego plant workers, -21 for
Los Angeles plant workers, and -14 for Milwaukee office workers.
Still, the evidence suggests a fairly high and stable rate of health insur
ance coverage for workers in most areas in the sample.
The right-hand columns of Table 3.2 show the percentage of work
ers with fully paid, employer-provided health insurance benefits.
Again, the AWS data indicates a much larger percentage of workers
with such benefits than is seen in national samples. Houseman (1995)
reported CPS data showing that about 28 percent of workers in 1980
and 21 percent in 1989 had health insurance requiring no employee
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Table 3.2 Health Insurance Coverage for Full-Time Plant
and Office Workers3 (%)
Workers covered
Initial year
Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988

Noncontributory plans3

Final year

Initial year

Final year

Plant Office Plant Office Plant Office Plant Office
89
93
97

96
98
99

98
97
94

99
99
99

82
86
86

71
64
70

70
75
65

58
43
54

99
94
95
99
96
98
96
97

99
97
96
100
98
99
98
99

96
94
93
94
93
90
84
96

99
97
97
99
99
85
89
99

74
74
85
94
72
72
82
80

54
69
66
91
65
71
64
57

65
60
63
80
61
37
35
67

55
48
37
81
58
23
32
43

94
94
93
93

99
96
99
99

93
82
84
61

99
90
99
88

58
74
46
55

52
57
47
65

49
42
39
14

36
41
42
38

96
95
97
99
98

99
99
99
99
99

85
74
75
98
99

98
95
91
99
99

78
75
76
84
91

56
68
67
76
65

47
42
40
79
81

52
50
43
85
72

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys.
a Noncontributory plans are fully paid by the employer.

contributions to premiums. Table 3.2 shows a dramatic decrease in
the percentage of workers with 100 percent employer-paid health insur
ance. The average change shown in Table 3.2 is -20.6 percentage
points for production workers and -15.2 points for office workers; the
only increases were for office workers in Chicago, San Jose, and Seat
tle. Again, the evidence for health insurance indicates that the rela
tive position of office workers tended to improve.
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PENSION COVERAGE
The percentage of workers offered pension plans and those with
plans fully paid by the employer can be found in Table 3.3. Pension
coverage in most areas in the sample is close to twice as high as the
45 percent reported by Houseman (1995), with the main exception
being production workers in Miami. From the mid 1970s to the late
1980s, pension coverage generally fell for production workers and rose
for office workers, although the changes were not pronounced. The
Table 3.3 Pension Coverage for Full-Time Plant
and Office Workers (%)
Workers covered
Initial year
Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988

Noncontributory plans"

Final year

Plant Office Plant Office

Initial Year

Final year

Plant Office Plant Office

76
88
88

85
88
89

76
88
68

86
91
91

73
82
83

77
76
82

69
82
58

78
86
75

84
81
88
91
84
84
87
89

85
91
88
90
90
88
85
83

81
80
80
80
78
86
87
93

83
93
90
92
95
96
92
96

73
73
83
89
74
77
82
84

68
85
80
85
81
79
75
73

74
73
75
78
73
72
67
85

73
81
81
89
89
76
78
83

68
79
70
55

79
87
83
80

82
82
73
53

92
83
89
73

59
70
59
49

59
76
70
74

63
63
55
38

76
65
72
65

70
74
78
77
90

80
85
73
86
91

68
73
71
81
87

88
88
88
88
90

59
58
70
63
82

64
67
61
70
82

53
65
53
73
77

69
67
64
73
77

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys.
a Noncontributory plans are fully paid by employers.
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average percentage point change across the 20 areas was -1.6 for plant
workers and +3.9 for office workers. Pension coverage for production
workers rose in 6 local labor markets, while that for office workers
rose in 16.
A similar pattern can be seen in the percentage of workers with
pensions requiring no employee contributions. That percentage fell
for production workers, with the change averaging -5.8 percentage
points, and rose slightly for office workers, with the change averaging
+1.2 points. These data reinforce the conclusion that the structure of
benefits changed in favor of office workers after the mid 1970s. They
also strongly suggest that the change was evolutionary, not revolu
tionary, in its effect, with a high and relatively stable percentage of
both office and production workers having employer-provided pen
sions. While there is evidence of inter-area differences in the levels
and in changes in the provision of health insurance and pensions, the
differences are not as pronounced as those seen in the wage distribu
tion data in Chapter 2.

OTHER INSURANCE BENEFITS
The AWS noted workers covered by benefits other than vacations,
health insurance, and pensions. Table 3.4 shows the changes over time
in the percentage of plant and office workers covered by different insur
ance programs in each of the 20 metropolitan labor markets. While
considerable differences are evident across the 20 markets, two gen
eral conclusions emerge. First, the data provide additional evidence
of an improvement in benefits for office workers relative to those for
production workers. Second, the percentage of workers offered longterm disability and dental insurance increased substantially in the
decade and a half after 1975.
It appears, however, that the percentage of plant and office work
ers offered life insurance fell slightly during the sample period. This
decrease, while indeed slight, was more pronounced for plant work
ers, particularly in Miami and Southern California. But coverage for
accidental death and dismemberment rose in 9 areas for production
workers and in 15 areas for office workers. Again, there were fairly

Table 3.4 Changes in Employer Coverage of Insurance Programs8 (%)
Accidental death
& dismemberment

Life
Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988
Average

Sickness
& accident

Long-term
disability

Dental

Plant

Office

Plant

Office

Plant

Office

Plant

Office

Plant

Office

+6
-3
-A

+3
+2
+2

+11
+2
+16

+6
+15
+13

+9
-16
-13

+12
+4
+9

+12
+11
-1

+27
+30
+10

+34
+46
+33

+48
+61
+47

-1
-3
-9
-8
-2
0
-7
-2

0
+5
-5
0
-1
-2
0
0

+15
+9
-10
-7
0
+7
-1
+3

+18
+11
+8
+4
+3
+5
+9
-7

-2
+4
-8
-15
-20
-1
+14
-5

_j
+9
+12
0
-11
+4
+15
+5

+3
+9
0
0
+5
+13
+16
+10

+11
+15
+21
+19
+11
+30
+25
+29

+56
+52
+56
+22
+35
+54
+53
+27

+66
+70
+78
+33
+53
+71
+59
+40

-4
0
-4
-22

0
-3
-1
-5

-3
+20
+15
-15

-3
+4
+26
+6

+11
0
-3
-13

+36
+4
+16
+17

+15
+10
+19
0

+25
+19
+27
+27

+51
+43
+60
+18

+68
+67
+78
+69

-18
-11
-16
-1
-2
-5.5

0
0
-3
+1
+1
-0.3

-28
-9
-16
-8
-1
0

-18
+4
-10
+4
-2
+4.8

+8
+6
+18
+6
-10
+17.7

+28
+26
+31
+34
+23
+39.1

+38
+45
+44
+39
+41
+55.7

+3
-3
+7
-1
-2
-2.7

+3
-19
+12
+8
+9
+7.2

-7
-2
+7
-6
+9
+6.1

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys.
a Numbers show the change in the percentage of workers covered by insurance between the initial and final year for each area.
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large decreases in coverage for plant workers in Miami, Anaheim, and
San Diego. In the case of sickness and accident insurance, the pattern
is one of decreased availability for production workers and increased
availability for office workers. For plant workers, the biggest drops
in coverage were in New York, Indianapolis, Miami, and Philadelphia.
While coverage for clerical workers rose in general, it dropped sig
nificantly in Indianapolis and Los Angeles. There appear to have been
greater inter-urban differences in the coverage for life, accidental death
and dismemberment, and sickness and accident insurance than we saw
in the data for health insurance and pensions.
The percentage of workers covered by long-term disability insur
ance generally rose or remained constant from the mid 1970s to the
late 1980s. On average, the increase in coverage for office workers
was nearly three times greater than that for production workers.
Finally, in all 20 areas, the percentage of office and production work
ers covered by dental insurance rose dramatically from the very low
levels of the mid 1970s. Again, office workers clearly gained relative
to production workers.

UNION CONTRACT COVERAGE
The field surveys conducted as part of the AWS program also
inquire about the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. Pub
lished AWS reports data listed the percentage of office or plant work
ers in firms where a majority of office or plant workers were covered by
union contracts. This measure of union influence is very different from
data on union membership and goes beyond other union coverage data,
since workers that met the criterion were included as covered, even if
their individual terms and conditions of employment were not governed
by a union contract. To the extent that the effects of a union contract
spill over to nonunion workers in the same firm, this measure of union
influence might perhaps best be regarded as a measure of the percent
age of workers in the local labor market who are most likely to a have
their wages and benefits influenced by collective bargaining.
Table 3.5 reports data on union contract coverage for the initial
and final years for each of the 20 metropolitan labor markets. It also
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Table 3.5 Union Contract Coverage for Full-Time Plant
and Office Workers3

Metropolitan area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk 1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia 1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis 1975/1988
Milwaukee 1975/1991
Minneapolis 1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles 1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988
Average

Percentage point
change

Initial year (%)

Final year (%)

Plant

Office

Plant

Office

Plant

59
81
72

11
14
12

47
79
51

7
21
10

-12
-2
-11

-4
+7
-2

72
67
80
89
66
75
71
82

13
11
11
17
8
22
11
15

58
46
53
62
46
49
38
76

15
7
7
17
5
21
6
10

-14
-21
-27
-27
-20
-26
-33
-6

+2
-4
-4
0
-3
-1
-4
-5

45
63
40
30

12
18
6
8

32
40
24
13

12
12
5
9

-13
-17
-16
-17

0
-6
-1
+1

41
56
57
46
91
64.1

13
16
10
16
22
13.3

23
40
34
32
65
45.4

7
9
10
11
28
11.4

-18
-16
-23
-14
-26
-18.0

-6
-7
0
-5
+6
-1.8

Office

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys.
a Figures show the percentage of full-time workers in firms where a majority of
workers in each group were covered by union contracts.

shows the changes in union contract coverage over time and gives the
average values for the 20-area sample. A substantially larger per
centage of workers is counted as "covered" by (i.e., affected by) union
contracts in this data than is seen in national data on union member
ship and union contract coverage. Here, contract coverage averaged
close to two-thirds of production workers in the mid 1970s, with val
ues over 80 percent for five metropolitan areas.
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As is well known, union membership in the United States and in
several other industrialized countries dropped sharply during the
1980s. As shown in Table 3.5, union contract coverage in the 20 labor
markets also dropped sharply, even though union contract coverage
for office workers in New York, Chicago, Miami, and Seattle rose
slightly from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s. The drop in union con
tract coverage was most pronounced for plant workers in the industri
alized Midwest, where it fell by 20 percentage points or more in Cincin
nati, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis.
San Diego and Seattle are the only areas outside the Midwest to have
had declines of that magnitude. Union contract coverage appears to
have dropped the least in the three areas in the Northeast, particularly
in New York, where the rate of coverage for plant workers fell by 2
points and that for office workers rose by 7. Local trends in union
ization thus appear to parallel national trends. However, considerable
inter-urban variation in the level of and changes in contract coverage
are evident in the data.

THE UNION INFLUENCE ON BENEFIT LEVELS
What is the relationship between inter-urban differences in union
contract coverage and the percentage of workers offered various bene
fits? Given the evidence for a substantial drop in contract coverage over
time, how has that relationship changed? Table 3.6 presents the results
of a regression analysis of the effect of union contract coverage on the
percentage of plant and office workers with health insurance, life insur
ance, a pension plan, and long-term disability insurance. Separate
regressions were run on cross-section data for the initial and final years
in the time series available for each city. There are 40 observations on
the two worker groups across the 20 metropolitan areas. In addition to
separate union contract coverage rate variables for office and plant
workers, the regressions include as independent variables a dummy
variable distinguishing plant from office employees and, to control for
the net effect of area-specific measures, fixed effects for the 20 areas.
In general, the effect of union contract coverage on benefit cover
age was substantially different for office and plant workers. For plant
workers, the fraction covered by benefits increased with union cover-
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Table 3.6 Regression Estimates for the Effect of Union Contract
Coverage on Employee Coverage for Selected Benefits8
Union coverage
Benefit
Health insurance
First year
Final year
Pensions
First year
Final year
Life insurance
First year

Final year
Long-term
disability insurance
First year
Final year

Plant
workers

Office
workers

Dummy
for plant
workers

100.80*b
(1.26)c
90.69*
(3.97)

0.052*
(0.018)
0.278*
(0.075)

-0.107
(0.066)
-0.082
(0.168)

-7.46*
(0.862)
-20.53*
(2.97)

79.87*
(2.64)
90.74*
(3.19)

0.371*
(0.046)
0.281*
(0.047)

0.322*
(0.142)
0.069
(0.418)

-24.64*
(3.54)
-23.53*
(1.98)

94.30*
(1.75)
93.22*
(2.26)

0.092*
(0.032)
0.277*
(0.065)

0.116
(0.106)
0.304*
(0.092)

-6.81*
(2.05)
-17.86*
(2.91)

0.76

52.76*
(4.25)
66.46*
(6.73)

-0.025
(0.087)
0.1250
(0.1138)

-0.360
(0.248)
-0.155
(0.518)

-27.53*
(5.21)
-43.15*
(5.04)

0.94

Constant

R2
0.87
0.88
0.91
0.88

0.86

0.93

a The regressions labeled "first year" are estimated on 40 observations by type of worker
and by metropolitan area for the first year available for each area. The regressions
labeled "final year" are estimated for the final year available. All regressions include
metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
c Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.
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age. For office workers, however, the variation among areas in union
coverage did not correlate with the variation in the fraction of work
ers receiving benefits.
The regression estimates are similar for health and life insurance.
Union contract coverage for plant workers has a statistically signifi
cant1 positive relationship with the fraction of workers receiving these
benefits. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for union contract
coverage are substantially larger in the final years. Apparently, the
drop in union contract coverage was not accompanied by a drop in the
union influence on these benefits. The magnitude of the coefficients
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in union contract cov
erage would lead to a 7-point increase in the fraction of plant work
ers with health and life insurance in the late 1980s. The dummy vari
ables for plant workers have a statistically significant negative effect
on the fraction with health and life insurance, indicating that, other
things being equal, office workers had higher rates of benefit cover
age than did plant workers, and since the estimated coefficients are
more than twice as large in absolute value in the final years, that advan
tage grew over time.
In the regression having pension plan coverage as the dependent
variable, union contract coverage also has a statistically significant pos
itive coefficient estimate. However, the estimated union effect is about
the same in the initial and the final years and has a fairly large effect on
the dependent variable. A one-standard-deviation increase in union
contract coverage would add almost 13 points to plant worker pension
coverage in the initial years and close to 8 points in the final years. Such
increases would amount to a 15.5 percent increase over the mean value
for pension coverage in the initial years and a 8.7 percent increase over
the mean in the final years. Other factors held constant, the regressions
also indicate that plant workers had substantially lower rates of pension
coverage than did office workers. The coefficients for the plant dummy
variables are very similar in the initial and final years, however, which
suggests that the structure of pension coverage changed little over this
period.
Finally, the regressions for long-term disability coverage indicate
that union contract coverage had no statistically significant effect on
the likelihood that workers would receive this benefit. For both the
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initial and the final years, the estimated coefficients are near zero and
substantially less than their estimated standard errors. Again, the plant
worker dummy variables indicate a strong advantage for office work
ers, one that increased from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s. In gen
eral, the results suggest that the extent of unionization had an impor
tant positive effect on the percentage of plant workers receiving several
benefits.
Table 3.7 examines the effect of union contract coverage on the
percentage of office and plant workers receiving fully paid health insur
ance and pension benefits. In the health insurance regression, the sharp
drop in the constant term from the first to the second regression is con
sistent with the substantial erosion in health insurance benefits fully
paid for by the employer seen in Table 3.2. Plant worker union con-

Table 3.7 The Effect of Union Contract Coverage on the Percentage
of Workers Receiving Fully Paid Health Insurance
and Pension Benefits3
Union coverage
Benefit
Health Insurance
First year
Final year
Pensions
First year
Final year

Constant

Plant
workers

Office
workers

Dummy
for plant
workers

66.05 *b
(4.93)c
36.22*
(7.53)

0.267*
(0.103)
0.553*
(0.111)

-0.015
(0.302)
-0.073
(0.428)

-6.30
(6.86)
-19.97*
(3.90)

62.15*
(5.73)
74.51*
(3.96)

0.431*
(0.075)
0.301*
(0.063)

0.574
(0.298)
0.0001
(0.1528)

-22.94*
(4.83)
-22.42*
(2.73)

R2

0.89
0.91
0.86
0.91

a The regressions labeled "first year" are estimated on 40 observations by type of
worker and by metropolitan area for the first year available for each area. The regres
sions labeled "final year" are estimated for the final year available. All regressions
include metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
cHeteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.

Rising Wage Inequality

59

tract coverage had a statistically significant effect on the incidence of
employer-paid health plans, with the estimated effect rising over time.
In the regression for the final years, a 10 percent increase in union con
tract coverage would be associated with a 2.5 percent increase in the
fraction of plant workers in health plans that did not require worker
co-payments. As in the regressions reported in Table 3.6, office worker
union contract coverage was not significantly correlated with the frac
tion of workers with fully paid health plans.
Plant worker union contract coverage is also statistically signifi
cant and positively correlated with the fraction of workers with pen
sion plans in which the employer pays 100 percent of the premiums.
Office worker union contract coverage is statistically significant and
positively correlated with fully paid pension plans in the regression for
the initial years, but it is not in the regression for the final years. In
general, the regression analyses reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show
that plant workers lagged behind office workers in benefit coverage,
but that disadvantage was offset to some extent by the higher rates of
unionization and the greater union-benefit effects for plant workers.

SUMMARY

An analysis of the AWS data on benefits reveals important changes
in benefit coverage from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s. However,
the nature of those changes varied considerably by metropolitan area
and by type of benefit. Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that the
evidence points to a relative shift in benefit coverage away from plant
workers and toward office workers. In many cases, this relative shift
also represented an absolute decrease in the fraction of plant workers
receiving various benefits. The absolute decrease was perhaps most
pronounced in Miami, where the fraction of plant workers receiving
benefits generally fell substantially.
While we cannot directly tie the benefit coverage data in the
AWS to the wage data described in Chapter 2, the tendency toward
greater benefit advantage for office workers is at least consistent with
one important feature of the rise in wage inequality. Recall from
Chapter 2 the sharp rise in the average wage of office-clerical and pro
fessional-technical workers relative to that of material movement
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workers. Recall also that a few studies reviewed in Chapter 1 found
evidence of sharp increases in the relative wage of nonproduction
workers in manufacturing during the 1980s. The analysis in this chap
ter suggests that increases in the relative wages for office workers were
accompanied by an increase in the relative availability of various ben
efits for these workers.
The AWS data also yield information on the extent of union influ
ence on local labor markets. Because the specific measure employed
includes workers who might not have been union members or who
might not have been covered by explicit union contracts, the estimates
for plant worker union contract coverage reported here are substan
tially higher than those drawn from the CPS or from union member
ship rolls. The union data from the AWS do follow the national trend
toward lower union contract coverage rates over time. Estimates of
the effects that inter-area differences in unionization have on various
benefits indicates that greater union coverage was associated with
higher fractions of plant workers with life insurance, health insurance,
and pension plans. Unionization had no significant effect, however,
on the benefits received by office workers.

Note
1.

Unless otherwise stated, statistical significance is at the 5 percent level.

4 Skill Requirements
and Returns on Skills
Underlying the dramatic increase in wage inequality over the past
two decades is a marked change in the price paid for skills and in the
skills required by employers. The evidence points to sharp increases
during the 1980s in the wage returns on schooling and on potential labor
market experience (Buchinsky 1994), on cognitive skills in addition to
schooling (Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995), and on specific technical
skills, such as the ability to use computers on the job (Krueger 1993).
The evidence that wage inequality has increased for workers with a
given level of education and that the returns on schooling are higher and
growing more rapidly for workers at the upper reaches of the wage dis
tribution (Buchinsky 1994) has also been taken as a sign of increased
wage returns on unmeasured skills (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993).
The evidence also indicates that the demand for labor has shifted
substantially in the direction of skilled workers, as seen in data show
ing that the level of education has risen over time (Wolff 1995), that
required job-specific skills have increased (Cappelli 1993), and that
the distribution of employment by occupation and by industry has
shifted toward jobs requiring higher skills (Gittleman and Ho well
1995). There is considerable interest in determining the relative impor
tance of international trade and technological change in the rising
demand for skilled workers. And, there is some question about the
impact skill upgrading had on the 1980s rise in wage inequality, given
the empirical evidence that skill upgrading rose more rapidly in the
1970s than in the 1980s (Howell 1994; Mishel and Bernstein 1996)
and given the theory favoring the conclusion that rising average skill
levels are associated with reduced wage inequality (Teulings 1995).
This chapter examines the evidence for changes in the returns on
skills and in the relative demand for skills in the sample of 20 local
labor markets. Since the AWS data measured job-specific wage rates
and provided no information on the characteristics of the workers in
those jobs, we cannot examine increases in the returns on skills through
a traditional human capital model. Instead, we turn to an older model
61
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of wage determination, one in which wages are attached to jobs and
are determined largely by the relative skill requirements of those jobs.
With this model, we can examine how average wage levels across
occupations and among local labor markets responded to the skill char
acteristics of those occupations at different times. We can also use
occupational skill measures to determine whether the skill mix within
the four job groups covered by the AWS changed during the 1980s.
OCCUPATIONAL SKILL INDICES
The most comprehensive data on skill requirements is the Dictio
nary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1991). Field
examiners for the Department of Labor rated each job title by the level
of skill required for the job. The ratings reflect many dimensions of
skill, including the amount of education and training required, the phys
ical and environmental demands of the job, the levels of cognitive,
interactive, and language skills involved, and the degree of responsi
bility for machine operations. While the Dictionary has its limitations
(see Miller et al. 1980), it does allow for a more comprehensive study
of the returns on various job-specific skills than does a human capital
model, restricted as it is to data on schooling and potential work expe
rience as measures of skill.
Table 4.1 presents skill data selected from the Dictionary for each
job title in the four occupational groups covered by the Area Wage Sur
veys. Skills are represented by three separate measures: specific voca
tional preparation, general educational development, and the worker
functions required for each job.
Specific vocational preparation refers to the time the average work
er needs to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop
the ability to be an average performer. This preparation includes voca
tional education; apprenticeship, in-plant, and on-the-job training; and
experience acquired in other jobs. Specific vocational preparation is
measured according to the following nine-point scale (Gamboa, Gibson, and Holland 1994):
1. Short demonstration
2. Less than one month
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3. Over 1 month and up to 3 months
4. Over 3 months and up to 6 months
5. Over 6 months and up to 1 year
6. Over 1 year and up to 2 years
7. Over 2 years and up to 4 years
8. Over 4 years and up to 10 years
9. Over 10 years
In the AWS data, on this scale, the job titles range from a low of 2
for shipping packers to a high of 8 for maintenance electricians and tooland-die makers. It is interesting that the required training time is high
for the skilled maintenance workers and for the professional-technical
workers in our sample. Most job titles in the two groups require two to
four years or more of training. In contrast, most office-clerical jobs
require less than six months of vocational preparation, and six of the
nine material movement jobs in the sample require but one to three
months. The result for this variable highlights one of the advantages of
using occupation-based skill data as a supplement to worker educational
attainment in measuring skill. It is unlikely that the long vocational
preparation required for workers in skilled maintenance jobs would be
adequately measured by years of schooling alone.
General educational development (GED) attempts to characterize
the cognitive skills that are usually associated with formal education.
Jobs are rated on a scale of 1 to 6 for levels of reasoning, mathematics,
and language development. Reasoning development ranges from 1 (for
jobs requiring only that the worker carry out instructions) to 6 (for jobs
requiring logical or scientific thinking). Mathematics development
runs from 1 (for jobs requiring basic arithmetic) to 6 (for jobs requiring
advanced calculus, algebra, and/or statistics). Language development
ranges from 1 to 6, depending on the degree of reading comprehension
and oral communication skills needed for the job.
In our sample, the lowest-rated job titles (with ratings of 2 for rea
soning and 1 for both mathematics and language) are shipping-packer,
fork-lift operator, material-handling laborer, and general maintenance
worker. Table 4.1 shows a clear ranking, with professional-technical

Table 4.1

Skill Measures for Job Titles by Occupational Group9

Occupational group/job
Office-Clerical
Accounting clerk
File clerk
Key entry operator
Messenger
Order clerk
Payroll clerk
Receptionist
Secretary
Stenographer
Switchboard operator
Typist
Word processor
Professional-Technical
Computer operator
Computer programmer
Computer systems analyst
Drafter
Electronics technician
Registered industrial nurse
Skilled Maintenance
Carpenter
Electrician

Specific
vocational
preparation

Reasoning

Mathematics

Language

Data

People

Things

5
3
4
2
4
4
4
6
5
3
3
5

4
3
3
2
3
4
3
4
3
3
3
3

3
1
2
1
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2

3
2
3
2
3
3
3
4
3
3
3
3

4
3
5
6
3
3
3
3
3
6
5
3

8
8
8
7
6
8
6
6
6
6
8
8

2
7
2
7
2
2
7
2
2
2
2
2

6
7
7
7
7
7

4
5
5
5
5
5

2
4
4
5
5
4

3
5
5
4
4
5

3
0
1
2
1
3

6
6
6
6
6
7

2
2
7
1
1
4

7
8

4
4

4
4

3
4

2
2

8
6

1
1

General educational development

Worker functions

Table 4.1

(continued)

General maintenance
Machine-tool operator
Maintenance mechanic
Motor vehicle mechanic
Millwright
Painter
Pipefitter
Stationary engineer
Tool & die maker
Trades helper
Material Movement
Guard
Janitor
Material handling laborer
Order filler
Fork-lift operator
Shipper/receiver
Warehouseman
Truck driver
Light/medium
Heavy/tractor trailer
Shipping packer

3
7
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
4

2
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
4
2

1
4
3
3
3
2
4
4
4
1

1
4
3
3
3
2
3
3
4
2

3
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
6

8
8
8
8
8
8
6
8
6
8

4
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
4

3
3
3
3
3
5
4

3
3
2
3
2
3
3

1
2
1
2
1
3
3

2
3
1
2
1
2
2

6
6
6
4
6
3
3

6
6
8
8
8
8
8

7
4
3
7
3
7
7

3
4
2

3
3
2

2
2
1

2
2
1

6
6
5

8
6
8

3
3
7

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor 1991.
a See the text for an explanation of the skill measures and codes

66

Skill Requirements and Returns on Skills

jobs requiring the highest GED levels and material movement jobs
requiring the lowest. The distinction between the professional-techni
cal and the skilled maintenance groups is much sharper than it was for
vocational training. However, skilled maintenance jobs still require
fairly high degrees of reasoning and mathematics skills.
Worker function ratings assess the requirements for dealing with
data, people, and things. In contrast to the other skill indices in the table,
worker functions involving more complex responsibility and judgment
are assigned lower rather than higher numbers. Various jobs are rated
according to the scales in Table 4.2 (U.S. Department of Labor 1991).
Professional-technical jobs require the highest skill level for datarelated tasks, with the typical job requiring data coordination and analy
sis. While the worker function ratings related to data are generally
lower for skilled maintenance than for professional-technical jobs, eight
of the job titles within the skilled maintenance group do require data
analysis.
No group in our sample requires high skill levels for the "people"
variable. The jobs in the sample mainly require speaking/signaling and
serving, tasks at the bottom of the scale of people-related functions,
which undoubtedly reflects the fact that none of the groups covered by
the AWS included strictly managerial jobs, which carry the highest peo
ple ratings.
Skilled maintenance jobs have the highest worker function ratings
for tasks related to things (machines). The values for this measure
indicate that precision work and operating-controlling skills are charTable 4.2 Worker Function Scale
Rating
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Data
Synthesizing
Coordinating
Analyzing
Compiling
Computing
Copying
Comparing

People
Mentoring
Negotiating
Instructing
Supervising
Diverting
Persuading
Signaling
Serving
Taking instructions

Things
Setting up
Precision working
Operating-controlling
Driving-operating
Manipulating
Tending
Feeding-offbearing
Handling
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acteristic of the typical skilled maintenance job. Drafters and elec
tronic technicians (from the professional-technical group) also have
high machine-related worker function ratings.
As might be expected, there is a close correlation among most of
the skill measures reported in Table 4.1. The three GED measures are
highly interrelated, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.81 to
0.89 for the 40 job titles in the four occupational groups. Specific
vocational preparation is also highly correlated with GED reasoning
(r = 0.81), GED mathematics (r = 0.83) and worker functions related
to data (r = -0.78) measures. Because of these close correlations and
the uniformly low levels for the worker functions-people measure, the
analysis of the returns on skill in the next section narrows its focus to
specific vocational preparation, language development, and relation
ship to things.

RETURNS ON SKILL
If the skill measures described above accurately portray the skill
requirements for various jobs, the difference in ratings across jobs
should be reflected in average wage levels. Data are available in the
AWS on the average wages paid to male and female workers in spe
cific job categories in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing in each of
the 20 areas in our sample. The AWS data can be used to determine
the extent to which average wages reflect the skill requirements linked
to specific job categories by the Dictionary data and to study the evi
dence for changes over time in the relationship between job-specific
wages and skill requirements. This analysis focuses on the estimated
parameters of
Eq.4.1

ln^ = (3 1 S. + p2 X. + ^.

The dependent variable in this equation is the logarithm of aver
age real hourly wages for male or female workers in manufacturing or
nonmanufacturing establishments in job title / and local labor market
j. Vector S.includes various Dictionary skill measures for the /th occu
pation. Vector X. controls for the effect of other determinants of the
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average wage in job i and area/ Finally, e represents a random error
term.
Of the 20 metropolitan areas in the sample, 16 have AWS data for
both the late 1970s and the late 1980s. Since these were periods of
economic expansion a decade apart, the analysis of changes in the
returns on skill during the 1980s is limited to these 16 areas. For both
the late 1970s and the late 1980s, there are over 1,000 observations on
average hourly wages for job titles, by sex and by industry cells, across
the 16 local labor markets in the sample. The areas and years included
in this analysis are
Anaheim
Atlanta
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Detroit
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Miami

1978,
1978,
1978,
1979,
1979,
1978,
1978,
1978,

1988
1987
1987
1989
1989
1988
1989
1987

Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nassau-Suffolk
New York
Philadelphia
St. Louis
San Jose
Seattle

1978,
1978,
1978,
1978,
1979,
1979,
1978,
1979,

1987
1987
1987
1989
1988
1989
1988
1988

Independent Variables
Four independent variables are included in the vector X. to control
for wage determinants in addition to skill requirements. The first is a
dummy variable indicating whether workers in a particular job were
employed in manufacturing. The second is a dummy variable that dif
ferentiates male from female workers. The third independent variable
is the measure of union contract coverage found in the AWS (discussed
in Chapter 3). The AWS reported estimates of the proportion of work
ers in firms where a majority of workers were covered by union con
tracts. The AWS also reported data on aggregate plant and aggregate
office worker groups separately for each local labor market, by man
ufacturing and nonmanufacturing industry. Each job title falling in,
for example, the office worker category in manufacturing in a given
area would have the same value for the union contract coverage vari
able. The fourth independent variable in X. is the local rate of occu
pational unemployment for the year preceding the relevant AWS sur-
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vey. This variable is also an aggregate measure matching the four
AWS occupational categories. Appendix C gives details on the source
and characteristics of the unemployment rate variable.
The vector of job-specific skill requirements in the wage model
includes six different variables. The first, taken from the Dictionary
but not yet discussed, is a measure of the physical demands of the job.
This dummy variable differentiates jobs that require moderate or heavy
work, as measured by the exertion of force needed to perform the tasks
involved (see Gamboa, Gibson, and Holland 1994) from jobs charac
terized by light or sedentary work.
The second skill variable in the model comes from the AWS. A
number of the office-clerical and professional-technical jobs and a few
material movement jobs have wage data reported for various job lev
els. For example, average hourly wage data were reported for Secre
taries I, II, III, IV, and V. The job levels distinguish between work
ers who perform the same basic job but whose tasks involve differing
degrees of experience, responsibility, and supervisory duties. Four
dummy variables are included, to indicate whether a specific observa
tion was for a job at the first, second, third, or higher level for a spe
cific job title. The reference group for the job-level dummy variables
is all workers in jobs with just one job level reported in the AWS.
Dummy variables are also used to examine the effect that differ
ent levels of required vocational preparation have on the average wage
for a given job and in a given local labor market. Separate variables
indicate jobs requiring 6 to 12 months of specific vocational prepara
tion, jobs requiring 1 to 2 years of preparation, and jobs requiring 2
or more years. The reference job for these dummy variables requires
six months or less of specific vocational training.
The level of GED language development required for each job is
another skill requirement used in the model. Recall that GED require
ments usually reflect skills acquired through formal education and that
the three GED measures in the Dictionary data are all highly corre
lated across the job titles in the sample. Thus, while the variables used
in the regressions refer explicitly to language skills, they can also be
interpreted as indicators of the education required. The model includes
three dummy GED variables: GED1 indicates jobs that require the abil
ity to read rules and procedures, to write reports, and to speak before
an audience; GED2 indicates those that require the ability to read jour-
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nals and manuals, to write business letters and reports, and to partici
pate in panel discussions; and GED3 indicates jobs that require the
ability to read technical and financial reports and legal documents, to
write speeches, manuals, and critiques, and to use effective and per
suasive speech. Jobs requiring basic reading, writing, and speaking
skills form the reference group. 1
Two dummy variables are used to measure job requirements in
relationship to working with machines (worker functions-things). One
designates jobs that require operating, controlling, or driving machin
ery; the second designates jobs that require machine set-up and preci
sion work. Jobs associated with handling, tending, or feeding machin
ery are in the reference group.
The final job-related skill measure is available only for the regres
sions estimated for 1987 to 1989. Alan Krueger has kindly supplied
CPS data on the proportion of workers using computers in each threedigit census occupation in 1984 and 1989 from his study of the effect
of computer use on wages (Krueger 1993). The average of the 1984 and
1989 data serves as an independent variable in alternate regressions for
the late 1980s.
Regression Results
The results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimated
separately for 1978-1979 and 1987-1989 are reported in Table 4.3.
The skill requirements and other wage determinants, including metro
politan-area fixed effects, explain about 70 percent of the variation in
average wages across jobs, by sex, by industry, and by urban area cells
in the two periods. Almost all the estimated coefficients are statistically
significant, with signs that are logically consistent. Finally, a compar
ison of the results for the two periods supports the conclusion that the
wage returns on skills changed significantly during the 1980s.
The coefficients for the manufacturing dummy variable indicate
that workers in that sector enjoyed a wage advantage of about 3 per
cent when compared with those in nonmanufacturing jobs in the late
1970s. In the late 1980s sample, however, the estimated wage effect
from working in manufacturing is not significantly different from zero.
The result supports the argument that increased foreign and domestic
competition in the manufacturing sector during the 1980s lowered rents
and the share of rents captured by workers (Sachs and Shatz 1996).
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Table 4.3 Skill Requirements and Other Determinants of Wages,
by Job and by Area, All Workers8
1978-79
Variable

Coefficient

Mean

—
1.7200*c
(0.0233)d
0.5238
Manufacturing
0.0301*
(0.0083)
Male
0.1531*
0.5603
(0.0126)
Union
0.0032* 33.51
(0.0004)
6.94
% Unemployed -0.0058*
(0.0024)
0.0546*
Physical
0.359
demands
(0.0247)
-0.1707*
0.1785
Job level 1
(0.0166)
0.1961
Job level 2
-0.0141
(0.0159)
Job level 3
0.0580*
0.0912
(0.0218)
Job level 4
0.1642*
0.0684
(0.0231)
Voc. prep.,
0.0962*
0.1251
6 mo. to 1 yr. (0.0112)
0.1609
Voc. prep.,
0.1058*
1 to 2 yr.
(0.0129)
0.2417
Voc. prep.,
0.0334
2 to 4 yr.
(0.0174)
0.0624*
0.4397
GED 1
(0.0166)
GED2
0.1876
0.0721*
(0.0208)
0.0873
GED 3
0.5518*
(0.0275)
Constant

1987-89
Coefficientb Coefficient
1.7412*
(0.0397)
-0.0020
(0.0147)
0.1087*
(0.0175)
0.0037*
(0.0005)
-0.0152*
(0.0046)
0.1304*
(0.0462)
-0.1293*
(0.0238)
0.0037
(0.0225)
0.1043*
(0.0280)
0.2517*
(0.0281)
-0.0038
(0.0155)
0.0960*
(0.0175)
0.0998*
(0.0254)
0.0849*
(0.0228)
0.1745*
(0.0297)
0.5890*
(0.0396)

Mean

—
1.6980*
(0.0400)
-0.0027
0.5255
(0.0115)
0.1072* 0.5075
(0.0175)
0.0039* 27.16
(0.0005)
-0.0134* 4.86
(0.0045)
0.1418* 0.3434
(0.0325)
-0.1507* 0.1623
(0.0273)
-0.0177
0.1858
(0.0254)
0.0851* 0.1
(0.0296)
0.2388* 0.0632
(0.0296)
-0.0014
0.1566
(0.0016)
0.0877* 0.1472
(0.0175)
0.1064* 0.2208
(0.0246)
0.0771* 0.4792
(0.0232)
0.1736* 0.1774
(0.0292)
0.5513* 0.0858
(0.0438)
(continued)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
1978-79
Variable
Machine
operation
Machine set-up
Computer use
R2

1987-89

Coefficient

Mean

0.1511*
(0.0145)
0.2014*
(0.0252)
—

0.5283

0.73

0.1837
—

Coefficient5 Coefficient
0.1002*
(0.0198)
0.1169*
(0.0362)
—
0.7

0.0965*
(0.0199)
0.1220*
(0.0350)
0.0010*
(0.0004)
0.7

Mean
0.5396
0.1575
46.39

a The mean of the dependent variable is 2.1708 for 1978-79 and 2.1380 for 1987-89.
There are 1,535 observations for 1978-79 and 1,060 for 1987-89. All regressions
include metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b Excluding computer use variables.
c * = significant at the 5% level.
d Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.

The wage advantage accruing to men is also lower in the 1980s
regression than in that estimated for the 1978-1979 cross-section data.
Other things being equal, men earned about 16.5 percent more than
women in the late 1970s and 11.5 percent more than women in the late
1980s.2 Evidence of improvement in the relative standing of women
during the 1980s had been found in a number of earlier studies.
The estimated wage effect of union contract coverage rose slightly
from 1978-1979 to 1987-1989, even though the percentage of workers
in firms where a majority of workers were under contract fell from 33.5
percent to 27.2 percent. This result appears to be inconsistent with the
evidence on union wage concessions during the 1980s (Voos 1994) and
with evidence from the United Kingdom on falling union wage differ
entials accompanying the decline in union membership (Stewart 1995).
However, Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990) found that the union
wage advantage in the United States may have risen slightly during the
1980s from already high levels in the late 1970s.
The unemployment rate results are consistent with other studies
on the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994) and with evidence
that wages became more responsive to labor market forces during the
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1980s (Eberts and Groshen 1991). The indications are that a one-point
rise in the local rate of occupational unemployment would have low
ered the average occupational wage by 0.6 percent in the late 1970s
and by close to 1.5 percent in the late 1980s, other things being equal.
When the results for the late 1980s are compared with those for
the late 1970s, the coefficient estimates for the skill variables gener
ally change in a way that can be interpreted as evidence for an increase
in the returns on skill. For example, the estimated coefficient for the
dummy variable "physical demands" (identifying jobs requiring mod
erate to heavy physical exertion) is more than twice as great in the
1980s regression. Workers in jobs requiring moderate to heavy exer
tion had a wage advantage of 5.6 percent in the late 1970s and almost
14 percent in the late 1980s.
The estimates for the job-level coefficients bear close scrutiny. The
negative coefficients for Level-1 jobs suggest that workers in these jobs
earned significantly less than the average wage for jobs with only one
level in the AWS. Those in Level-2 jobs earned about the same, on
average, as workers in jobs without job-level designations. Finally,
workers in Level-3 and Level-4 (or higher jobs) earned higher wages,
on average, than workers in jobs without levels. The pattern of coeffi
cients for these four variables indicates that the marginal wage effect of
the job level rose with the level and that the marginal wage effect for
Levels 3 and 4 rose substantially between the late 1970s and late 1980s.
The pattern of change in the estimated wage returns on vocational
preparation is more complex. These returns fell for workers in jobs
requiring the least training. During the 1980s, jobs requiring six months
to one year of training became indistinguishable, in wage terms, from
jobs requiring less than six months of training. Further, the estimated
coefficient for jobs requiring one to two years of specific vocational
preparation also is slightly smaller in the regression for the late 1980s.
Only the results for the dummy variable for jobs requiring over two
years of specific vocational preparation are consistent with the risingreturns-on-skill argument. The wage advantage, on average, for work
ers in job requiring more than two years of training increased from 3.4
percent in the late 1970s to 10.9 percent in the late 1980s.
The estimated parameters for the three language development vari
ables (GEDl, GED2, and GED3) indicate that higher skill levels were
associated with greater marginal wage effects in both the late 1970s and
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the late 1980s and that the wage returns on language skills rose for all
three levels from the 1970s to 1980s. Recall that the language devel
opment variable is highly correlated with math and reasoning develop
ment across the occupations in our sample and that all three variables
measure skills generally acquired through formal education. Thus, the
changes noted in Table 4.3 in the wage effect of GED1, GED2, and
GED3 offer further evidence of increasing wage returns on language,
math, and reasoning skills (Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995). The esti
mated returns on skill for jobs requiring the highest GED level is 74 per
cent for the regression for the late 1970s and about 80 percent for the
regression for the late 1980s.
While there is evidence of an increased wage advantage during the
1980s for workers in jobs requiring the most training, higher language
development, and greater levels of responsibility, the wage advantage
for those with machine-related skills is estimated to have declined
between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, as can be seen in the smaller
estimated coefficients for the machine operator and the machine set
up variables in the regression for the late 1980s. The coefficients indi
cate that the average wage in jobs requiring machine-operation skills
was 16.3 percent higher than that for machine-tending in the late 1970s
and 10.5 percent higher in the late 1980s, other things being held con
stant. The wage advantage for machine set-up skills relative to
machine-tending skills was 22.3 percent in the late 1970s and 12.4 per
cent in the late 1980s. Clearly, the argument that technological change
and other labor-market forces increased the returns on skills during the
1980s needs to be qualified.
The addition of the variable measuring the extent of computer use
in a given job changes the estimated coefficients for the other inde
pendent variables in the 1987-1989 regression only slightly. The com
puter-use variable itself has a statistically significant positive correla
tion with the average hourly wage for a given job by gender, by industry,
and by area cell, lending support to Krueger's (1993) conclusion that
computer skills were particularly relevant in the 1980s, a relevance
reflected in a wage advantage for workers with that skill.
The regression results reported in Table 4.3 indicate that firms in
the 20 local labor markets generally paid more for various measures of
worker skill at the end of the 1980s than they did at the beginning of
that decade. The only exceptions are found in the estimated wage
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response for jobs requiring six months to one year and one to two years
of specific vocational preparation and in the wage advantage associated
with machine-operation and set-up skills. The largest increases in the
wage returns on skill during the 1980s were in the jobs requiring the
longest training and the highest GED levels.
Regression Results, by Sex
Given the differences between the labor market experience of men
and women during the 1980s (Blau and Kahn 1994), it is useful to exam
ine estimates of the model by sex. Chow tests yield F statistics that
reject the null hypothesis of common regression coefficients for men
and women and support the estimation of separate regressions for each.
The results for men are reported in Table 4.4 and those for women in
Table 4.5.
The results for men generally support the main conclusions of the
analysis for all workers, although there are some interesting differences.
The estimated effect of the manufacturing industry on wage rates for
men is not statistically different from zero in the late 1970s or in the late
1980s. The estimated response of male wages to local rates of occupa
tional unemployment is substantially smaller in the regressions for the
late 1980s, particularly when computer use is added to the equation.
The job-level dummy variables are generally not statistically significant
determinants of male wage rates, perhaps because the job-level desig
nations in the AWS are most prevalent among office-clerical jobs.
The regressions for men do indicate a substantial increase in the
wage advantage associated with higher job requirements for specific
vocational preparation and for the GED language level. And, like the
results for all workers, the regressions for men also indicate that the
wage advantage for skills associated with machine operation and set-up
were lower in the regression for the late 1980s than in that for the late
1970s. Finally, the proportion of workers using computers on the job
has a statistically significant positive effect on the average wage for
men, by industry and by area cells in the 1987-1989 sample.
The regression results for women (Table 4.5) also support the con
clusion of rising returns on skill during the 1980s. They also reveal
some interesting differences in comparison with the estimates for all
workers and for male workers.
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Table 4.4 Skill Requirements and Other Determinants of Wages,
by Job and by Area, Men3

1978-1979
Variable

Coefficient

1.9670*c
(0.0462)d
-0.0135
Manufacturing
(0.0140)
Union
0.0035*
(0.0005)
% Unemployed -0.0092*
(0.0030)
Physical
0.0345
demands
(0.0388)
-0.2117*
Job level 1
(0.0496)
0.0024
Job level 2
(0.0446)
Job level 3
0.0763
(0.0493)
0.1680*
Job level 4
(0.0525)
0.0719*
Voc. prep.,
6 mo. to 1 yr. (0.0231)
Voc. prep.,
0.0038
1 to 2 yr.
(0.0299)
Voc. prep.,
-0.0207
2 to 4 yr.
(0.0253)
0.0804*
GED 1
(0.0249)
GED2
0.0218
(0.0339)
0.5247*
GED 3
(0.0370)
0.1400*
Machine
operation
(0.0213)

Constant

1987-1989

Mean

Coefficient5

Coefficient

Mean

—

1.9483*
(0.0632)
-0.0250
(0.0199)
0.0032*
(0.0007)
-0.0071
(0.0057)
0.0422
(0.0422)
-0.1954*
(0.0679)
-0.1304*
(0.0599)
-0.0417
(0.0632)
0.0599
(0.0634)
-0.0544
(0.0295)
0.0837
(0.0437)
0.0825*
(0.0347)
0.1092*
(0.0323)
0.1786*
(0.0490)
0.6513*
(0.0492)
0.0862*
(0.0213)

1.9069*
(0.0641)
-0.0236
(0.0199)
0.0033*
(0.0007)
-0.0056
(0.0045)
0.0485
(0.0414)
-0.2183*
(0.0726)
-0.1526*
(0.0632)
0.0612
(0.0659)
0.0489
(0.0628)
-0.0784*
(0.0309)
0.0213
(0.0512)
0.0662
(0.0347)
0.1059*
(0.0324)
0.1412*
(0.0529)
0.5945*
(0.0594)
0.0909*
(0.0302)

—

0.5733
46.32
7.88
0.5919
0.0826
0.1221
0.1035
0.0558
0.0988
0.0953
0.3802
0.3198

0.1698
0.1116
0.3570

0.5911
38.83
5.47
0.6115
0.0781

0.1059
0.5085
0.3450
0.1022
0.0554
0.3550
0.3253
0.1561
0.1004
0.3401
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Table 4.4

(continued)
1987-1989

1978-1979
Variable
Machine
set-up
Computer use
/?2

77

Coefficient

Mean

Coefficient13

Coefficient

Mean

0.2310*
(0.0317)
—

0.3209

0.1603*
(0.0433)
—

0.1965*
(0.0476)
0.0013*
(0.0007)
0.60

0.3048

0.59

—

0.59

32.98

a The mean of the dependent variable is 2.3056 for 1978-79 and 2.2599 for 1987-89.
There are 860 observations for 1978-79 and 538 for 1987-89. All regressions include
metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b Excluding computer use variables.
c * = significant at the 5% level.
d Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.

In contrast to the results for men, women employed in manufactur
ing earned significantly higher wages than those working in nonmanufacturing in both the late 1970s and the late 1980s. The estimated wage
advantage for the manufacturing industry did fall from around 8 percent
in the 1978-1979 sample to 3.5 percent in the later period.
The regressions for women also indicate that the wage effect asso
ciated with union contract coverage was smaller in the late 1980s. In
addition, the local rate of occupational unemployment did not have a
statistically significant impact on women's wage rates in either period.
The estimated coefficients for skill variables follow a pattern for
women somewhat similar to that for all workers. The wage advan
tages associated with the physical exertion required in a job, with the
highest job levels (in those jobs with level data reported by the AWS),
and with the most training required all increased during the 1980s. In
contrast, the wage effect of the highest GED level in the late 1980s
was substantially lower than that estimated for the late 1970s.
Because only a small number of women work in jobs requiring
machine set-up and operation, the two machine-related dummy vari
ables were combined for the regressions for women. The results indi-
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Table 4.5 Skill Requirements and Other Determinants of Wages,
by Job and by Area, Women8

1978-1979
Variable

Coefficient

1.6046*c
(0.0308)d
0.0782*
Manufacturing
(0.0095)
0.0039*
Union
(0.0007)
0.0008
% Unemployed
(0.0057)
-0.0911
Physical
(0.0510)
demands
-0.1311*
Job level 1
(0.0157)
0.0269
Job level 2
(0.0157)
0.0880*
Job level 3
(0.0225)
0.1952*
Job level 4
(0.0220)
0.1022*
Voc. prep.,
(0.0122)
yr.
1
to
6 mo.
0.1465*
Voc. prep.,
(0.0264)
yr.
2
to
1
0.1252
Voc. prep.,
(0.0645)
2 to 4 yr.
0.0825*
GED 1
(0.0208)
0.0627*
GED2
(0.0338)
0.5383*
GED 3
(0.0684)

Constant

1987-1989

Coefficientb Coefficient Mean
—
—
1.5421*
1.7232*
(0.0659)
(0.0617)
0.4579
0.0346*
0.0341*
0.4607
(0.0116)
(0.0126)
15.14
0.0017
0.0022*
17.19
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
4.22
-0.0089
-0.0181
5.73
(0.0099)
(0.0100)
0.0670
0.2766*
0.1736*
0.0622
(0.0804)
(0.0893)
0.2490
0.3007 -0.1116* -0.2174*
(0.0240)
(0.0218)
-0.0650*
0.2680
0.0412
0.2919
(0.0260)
(0.0226)
0.1111
0.0624*
0.1688*
0.0756
(0.0291)
(0.0282)
0.0900
0.2280*
0.3304*
0.0844
(0.0299)
(0.0280)
0.2126
0.1263*
0.0173
0.1585
(0.0271)
(0.0174)
0.2184
0.0577
0.1285*
0.2444
(0.0331)
(0.0324)
0.0824
0.1516*
0.3021*
0.0652
(0.0771)
(0.1225)
0.6379
0.0262
0.0782*
0.5926
(0.0355)
(0.0347)
0.1992
0.2251*
0.1121*
0.2104
(0.0483)
(0.0451)
0.0709
0.3843*
0.3862*
0.0563
(0.0818)
(0.1266)
Mean
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Table 4.5

(continued)
1978-1979

Variable
Machine
operation
and set-up
Computer use
R2

79

1987-1989

Coefficient

Mean

Coefficient

Coefficient

Mean

0.1332*
(0.0194)

0.7556

0.0907*
(0.0249)

-0.0034
(0.0294)

0.7510

—

—

—

0.0049*
(0.0007)
0.79

0.81

0.76

60.21

a The mean of the dependent variable is 1.999 for 1978-79 and 2.0124 for 1987-89.
There are 675 observations for 1978-79 and 522 for 1987-89. All regressions
include metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b Excluding computer use variables.
c * = significant at the 5% level.
d Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.

cate that the wage advantage associated with these skills dropped from
the late 1970s to the late 1980s.
The estimated coefficients of the wage regression for female work
ers are greatly affected by including the computer-use variable in the
model. Statistically speaking, perhaps the biggest effect is to drive the
estimated coefficient of the machine-related dummy variable to zero.
Apparently, in the late 1980s, computer use on the job was the most
relevant machine-related skill for determining women's wages. Com
puter use itself had a much more important positive effect on women's
wages than it had on men's.
Including the computer-use variable also reduces the estimated
coefficients for the dummy variables for jobs requiring one to two years
and two or more years of specific vocational preparation and reduces
those for the job-level dummy variables. One might speculate that the
introduction of computer technology has eroded the value that employ
ers place on some skills gained through lengthy training or through
experience in lower-level jobs. Such skill substitution might be more
pronounced in predominantly female office-clerical jobs where com
puter use has probably changed work the most.
The results for both men and women suggest that changes in the
price paid for skills during the 1980s were perhaps more complex than
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is suggested by traditional human capital models, which focus on the
returns on schooling and on potential experience. Returns on some
levels of skill, like those associated with machine operation, fell dur
ing the 1980s. And, at least for women, computer use on the job may
have lowered the returns on other skills and raised the wages for those
who could use computers.

TRENDS IN THE SKILL MIX, BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
Along with a tendency toward higher wage returns on skill,
researchers have also noted a rise in the average skill level of the U.S.
workforce during the 1980s. Rising average skill levels have come
about because of changes in industry and in patterns of employment,
leading to an increase in the relative importance of skilled workers
(Gittleman 1994), and because of increases in the skills required for a
given job (Cappelli 1993). This pattern of rising returns on skill,
accompanied by the rising relative employment of the skilled, is a key
factor in analyzing the impact of technological change on the wage
structure (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994).
Table 4.6 summarizes data on changes in the skill mix, by aggre
gate occupational group, for each of the 20 local labor markets in this
study. The table reports the percentage change in the weighted aver
age months of specific vocational preparation (SVP) between the ini
tial and final years for the jobs in each group and in each area. For
each job, we use the midpoint of the time range identified for each
SVP code; for example, jobs with a code of 5 are assigned nine months
of required preparation. Since the measure of skill is constant, changes
in the skill index reflect changes in employment patterns across jobs
requiring different skills within each occupational group. A positive
percentage change indicates that employment within a group has
shifted over time to higher-skill jobs.
Despite considerable differences across the 20 local labor markets,
two trends are clear in Table 4.6. Three groups show a rise in the skill
mix. Averaged across all 20 areas, the weighted average of the voca
tional preparation measure rose 10.2 percent for office-clerical work
ers, 2.5 percent for material movement workers, and 1.9 percent for
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Table 4.6 Change in the Weighted Average of the Specific
Vocational Preparation Index, by Occupational Group (%)
Metropolitan
area/years
Northeast
Nassau-Suffolk
1975/1987
New York 1975/1989
Philadelphia
1976/1988
Midwest
Chicago 1974/1986
Cincinnati 1974/1989
Cleveland 1974/1990
Detroit 1976/1989
Indianapolis
1975/1988
Milwaukee
1975/1991
Minneapolis
1975/1991
St. Louis 1976/1989
South
Atlanta 1975/1991
Baltimore 1975/1991
Houston 1974/1990
Miami 1975/1990
West
Anaheim 1975/1988
Los Angeles
1975/1989
San Diego 1974/1989
San Jose 1975/1988
Seattle 1974/1988
Mean

Office- ProfessionalSkilled
Material
Clerical Technical Maintenance Movement
-8.9

1.4

-40.9

7.4

7.8
1.4

5.7
4.2

-32.9
-11.1

-4.0
-2.9

7.4
47.1
12.3
23.8
-6.6

3.3
3.5
3.2
3.7
3.3

-2.7
-14.6
-7.1
0.2
-12.7

1.5
16.5
2.1
1.4
2.1

4.2

7.4

-10.5

3.1

15.1

3.2

-23.0

10.7

26.7

6.0

-1.2

8.7

1.3
10.9
16.1
9.7

-2.7
-1.8
5.6
4.6

-24.0
-0.1
-14.1
-54.7

8.6
0
-2.9
-7.1

3.9
10.4

0.2
1.4

-12.3
-17.5

-6.2
1.8

6.8
17.1
5.7
10.2

-0.5
-0.3
-0.7
1.9

-19.1
-18.5
-27.3
-17.2

-8.2
4.3
2.0
2.5

SOURCE: Area Wage Surveys and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles© training
data.
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professional-technical workers. Perhaps what is most striking is the
sharp 17.2 percent decline in the average required months of voca
tional preparation within the skilled maintenance group.
Table 4.7 provides more complete information on the trends in the
weighted average of months of specific vocational preparation for the
20 labor markets as a whole. The entries in Table 4.7 are the esti
mated slope coefficients for each occupational group from the fol
lowing regression equation:
Eq. 4.2

In SVP/, = <x. + pYEAR + eit

in which the dependent variable, the logarithm of the weighted aver
age months of vocational preparation required for jobs in occupation
J and area i during period t, is a function of an area fixed effect and a
trend term.
Controlling for inter-area differences shows evidence of a statisti
cally significant positive trend in the SVP measure for the office-cler
ical and professional-technical groups. The data suggest that shifts in
the job mix within these groups resulted in a 0.7 percent annual rate
of increase in the SVP for office-clerical workers and a 0.15 percent
annual rate of increase for professional-technical workers.
The positive shift, however, is restricted to the two white-collar
groups. The trend coefficient is negative and statistically significant
for skilled maintenance workers and not significantly different from
zero for material movement workers. The SVP fell by -1.7 percent
each year for skilled maintenance workers from 1974 to 1991.
The combined effects of increases in the mix of skills required for
office-clerical and for professional-technical jobs and rising returns on
skill help explain the increased relative wage reported for these two
groups in Table 2.6. These combined effects are consistent with a rel
ative improvement in benefits for office-clerical workers (discussed in
Chapter 3). In general, the skill, wage, and benefit findings for the
office-clerical and professional-technical groups support earlier stud
ies that found a positive relationship between the relative earnings and
employment of nonproduction workers and various measures of tech
nological change.3
The results for skilled maintenance workers are somewhat sur
prising, although Howell (1995) found that the share of employment
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Table 4.7 Trend Effects on the Average Number of Months
of Specific Vocational Preparation Required
for Each Occupational Group9

p
R2

Officeclerical

Professionaltechnical

Skilled
maintenance

Material
movement

0.0069*b
(0.001 l)c
0.64

0.0015*
(0.0004)
0.56

-0.0177*
(0.0021)
0.60

0.0003
(0.0011)
0.55

a All regressions include metropolitan-area fixed effects.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
c Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses.

in high-skill, blue-collar jobs fell relative to the share of low-skill,
blue-collar jobs in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing indus
tries from 1985 to 1990. A reduction in the average skill level required
for skilled maintenance jobs and in the wage return on machinecontrol skills are the types of changes one might expect from machinetool computerization and other aspects of the widespread redesign of
the American workplace since the mid 1980s (Applebaum and Batt
1994). The changes in the skill mix and in the returns on machinerelated skills are partly responsible for the slower growth in the rela
tive wage for skilled maintenance workers relative to office-clerical
and professional-technical groups (see Table 2.6). The next chapter
looks more closely at the determinants of changes in relative wage lev
els in our sample of local occupational labor markets.

SUMMARY

The major shift in the position of skilled workers in the U.S. econ
omy is an important element in the changes in the wage structure over
the past two decades. The wage advantage of skilled workers has
increased substantially, and the demand for labor appears to have
shifted markedly toward skilled and away from unskilled workers. To
date, most of the discussion of these shifts has focused on relative
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returns and on employment opportunities for more-educated workers.
The occupational focus of the Area Wage Survey data permits a broader
look at the role that skills play in the 20 local labor markets under study.
Using the skill information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, we
are able to examine occupational skills in terms of the training, cogni
tive skills, and responsibility for machine operations required.
This chapter offers two insights. First, the evidence shows that the
wage returns on several dimensions of skill rose sharply from the late
1970s to the late 1980s, particularly for jobs requiring higher levels of
training, cognitive skills, and responsibility. In contrast, the wage dif
ferential for jobs requiring greater responsibility for setting up and oper
ating machinery, a traditional blue-collar and clerical skill, appears to
have fallen significantly during that decade. This is particularly evident
in the wage regressions for women when we control for computer use
on the job.
Second, employment shifts from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s
generally worked to increase the relative importance of jobs requiring
more training. The main exception is the case of skilled maintenance
workers, for whom employment appears to have shifted in favor of
jobs requiring less training. The evidence for wage returns on skill
and for the relative mix of job skills indicates that skilled blue-collar
jobs in the 20 local labor markets may not have followed the general
U.S. trend toward greater returns on skill and toward more employ
ment opportunities for the most skilled worker

Notes
1. The GED rating for each job is on a scale from 1 to 6. The reference group for
jobs requiring basic reading skills combines those jobs with a GED language rat
ing of 1 or 2. My GED1 variable includes jobs with a 3 rating; my GED2 vari
able indicates jobs with a 4 rating, and my GED3 variable indicates jobs with a
5 rating. None of the job titles in the sample carried a rating of 6 on the GED
language scale.
2. In semilogarithmic regressions like these, the coefficients of dummy variables
must be adjusted in order to correctly calculate the proportionate change in the
dependent variable. If b is the coefficient on a dummy variable X, then the
percent change in the dependent variable associated with X = 1 versus X = 0 is
(eb©- 1) X 100, where e is the base of natural logarithms. So the proportionate
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wage advantage for men in the late 1970s using the regressions in Table 4.2 is
(eo.i53i _ i) x 100 = 16.5%. For more details on this adjustment, see Thornton
and Innes (1989).
See, for example, Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Howell and Wolff (1992),
and Bernard and Jensen (1997).

5 Market and Institutional
Factors in Rising Wage Inequality
One important open question about the causes of rising U.S. wage
inequality is the relative importance of market versus institutional fac
tors. The sharp decline in trade union membership and the falling real
value of the minimum wage during the 1980s has led some observers
to emphasize these institutional factors as determinants of the simul
taneous rise in wage inequality. Institutional factors also seem to be
of primary importance in explaining international differences in wage
inequality, since market factors, especially those related to technolog
ical change and international trade, are likely to have common effects
in all industrialized countries (see Freeman 1996). This chapter exam
ines the relative importance of labor market factors, as well as changes
in unionization and the minimum wage, in explaining the growth of
wage inequality in the sample of 20 local labor markets.
The results in Chapter 2 show that changes over time in the vari
ance of the logarithm of the real wage for all workers in the sample can
be traced to changes in both the relative wage across and the variance
within the four occupational clusters included in the AWS data. Given
the importance of these two sources of change, this chapter focuses on
an analysis of the determinants of the changes in the average occupa
tional wage and the variance of wage rates within occupations over
time. In addition, because much of the interest in changes in the wage
distribution is motivated by concern over the relative wages earned by
the lowest-paid workers, this chapter also examines the factors associ
ated with changes in the wage differential between workers at the
median and at the 25th percentile of the occupational wage distribution.
Previous studies have had difficulty in assessing the relative impor
tance of market and institutional factors because of database limita
tions. Time-series databases for a single country covering a short time
span may not be adequate to fully capture slowly changing institu
tional factors, and databases limited to cross-sectional information can
not capture market dynamics. Our panel data set, with its consider
able variation among occupations and metropolitan areas and its
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variation over time within these occupations and areas, can potentially
overcome these limitations of earlier databases.
METHOD
The analysis in this chapter treats the panel database as a sample
of 80 local occupational labor markets (4 occupational groups times
20 cities) observed at various points from 1974 to 1991. First, the
analysis assumes that, at least in the short run, there are significant bar
riers to mobility between local occupational labor markets as well as
barriers to mobility among metropolitan areas. This seems to be a rea
sonable assumption, given the four groups reported on in the AWS.
In the short run, it is easy to think of truck drivers, secretaries, com
puter programmers, and maintenance electricians as sellers of labor in
distinct labor markets. Because the model of the changes in the wage
structure in these 80 local occupational labor markets is a dynamic
one, the initial time series observation for each market is lost to lags,
leaving 364 observations in the panel database.
A second assumption in this analysis is that the parameters of the
wage structure model are constant across the 80 local occupational
markets. This assumption permits the full use of the cross-sectional
variation in the data set to estimate the parameters. While it might be
interesting to investigate parameter differences between occupations
or between metropolitan areas, that investigation is beyond the scope
of this study.
The analysis of the role of market and institutional factors in shap
ing changes in the wage structure in local occupational labor mar
kets is based upon the general single-equation dynamic model (Eq.
5.1). Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984) showed that such a model,
generalized to include any lag length, encompasses the commonly
employed single-equation dynamic models found in the literature:
Eq. 5.1

y,., = ay,_, + p,*,, + p2 *,.,_, + «» + 4 + /,

where the subscript / designates a particular occupation in a given met
ropolitan area. The model includes group effects (d^ and period effects
(/p that could be important in analyzing the panel data. An important

Rising Wage Inequality

89

question is whether to model the group and period effects as fixed or
random effects. Hsiao (1986) showed that in a dynamic model with
the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation,
the least-squares dummy variable approach to estimating fixed group
and period effects may seriously bias the estimate of a in a downward
direction. Since the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator used in
the random effects model is not subject to such a bias, it is the pre
ferred panel estimator for this type of model.
For greater ease of interpretation and to reduce the possibility of
multi-collinearity in its estimation, the model is rewritten as
Eq. 5.2

y, = a Ytl_k + P,(*,, - Xu_k) + ((3, + p2)*,_t + eit
+ 4 + /,

Here the effects on Yit of the independent variables included in Xi are
divided into a level effect, measuring the impact on F.f of a constantly
maintained level of Xi over time, and a change effect, measuring the
impact on Yit of a change in the level of Xf over time. This is useful
because it is not clear a priori whether it is the level of an institutional
variable or its change that matters for the distribution of wages
(Gottschalk 1996).
Equation 5.2 also recognizes that the length of the lag between
observations in the panel is longer than one year for most variables.
The length of time between AWS site visits was usually three years
but varied from two to four years in the sample. The variable lag is
shown by t - k in Equation 5.2. To control for the effects of variation
in this interval, all estimates of the model include the number of years
in the interval between t and t - k as a right-hand-side variable (see
Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay 1992).
The analysis looks at three dependent variables. The first set of
regressions uses the logarithm of the average real wage in the local
occupational labor market as the dependent variable. These regres
sions attempt to estimate the effect of the variables included in the vec
tor X on the changes in the relative wage level across occupations from
1975 to 1991. A second set of regressions uses the variance of the
logarithm of the real wage in the local occupational labor market as
the dependent variable. These regressions are used to analyze the
determinants of changes over time in the distribution of wages within
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occupations and within metropolitan areas. The final set of regres
sions uses the difference between the logarithm of the real wage at the
50th and the 25th percentiles of the wage distribution in the local mar
ket as the dependent variable. These results can shed some light on
the causes of changes in the relative position of low-wage earners
within specific occupations.
A point of considerable interest is whether the estimates of the
parameter a indicate the presence of an error-correction mechanism
in the model. If a is positive but significantly less than 1, there is evi
dence of error-correction in the sense that a shock to Yt would be dis
sipated to some extent over the following k years. The fundamental
supply-and-demand model of the labor market predicts such an effect,
based on the hypothesis that a short-run rise in the real wage would
attract workers and, by increasing labor supply, would lower the wage
over time. Similar effects might be seen with a rise in wage inequal
ity. For example, the 1997 Economic Report of the President looks
at how college enrollments have increased in response to the sharp rise
in the college wage advantage during the 1980s, with the effect of low
ering that advantage in recent years. If there were an error-correction
mechanism in the model, that would be consistent with the generally
accepted view that medium-term adjustments work to offset, at least
in part, the wage effects of short-run labor market shocks.
The model uses the unemployment rate for experienced workers in
each occupation and metropolitan area to capture short-run market fac
tors. This is the same unemployment rate used in the regressions in
Chapter 4, and Appendix C describes the sources and characteristics of
this data. Since the unemployment rate captures the net short-run effect
of supply-and-demand changes in the local occupational labor market,
the level effect is measured for the period t - 1 rather than for t-k. Bartik (1994, 1996) and Karoly and Klerman (1994) showed that more
rapid growth and falling unemployment in local and regional labor mar
kets are associated with reduced wage and income inequality. An arti
cle by Uchitelle (1997) suggested that falling unemployment in the
United States during 1996 and 1997 resulted in rising real wages for
the lowest-paid workers and reduced wage inequality. While we expect
the local unemployment rate to reflect structural changes in labor
demand (Hyclak 1996), to reflect the impact of foreign trade on domes
tic markets (Haveman 1997), and to capture the net effect of other short-
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run supply-and-demand changes in the labor market, this variable can
not be used to separate the effects of or to assess the relative importance
of trade versus technology on the wage structure.
Included in vector Xt of the independent variables is the measure
of union contract coverage (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The
AWS data reports the proportion of white-collar and blue-collar work
ers in firms where at least half of the workers were covered by union
contracts. The union contract coverage variable for office workers
serves as a measure of union coverage for both the office-clerical and
the professional-technical workers in a given metropolitan area. Sim
ilarly, the local estimate of union contract coverage for plant workers
serves as a measure of union coverage for both the skilled maintenance
and the material movement workers in a given area. Again, the AWS
measure of union contract coverage is a significantly broader measure
of potential union wage influence than union membership or contract
coverage rates would be.
In the regressions explaining the changes in the variance of wages
and the changes in the 50-25 wage differential within local occupa
tional labor markets, the impact of the minimum wage is measured by
the minimum wage for the corresponding state relative to the average
hourly wage in the local occupational labor market. The minimum
wage data are taken from Neumark and Wascher (1992) and Nelson
(1990, 1991, 1992). This relative measure of the importance of the
minimum wage in a local occupational labor market cannot be used
in the regressions having the logarithm of the average real wage as the
dependent variable, because doing so would be equivalent to placing
the inverse of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the
equation. In these regressions, then, the effect of the minimum wage
is measured by the logarithm of the real minimum wage, in which the
state-specific minimum wage is deflated by the CPI-W price index for
the relevant metropolitan area. To allow for the differential effects of
the minimum wage, the logarithm of the real minimum wage is inter
acted with dummy variables for each occupation.
The independent variables include measures designed primarily to
control for two composition effects: changes over time in the relative
importance of specific job titles within an occupational group for a
given metropolitan area and changes in the industry mix of firms
included in the AWS. The model controls for these composition effects

92

Market and Institutional Factors in Rising Wage Inequality

in a way that might yield additional insights into the causes of change
in the dependent variables.
The control variable for changes in the mix of workers by job title
measures the weighted average skill level of the job titles within each
local occupation. The skill level for each job title is measured by the
midpoint of the range of months of the specific vocational preparation
required for the job (see Chapter 4). Since this variable changes over
time only if the relative proportion of workers in each job title changes,
it can control for composition effects within occupations. The vari
able also provides a measure of the effect of shifts toward more-skilled
or less-skilled jobs within occupations on the level and the distribu
tion of wages in the local occupational labor market.
The control variable for the industry mix is also measured by a
weighted average summing, across the six industrial categories in
cluded in the AWS, the products of the industry share of total employ
ment and the 1984 industry-specific compensation effect estimated by
Krueger and Summers (1988). This variable has the same value for all
four occupational groups in a given area for a given year and changes
over time only if the industry mix of the firms surveyed by the AWS
changed. Thus, the variable accounts for changes in the industry mix
in each area and period and also controls for one estimate of the effect
of industry on compensation practices.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE REAL WAGE LEVEL

The first application of the model is analyzing the factors affect
ing the level of the logarithm of the average real hourly wage in the
panel of local occupational labor markets. The interest here is in deter
mining the role of market and institutional factors in explaining the
widening of the gap between relative wages among occupations noted
in Chapter 2. That widening gap played an important role in the over
all trend toward greater urban wage inequality during the 1980s.
Table 5.1 reports three estimates of the real wage model plus some
descriptive statistics. The three estimates are an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression without group or period effects; a generalized least
squares (GLS), random-effects model, with a group effect only for each
of the 80 local occupational markets in the cross-sectional portion of the
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Table 5.1 Determinants of the Average Real Wage8
Variable
Constant
ln(Real Wage),_fc
A% Unemployed,
% Unemployed,^
Aln(Skill),

In(Skill),^
AIndustry mix,
Industry mix,^

AUnion,
Union, fc
Aln RMW,
x OFFICE,
In RMW/Hfe
x OFFICE

OLS

GLS
(group)

GLS
(group & time)

0.1055
(0.0878)
0.8095*b
(0.0388)
[0.7700]
-0.0031*
(0.0013)
[-0.0335]
-0.0010
(0.0012)
[-0.0223]
0.2572*
(0.0418)
[0.0806]
0.1419*
(0.0325)
[0.5699]
-0.0078*
(0.0029)
[-0.0358]
0.0009
(0.0023)
[0.0056]
0.0019*
(0.0007)
[0.0349]
0.0009*
(0.0003)
[0.0903]
-0.0302
(0.0849)
[-0.0054]
-0.0561
(0.0347)
[-0.1203]

0.1297
(0.0750)
0.7630*
(0.0348)
[0.7258]
-0.0032*
(0.0010)
[-0.0346]
-0.0012
(0.0010)
[-0.0223]
0.2682*
(0.0346)
[0.0221]
0.1687*
(0.0284)
[0.6776]
-0.0078
(0.0049)
[-0.0358]
0.0016
(0.0021)
[0.0101]
0.0018*
(0.0006)
[0.0331]
0.0011*
(0.0003)
[0.1103]
-0.0132
(0.0696)
[-0.0006]
-0.0523*
(0.0290)
[-0.1122]

-0.0919
(0.1084)
0.8020*
(0.0368)
[0.7629]
-0.0013
(0.0011)
[-0.0141]
-0.0038*
(0.0011)
[-0.0706]
0.3136*
(0.0367)
[0.0983]
0.1581*
(0.0276)
[0.6350]
0.0105*
(0.0027)
[0.0482]
0.0043
(0.0022)
[0.0272]
0.0021*
(0.0005)
[0.0386]
0.0007*
(0.0003)
[0.0702]
0.1857*
(0.0853)
[0.0331]
-0.0092
(0.0759)
[-0.0197]

Mean,
std. dev.

2.2019
0.2500
-0.2679
2.8442
6.8923
4.8850
-0.0048
0.0824
2.6208
1.0556
-0.3462
1.2068
6.0973
1.6639
-2.1819
4.8302
33.6500
26.3625
-0.0166
0.0469
0.3233
0.5637
(continued)
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Table 5.1

(continued)

Variable
Aln RMW,
X TECH,
In RMWfHt
x TECHfHt
AlnRMW,
x SKILL,
In RMW,_£
x SKILL
Aln RMW,
X MATER,
In RMWrHt
x MATERrHt
Interval
tf2
LM statistics

OLS
-0.0287
(0.0847)
[-0.0051]
-0.1160*
(0.0401)
[-0.2488]
0.1101
(0.0853)
[0.0196]
-0.1615*
(0.0428)
[-0.3464]
0.1960*
(0.0851)
[0.0349]
0.0293
(0.0500)
[0.0628]
0.0007
(0.0085)
[0.0011]
0.95
N/A

GLS
(group)

GLS
(group & time)

Mean,
std. dev.

-0.0150
(0.0694)
[-0.0027]
-0.1240*
(0.0334)
[-0.2660]
0.1041
(0.0699)
[0.0186]
-0.1764*
(0.0360)
[-0.3784]
0.2068*
(0.0697)
[0.0369]
0.0527
(0.0429)
[0.1130]
0.0016
(0.0024)
[0.0026]
0.95
4.05

0.1742*
(0.0854)
[0.0311]
-0.0887
(0.0772)
[-0.1902]
0.2740*
(0.0847)
[0.0489]
-0.1185
(0.0771)
[-0.2542]
0.4063*
(0.0840)
[0.0725]
0.1169
(0.0822)
[0.2507]
0.0441*
(0.0095)
[0.0158]
0.94
260.4

-0.0166
0.0469
0.3233
0.5637
-0.0166
0.0469
0.3233
0.5637
-0.0166
0.0469
0.3233
0.5637
3.1422
0.4243
N/AC
N/A

a Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses. Beta coefficients are
in brackets. The mean of the dependent variable is 2.1886, with a standard devia
tion of 0.2628.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
c N/A = not applicable.
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database; and a generalized least squares, random-effects model, with
both group and period effects. The entries under these columns of Table
5.1 show the estimated coefficient, its heteroskedasticity-resistant stan
dard error, and a beta coefficient for each independent variable. The
beta coefficient measures the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase
in the independent variable on the dependent variable, ceteris paribus,
expressed as a fraction of the dependent variable's standard deviation.
Thus, the beta coefficients can be used to compare the relative influence
each independent variable has on the average real wage level. The right
most column reports the mean (upper value) and standard deviation
(lower value) for each variable.
The final row of Table 5.1 reports Lagrange multiplier (LM) sta
tistics for the two GLS regressions, testing the random effects models
versus the OLS model. The LM statistics favor both random-effects
models over the OLS regression and favor them by a large margin in
the case of the model incorporating both group and period random
effects. Given the R2 and LM results, the discussion will focus on the
GLS regression with group and period effects.
The estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in
this regression, while indicating a high degree of persistence in the aver
age real wage over time, does present evidence of an error-correction
mechanism. The coefficient is statistically significant and less than 1,
and its point estimate suggests that an increase in the log of the real wage
in time period t would dissipate by about 20 percent, ceteris paribus,
over the following k years. This finding is consistent with other find
ings that local labor markets do adjust to shocks in the manner suggested
by basic theory, but that such adjustments occur over a long period (see
Eberts and Stone 1992).
There is also evidence that the real wage in the local occupational
labor markets under study responds as expected to short-run changes
in the rate of occupational unemployment. The coefficients for the
current change in the unemployment rate and for the unemployment
rate lagged one year are both estimated to be negative, although only
the coefficient for the latter variable is substantially greater than the
corresponding standard error. Cyclical or structural factors that cause
a one-point rise in the unemployment rate for a local occupational labor
market would have a short-run effect within one year, lowering the
average real wage by about 0.5 percent.
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In a dynamic model such as this, the long-run response of the
dependent variable Y to a given change in an independent variable X,
holding other effects constant and taking into account the feedback
from the lagged values of the dependent variable, is given by
Eq. 5.3

A7 = (AX)[(pj + p2)/(l - a)]

where a, (3 p and P2 are the coefficients defined in Eqs. 5.1 and 5.2.
Because in this section Y is defined as the logarithm of the average
real wage, the proportionate change in the real wage resulting from a
given ceteris paribus change in an independent variable X is given by
Eq. 5.4

%A(Real Wage) = (eAK - 1)100

Calculated in this way, the long-run effect of a permanent one-point
increase in the unemployment rate would be to lower the average real
wage by 1.9 percent. The long-run elasticity of the real wage in
response to a 1 percent increase in the mean unemployment rate is
-0.13, which is very similar to the results reported in the wage curve
literature (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994).
The control variables for the skill mix of the specific jobs in an occu
pational group and those for the industry mix in the metropolitan area
are positive and statistically significant. The real wage is higher in local
occupational labor markets that have a higher proportion of workers in
jobs that require higher skills and in markets where shifts in the job mix
increase the relative proportion of jobs with higher skill requirements.
The real wage is also higher in local occupational labor markets that have
an industry mix more heavily weighted with industries estimated to have
a high industry-specific compensation effect. Changes in the local
industry mix away from high-compensation industries would result in a
lower average occupational wage. Interestingly, the wage effect of
changes in the industry mix would be just the opposite if we were to look
solely at the OLS results (without group and period effects).
In all three regressions, union contract coverage also has a statis
tically significant positive effect on the real wage level for local occu
pational labor markets. For every one-point decrease in union con
tract coverage, the model predicts a long-run decrease in the average
real wage of 0.35 percent, holding constant the effects of other vari
ables. As Table 3.5 reported, on average, union contract coverage fell
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by 18 percentage points for plant workers and 2 points for office work
ers over the entire period sampled. These declines would translate into
a 6.1 percent decrease in the real wage of maintenance and movement
workers and a 0.7 percent decrease in the real wage of office-clerical
and professional-technical workers.
For all four occupational groups, changes in the log of the real
minimum wage (RMW) are positively correlated with the average
wage level and are statistically significant. The short-run impact of a
change in the minimum wage is felt most strongly in the market for
material movement workers. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients
for the lagged level of the real minimum wage are not statistically dif
ferent from zero, even at the 10 percent significance level. This sug
gests that changes in the minimum wage have no long-run effect on
the average real occupational wage rate.
The results are reassuring in that they support generally held views
regarding the factors behind the sluggish growth of real wages in the
United States during the period included in the database. High unem
ployment rates during the recessions of the 1980s had a negative effect
on real wages, an effect only partially offset by longer-run market
adjustments. The changing mix of skills within occupations, shifts in
the mix of local industry away from high-wage industries, and the
decline in union contract coverage and in the real minimum wage also
contributed to changes in the local occupational real wage level. The
beta coefficients offer one way to determine the relative effects of mar
ket and institutional forces on the real wage.
The beta coefficients shown in Table 5.1 are broadly similar for all
the statistically significant independent variables with the exception of
the lagged dependent variable and the lagged skill-mix measure. The
estimated beta coefficient is -0.07 for the lagged unemployment rate,
0.05 for the change in industry mix, 0.03 for the lagged industry mix,
0.04 for the change in union contract coverage, 0.07 for the lagged union
contract coverage rate, and 0.03 to 0.07 for the change in the log of the
real minimum wage. The skill-mix variables have a strong effect on the
dependent variable, with beta coefficients of 0.09 for the change in skill
mix and 0.64 for the lagged level of the skill-mix measure. The beta
coefficients suggest, then, that short-run labor-market forces, institu
tional changes in the minimum wage, and union contract coverage were
about equally important in influencing changes in the average real wage
from the mid 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s.
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How well does the wage model explain the changes in relative
wages noted in Chapter 2? One way to answer this question is to see
how the model fits the situation in a given metropolitan area. Los Ange
les serves as a case study.
The model has four variables that can account for movements in
relative wage levels: 1) the occupational unemployment rate, 2) the
occupational skill mix, 3) the collective bargaining coverage rate, and
4) the occupational-specific minimum wage effect. The other inde
pendent variables have common effects on all four occupational groups.
The unemployment rate for all four occupational groups in Los Ange
les rose from 1978 to 1984, in response to the serious recessions of the
early 1980s, and fell from 1984 to 1989 as the economy recovered.
However, the recessionary effects were much milder and the expan
sionary effects much stronger for the two white-collar groups. The
unemployment rate of laborers relative to clerical workers was 1.88 in
1978 and 2.4 in 1989, and the ratio of the laborers' rate to that for pro
fessional-technical workers rose from 2.4 in 1978 to 5.5 in 1989. The
unemployment rates for the two blue-collar groups maintained roughly
the same relative relationship throughout the period.
From 1978 to 1989, the skill mix in Los Angeles generally rose
for office-clerical and professional-technical workers, fell slightly for
skilled maintenance workers, and remained largely unchanged for
material movement workers. Union contract coverage fell from 18 per
cent to 12 percent for white-collar workers and from 59 percent to 48
percent for blue-collar workers over the same period. Finally, the real
minimum wage in Los Angeles fell by 30 percent from 1978 to 1989.
Given the regression estimates in Table 5.1, all three factors would be
expected to widen the relative wage gap between white-collar and bluecollar workers.
The changes in the independent variables are consistent with the
changes in the relative occupational wage levels shown in Figure
5.1. Relative wage measures were constructed by dividing the actual
wage and the wage predicted by the GLS model (with group and period
effects for office-clerical, professional-technical, and skilled mainte
nance workers) by the actual and the predicted wage levels for material
movement workers. Relative wages rose the most for professionaltechnical workers and rose slightly for office-clerical workers, while
relative wages for skilled maintenance jobs remained unchanged from
1978 to 1984 and rose slightly thereafter. Figure 5.1 also suggests that
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Figure 5.1 Ratio of Wages Relative to Material Movement Worker
Wages, Los Angeles

the GLS wage regression matched the changes in relative wages in Los
Angeles from 1978 to 1989. The correlation between the actual rela
tive wage and that derived from the wage levels predicted by the model
for the 15 observations available for Los Angeles is 0.97. For Los Ange
les, then, differences across occupations in the strength of labor demand
relative to labor supply, in changes in the skill mix of jobs, in changes
in union influence, and in the minimum wage help to account for the
widening of relative wage levels during the 1980s.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIANCE OF REAL WAGES
The second factor contributing to the rise in overall wage inequal
ity in the 20 metropolitan areas in the 1980s was an increase in the
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variance of the hourly wages paid within each of the four occupational
groups. Table 5.2 gives estimates of the determinants of the variance
of the logarithm of real wages in local occupational labor markets.
Like the real wage level regressions discussed above, these estimates
are based on 364 observations of 80 local occupational labor markets
over time. Unlike the real wage regressions, the Lagrange multiplier
statistics (Table 5.2, last row) reject the two GLS random-effects mod
els in favor of the OLS regression. Because of this result and because
the estimated coefficients are very similar for all three regressions, the
discussion here will focus on the OLS regression.
The estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable pro
vide evidence of an error-correction mechanism, with the coefficient
statistically significant and less than 1. An increase in the wage vari
ance within an occupation in period t would be dissipated by about 20
percent during the next k years. The wage variance exhibits about the
same persistence as the average occupational wage level. On the other
hand, the wage variance appears to be more responsive to short-run
changes in the occupational unemployment rate than the average occu
pational wage level. A one-point increase in the occupational unem
ployment rate would raise the wage variance within that occupational
group by 9 percent, which is substantially greater than the response of
the average wage to unemployment discussed above. 1 This suggests
that the wage response to cyclical or structural unemployment is sub
stantially greater throughout the wage distribution than perhaps is
reflected in changes in the mean wage level.
The estimated response of the wage variance to the unemployment
rate is of interest because several economists have found little evidence
for a cyclical component to the national rise in wage inequality dur
ing the 1980s (Gottschalk 1997). However, previous studies by Katz
and Revenga (1989) and Karoly and Klerman (1994) estimated statis
tically significant positive relationships between inequality measures
and local or regional rates of unemployment. Bartik (1994, 1996) con
cluded that an acceleration of employment growth in a metropolitan
area has its greatest effect on the wages of the poorest workers.
The change in the skill mix of jobs and in the lagged level of the
skill mix are both statistically significant and negatively related to the
wage variance within occupations. Wage rates show less inequality
in local occupational labor markets that have a higher concentration
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Table 5.2 Determinants of the Variance of the Real Wage8

Variable
Constant
Variance/Ht
A% Unemployed,
% Unemployed,^
Aln(Skill),
In(Skill),^
AIndustry mix,
Industry mix/Hfe
AUnion,
Union,_£
ARelative
minimum,

OLS
7.0075*b
(1.9776)
0.8216*
(0.0359)
[0.7942]
0.0778*
(0.0359)
[0.0389]
0.2114*
(0.0053)
[0.1819]
-4.8722*
(1.1692)
[-0.0707]
-0.9896*
(0.2574)
[-0.1840]
0.1847*
(0.0816)
[0.0392]
0.0705
(0.0582)
[0.0207]
-0.0016
(0.0209)
[-0.0014]
-0.0115*
(0.0053)
[-0.0534]
-4.6860
(2.5512)
[-0.0328]

GLS
(group)

GLS
(group
& time)

7.1929*
(1.8547)
0.8025*
(0.0271)
[0.7757]
0.0771*
(0.0329)
[0.0386]
0.2159*
(0.0309)
[0.1858]
-4.9094*
(1.0628)
[-0.0712]
-1.0457*
(0.2435)
[-0.1944]
0.1790*
(0.0745)
[0.0380]
0.0736
(0.0562)
[0.0216]
-0.0033
(0.0189)
[-0.0028]
-0.0117*
(0.0051)
[-0.0543]
-4.5674
(2.3196)
[-0.0320]

6.8955*
(2.1111)
0.8082*
(0.0277)
[0.7812]
0.0542
(0.0366)
[0.0271]
0.1576*
(0.0360)
[0.1356]
-4.2443*
(1.1098)
[-0.0616]
-1.4886*
(0.2685)
[-0.2768]
0.0991
(0.0934)
[0.0211]
-0.0010
(0.0644)
[-0.0003]
-0.0025
(0.0185)
[-0.0021]
-0.0133*
(0.0054)
[-0.0618]
0.2854
(3.4124)
[0.0020]

Mean,
std. dev.
—

9.1316
5.4874
-0.2679
2.8442
6.8923
4.8850
-0.0048
0.0824
2.6208
1.0556
-0.3462
1.2068
6.0973
1.6639
-2.1819
4.8302
33.6500
26.3625
-0.0193
0.0398
(continued)
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Table 5.2 (continued)

Variable

OLS

GLS
(group)

Relative minimum^

-5.8197*
(1.8212)
[-0.1100]
-0.3770
(0.2363)
[-0.0282]
0.91
N/A

-5.7052*
(1.7168)
[-0.1078]
-0.3633
(0.2170)
[-0.0271]
0.91
1.81

Interval
R2
LM statistics

GLS
(group
& time)
-9.7077*
(2.0326)
[-0.1835]
0.8807*
(0.3024)
[0.0658]
0.90
4.64

Mean,
std. dev.
0.4168
0.1073
3.1422
0.4243
N/AC
N/A

a Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors are in parentheses. Beta coefficients are
in brackets. The current and lagged values of the variance are multiplied by 100.
The mean of the dependent variable is 9.8211, with a standard deviation of 5.6766.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
c N/A = not applicable.

of more highly skilled jobs and in markets where the job mix is shift
ing toward more highly skilled jobs. Skill mix has, then, two poten
tially offsetting effects on the wage distribution: it serves to raise aver
age wages and (as we saw in the case of Los Angeles) it adds to changes
in relative wages across occupations, but at the same time it acts to
reduce wage inequality within local occupational labor markets.2
The coefficient for the lagged level of the industry mix is not sta
tistically significant from zero in the regressions, although changes in
the industry mix toward higher-paying industries is positively corre
lated with wage inequality within local occupational labor markets.
The result presumably reflects an increase in the wage level for those
working in high-wage sectors relative to that of workers in the same
occupation but employed in low-wage industries. As the focus is on
wage inequality within occupations, the shift away from manufactur
ing and other high-wage industries toward the service sector is seen
as reducing wage disparities among similar workers.
The lagged level of the union variable is statistically significant and
negatively correlated with the wage variance in local occupational labor
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markets. Changes in the rate of union coverage do not have a statisti
cally significant effect on the wage variance in the regressions reported
in Table 5.2. As has been found in a number of previous empirical stud
ies, wages are more equally distributed among similar workers in the
more heavily unionized local labor markets. The regression estimates
indicate that a decrease of one percentage point in the rate of union con
tract coverage, ceteris paribus, would lead to a 0.7 percent increase in
within-group wage inequality. Like the result for the unemployment
rate, it appears that the wage variance is substantially more sensitive to
changes in union coverage than is the average wage level.
In the regressions reported in Table 5.2, the minimum wage effect
is measured by the locally relevant minimum wage divided by the aver
age wage in the local occupational labor market. This measure suggests
that the minimum wage is more important in labor markets where the
gap between the minimum and the average wage is smallest. Both the
lagged level and the change in this relative minimum wage variable are
statistically significant and negatively correlated with the occupational
wage variance. An increase in the relative minimum wage raises the
wage floor and thus reduces the range of wage rates and wage dispar
ity. The results suggest that the relative minimum wage has a fairly
large impact on the wage variance within local occupational labor
markets. A 10-point increase in the relative minimum wage, ceteris
paribus, would be associated with a 9.8 percent short-run decrease and
a 33 percent long-run decrease in the wage variance relative to its mean
value.
The high degree of explanatory power shown by the wage vari
ance regressions and the empirical support the regressions provide for
generally accepted explanations of rising wage inequality are reassur
ing. The estimated coefficients suggest that increased wage inequal
ity within occupations reflects high unemployment during the first half
of the 1980s and the decline in the extent of union contract coverage
and in the relative minimum wage during that decade. These inequal
ity-increasing forces would have been offset to some extent by an
increase in the skill mix within an occupation and by a shift away from
high-compensation industries.
The beta coefficients offer some insight into the relative impor
tance of market and institutional factors in explaining changes in the
wage variance within local occupational labor markets. The evidence
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Figure 5.2 Variances of the log of Real Wages, Los Angeles

again suggests that both forces were important, although here the bal
ance shifts somewhat toward short-run market factors. The beta coef
ficients are -0.04 for the change in the unemployment rate and -0.18
for the lagged unemployment rate. For the institutional variables, the
beta coefficients are -0.05 for the lagged union contract coverage rate,
-0.03 for the change in the relative minimum wage, and -0.11 for the
lagged relative minimum wage.
By looking at the relationship between the actual and fitted values
of the variance for each of the four groups in Los Angeles, we can
check the ability of the OLS regression to account for changes in the
wage variance. The actual and fitted values are plotted in Figure 5.2.
There is a fairly close fit between the actual data and the variances
predicted by the model, with the correlation between the two variables
at 0.95 for the 20 observations for Los Angeles.
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Keep in mind when assessing the time series patterns in Figure 5.2
that California raised its minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25 in 1989
(Neumark and Wascher 1992), leading to a corresponding rise in the
relative minimum wage for all four occupational groups. For exam
ple, after falling by about 29 percent from 1978 to 1986, the relative
minimum wage for office-clerical workers rose by 17 percent between
1986 and 1989. This rise in the relative minimum wage reinforced
the effects of falling occupational unemployment and contributed to
the observed decrease in wage variance in the four occupational labor
markets in Los Angeles at the end of the 1980s. The change in the
relative minimum wage alone could account for about 17.5 percent of
the decrease in the wage variance for office-clerical workers in Los
Angeles between 1986 and 1989.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE 50-25 WAGE DIFFERENTIAL
Since we are interested in the way changes in the wage structure
have affected the lowest-paid workers, the wage model was also esti
mated with the difference between the logarithm of hourly wages for
workers at the 50th and 25th percentiles of the occupational wage dis
tribution as the dependent variable. The results are found in Table 5.3.
With the R2 statistic at 0.74, this application of the model has slightly
less explanatory power than the real wage and wage variance versions
discussed above. Like the wage variance model, the Lagrange multi
plier statistics reject both GLS random-effects models in favor of the
OLS model. Apparently, group and period effects beyond those cap
tured in the independent variables are not important determinants of
the variance and the 50-25 differential.
The estimated coefficients for the lagged 50-25 differential show
the lowest degree of persistence and the highest error-correction
response of the three sets of regressions discussed in this chapter. Some
40 percent of an increase in the 50-25 differential in period t would
be eliminated by medium-term labor market adjustments in the fol
lowing k years.
The occupational unemployment rate lagged one year has a sta
tistically significant positive correlation with the 50-25 wage differ-
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Table 5.3 Determinants of the 50-25 Percentile Wage Differential3

Variable
Constant
50-25 Differential,^
A% Unemployed,
% Unemployed, j
Aln(Skill),
In(Skill)^
AIndustry mix,
Industry mix,^
AUnion,
Union, ^

ARelative minimum,

OLS

GLS
(group)

40.6280*b 57.8070*
(4.1067)
(7.1139)
0.5781*
0.6003*
(0.0411)
(0.0418)
[0.5585]
[0.5799]
-0.1001
-0.1112
(0.1309)
(0.1359)
[-0.0232]
[-0.0258]
0.6165*
0.6025*
(0.1229)
(0.1271)
[0.2459]
[0.2403]
-7.4909
-7.4279
(4.2310)
(4.4227)
[-0.0504]
[-0.0499]
-4.7902*
^.6265*
(0.8651)
(0.8805)
[-0.4129]
[-0.3988]
0.5251
0.5344
(0.2958)
(0.3082)
[0.0517]
[0.0527]
0.1624
0.1608
(0.2206)
(0.2194)
[0.0221]
[0.0218]
-0.0008
-0.0069
(0.0741)
(0.0770)
[-0.0003]
[-0.0027]
-0.0335
-0.0332
(0.0198)
(0.0184)
[-0.0721]
[-0.0715]
-27.1350* -26.7830*
(9.2165)
(9.6388)
[-0.0870]
[-0.0882]

GLS
(group
& time)
44.7830*
(8.2169)
0.5707*
(0.0425)
[0.5513]
-0.0977
(0.1506)
[-0.0227]
0.6104*
(0.1460)
[0.2434]
-7.8405
(4.5801)
[-0.0527]
-5.6458*
(1.0021)
[-0.4867]
0.1713
(0.3815)
[0.0168]
-0.2218
(0.2529)
[-0.0301]
-0.0016
(0.0770)
[-0.0006]
-0.0466*
(0.0213)
[-0.1003]
-32.0320*
(13.7620)
[-0.1041]

Mean,
std. dev.
—
23.4345
11.8310
-0.2679
2.8442
6.8923
4.8850
-0.0048
0.0824
2.6208
1.0556
-0.3462
1.2068
6.0973
1.6639
-2.1819
4.8302
33.6500
26.3625
-0.0193
0.0398
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Variable
Relative minimum,_k
Interval
R2
LM statistic
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OLS

GLS
(group)

GLS
(group
& time)

-37.0410*
(6.8580)
[-0.3245]
-2.1991*
(0.8954)
[-0.0762]
0.74
N/A

-37.470*
(6.7419)
[-0.3283]
-2.2220*
(0.8640)
[-0.0769]
0.74
1.52

-46.2290*
(8.1462)
[-0.4050]
-0.5398
(1.2125)
[-0.0187]
0.72
2.06

Mean,
std. dev.
0.4168
0.1073
3.1422
0.4243
N/AC
N/A

a Heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors in parentheses. Beta coefficients are in
brackets. The current and lagged values of the dependent variable are multiplied
by 100. The mean of the dependent variable is 24.5748, with a standard deviation
of 12.2460.
b * = significant at the 5% level.
c N/A = not applicable.

ential in local occupational labor markets. The estimated effect on the
dependent variable of a change in the rate in the current year is sub
stantially less than its estimated standard error in all three regressions
in Table 5.3. The 50-25 wage differential exhibits a fairly strong
response to the lagged unemployment rate: a one-point increase would
raise the mean wage differential in the short run by about 2 percent.
The long-run effect of a permanent one-point increase in the unem
ployment rate is estimated to be a 6.2 percent increase in the mean
50-25 wage differential in the sample. Again, there is evidence that
short-run cyclical or structural changes in the rate of unemployment
within an occupation have a greater impact on the wage distribution—
particularly at the low-wage end of the distribution—than on the aver
age wage level.
As with the wage variance results, changes in the skill mix and in
the lagged level of that mix within an occupation have a statistically sig
nificant negative correlation with the wage differential between the 50th
and 25th percentiles in the local occupational wage distribution. The
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statistically significant positive coefficient estimated for the change in
the industry-mix variable also reinforces the wage variance results. A
shift away from high-compensation industries works to reduce wage
inequality within an occupation by lowering the differential between the
worker at the 50th and the worker at the 25th percentile.
The change effect is not statistically significant for either institu
tional variable. However, the lagged rate for union contract coverage
has a statistically significant negative effect on the 50-25 differential.
Evaluated at the means of the data, the 18-point average drop in union
coverage for plant workers would raise the 50-25 wage differential by
8.5 percent. This is added evidence that unionization works to equal
ize the wage distribution by reducing the relative disadvantage of the
lowest paid workers.
As suggested by the non-parametric evidence of DiNardo and
Lemieux (1997), the minimum wage is very important in determining
of the shape of the wage distribution below the median. A relative
minimum wage that was permanently 10 percent higher would even
tually lower the 50-25 gap by 17.5 percent. The importance of the
minimum wage is also reflected in the beta coefficients. In the OLS
regression, the beta coefficients are 0.24 for the lagged unemployment
rate, -0.05 for the change in the occupational skill mix, -0.40 for the
lagged skill mix, -0.07 for lagged union contract coverage, and -0.32
for the lagged relative minimum wage. Skill mix is also important in
determining the 50-25 differential, but the relative minimum wage has
slightly greater influence on the dependent variable than does the occu
pational unemployment rate and substantially greater influence than
does the rate of union contract coverage.

OVERALL WAGE INEQUALITY
The analysis in this chapter began with the observation that
changes over time in the variance of wages for all workers could be
decomposed into changes in the variance within occupations and
changes in the relative wage across occupations. That was the reason
for the separate analyses of the determinants of the logarithm of the
average real wage and of the variance of the real wage in local occu-
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pational labor markets. Now the analysis turns to the regression results
to see how well the forecasts from the wage structure model fit the
data for the overall wage distribution for all workers.
The variance decomposition formula used in Chapter 2 to exam
ine the relative contribution of changes in wage inequality between
and within occupations for overall changes in urban wage inequality
is reproduced as Equation 5.5:
Eq.5.5

where pi is the fraction of workers in occupation / for a given metro
politan area, a? is the wage variance within occupation /, Wit is the log
arithm of the average real hourly wage in occupation i for period t, and
Wt is the logarithm of the average real hourly wage for all workers in
that area. The equation can be used to forecast the wage variance for
all workers from forecast values of the wage variance within occupa
tions and the average occupational real wage. The fitted values from
the OLS regression in Table 5.2 and the GLS regression with group and
time effects in Table 5.1 are used for those forecasts.
Table 5.4 presents data on the overall variance and the forecast
overall variance for all workers, derived from the fitted values from
the occupational real wage and wage variance regressions. The entries
in Table 5.4 are for the initial and final years for each metropolitan
area in the regressions. In general, the forecasts derived from the sep
arate occupational real wage and wage variance regressions are rea
sonably accurate. For both periods, the means of the actual and the
forecast values are very similar, the mean absolute errors and the mean
squared errors are small relative to the mean actual and forecast val
ues, and the actual and fitted values are closely correlated among the
20 labor markets.
The accuracy of the overall wage variance forecasts in Table 5.4
suggests that the models in this chapter do capture the main determi
nants of the changes in relative real wages across occupations and that
they also capture the variance of wages within the occupations in the
sample. These results, plus the evidence for Los Angeles, also sug
gest that estimating a common model for all four occupations and all
20 metropolitan areas does not seriously distort the estimated impact
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Table 5.4 The Actual and the Forecast Values of the Wage Variance
for AH Workers
Metropolitan
area
Anaheim
Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Houston
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis

NassauSuffolk
New York
Philadelphia
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle
St. Louis

Year

Actual

Forecast3

Year

Actual

Forecast3

1978
1978
1978
1977
1977
1977
1979
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978

0.1387
0.1717
0.1784
0.1157
0.1433
0.1409
0.1005
0.1755
0.1731
0.1342
0.1300
0.1450
0.1331
0.1334

0.1393
0.1411
0.1760
0.1177
0.1360
0.1430
0.1461
0.1539
0.1657
0.1400
0.1326
0.1345
0.1202
0.1273

1988
1991
1991
1986
1989
1990
1989
1990
1988
1989
1990
1991
1991
1987

0.1571
0.2003
0.2024
0.1550
0.1889
0.2379
0.1993
0.3113
0.2165
0.1808
0.1821
0.1907
0.1607
0.1411

0.1541
0.1911
0.2382
0.1699
0.1928
0.1906
0.1893
0.2380
0.2156
0.1938
0.2080
0.2388
0.1600
0.1653

1978
1979
1977
1978
1977
1979

0.1089
0.1544
0.1270
0.1142
0.1230
0.1631

0.1204
0.1342
0.1247
0.1023
0.1174
0.1502

1988
1988
1989
1988
1988
1989

0.1649
0.1787
0.2001
0.1520
0.1718
0.2370

0.2061
0.1985
0.2162
0.1429
0.1807
0.2229

0.1400

0.1361

0.1914

0.1956

Mean
Mean absolute error
Mean squared error
Correlation coefficient

0.0113
0.0002
0.7406

0.0209
0.0008
0.6805

a Forecast values are the author's estimates, based on forecasts from the real wage
and the wage variance regressions discussed in Chapter 5. See the text for details.
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of these determinants on the occupational real wage level or on the
real wage variance.

SUMMARY

This chapter has presented an analysis of the determinants of
changing wage inequality in 20 local labor markets. A general dynamic
model was applied to a panel data set with 364 observations on four
occupational groups in 20 areas at selected intervals from 1974 to 1991.
Because changes in wage inequality reflect both changes in the rela
tive wage across occupations and changes in wage inequality within
occupations, and because of particular concern for the relative posi
tion of the lowest wage earners, the model was estimated separately
with the log of the real wage, the variance of the log of the real wage,
and the log wage differential between the 50th and 25th percentiles as
the dependent variables. This analysis paid particular attention to
examining the relative importance of market and institutional factors.
The wage structure responds to short-run shifts in the labor market,
as measured by the local rate of unemployment within an occupation,
and to longer-run market adjustments as measured by the error-correc
tion mechanism in the model. Short-run changes in unemployment rate
had a greater estimated effect on the wage variance (and in particular
on the 50-25 wage differential) than on the average occupational real
wage level. The real wage level also showed more long-run persistence
than did either distribution measure. Close to half of a shock to the
50-25 differential would be dissipated over the following three years.
In addition to its usefulness in explaining changes in wage inequality in
metropolitan labor markets, the finding of higher unemployment at the
margins of the wage distribution could help to clarify how the wage
structure responds to cyclical and structural changes in unemployment.
The most closely studied institutional factors in the literature on
wage inequality are the changes in the relative importance of collective
bargaining and changes in the minimum wage. Our results indicate that
both were statistically important in explaining changes in the level and
distribution of wages in the sample. Markets with a higher percentage
of workers in firms where union contracts covered a majority of work-
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ers had higher real wage levels, a lower wage variance, and a smaller
50-25 wage differential. Increases in the real minimum wage were
reflected in higher average wage levels for an occupation, especially for
material movement workers. Local markets with a higher minimum
wage relative to the average wage registered significantly lower wage
variances and 50-25 differentials. The beta coefficients suggest that the
market and institutions had equal influence on the real wage, although
market factors may be slightly more important in explaining changes in
the wage variance. As might be expected, the relative minimum wage
was a very important determinant of the 50-25 wage differential.
Two variables introduced to control for composition effects gave
interesting results. The control variable for changes in the job mix
within occupations was the weighted average of the months of specific
preparation required for jobs. This variable was statistically significant
and empirically important in all of the regressions. Those local occu
pational labor markets with high-skill job mixes or with job mixes
changing toward jobs with higher skill requirements had higher aver
age wages and more equally distributed wages. The second control
variable, for changes in the industry mix of firms surveyed in the AWS,
was the weighted average of an estimate of the industry-specific com
pensation effect. This variable was less important in the regressions,
perhaps because the AWS data identified industries only by very broad
aggregates, or perhaps because the effect of changes in the industry mix
are reflected in unemployment rates (Hyclak 1996).
On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, the rise in urban wage
inequality during the 1980s can be explained as reflecting a widening
of the gap between the relative wages across occupations and as reflect
ing a rise in wage inequality within occupations. A key factor is the
greater cyclical impact of the deep recessions of the early 1980s on
blue-collar workers. Rising relative wage inequality would be due to
this difference in the unemployment response, exacerbated by the per
sistence of high real wages, by declining union contract coverage, and
by differences across occupations in the skill-related job mix. The fall
in the real minimum wage had a particularly pronounced impact on
the average real wage for material movement workers. Rising wage
inequality within occupations would be due to the higher rates of unem
ployment during the 1980s, falling union contract coverage rates, and
a falling relative minimum wage rate. In the office-clerical and pro-
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fessional-technical occupations, rising average skill levels would have
moderated the tendency toward greater within-occupation inequality.
The separate models for the occupational real wage and for real wage
variance generate forecast values that accurately portray changes over
time in the wage variance for all workers in the sample.
During the early 1980s, unemployment rates rose markedly for all
workers. By the end of the decade, the unemployment rates for bluecollar workers had generally increased relative to those for the whitecollar workers in the sample. Given our result that the changes in
wage inequality were responsive both to short-run labor market shocks
and to longer-run market adjustments, the extent to which changes in
labor market reflect permanent changes in "natural" levels or are more
fleeting responses to cyclical or structural forces remains an important
question. Clearly, much of the literature that cites technological change
and changes in international trade as explanations for changes in the
wage structure suggest that these changes are indeed permanent. At
the same time, we must remember that the 1980s, especially the early
years of that decade, were years of unusually high labor market stress
in many localities.

Notes
1. With the regression results for the wage variance and the 50-25 wage differen
tial, we calculate the percentage change in the dependent variable for a given
change in an independent variable as (Ay/F)100, where AF is given by Eq. 5.3.
2. It is important to note that this discussion refers to the ceteris parlbus effect of
changes in the job mix of the four occupational groups. Changes in the occu
pational unemployment rates might also reflect changes in the demand for vari
ous skills. In general, the unemployment rates of the two blue-collar groups in
the sample rose in comparison with the rates of the white-collar group over the
sample period. This would lead to a rise in overall inequality within and across
occupational groups.

6 Summary and
Policy Implications
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

Chapter 1 posed five questions about wage inequality. The answers
to those questions summarize the results from this study of 20 metro
politan labor markets.
1. Are trends in the structure of wages in local labor markets
similar to the trends in the structure of wages as revealed
in nationwide data sets?
The short answer is yes. Chapter 2 reveals broad similarities
between the trend toward greater wage inequality, revealed by studies
of national samples of workers such as the CPS, and the trend toward
greater wage inequality found in local samples such as the AWS. This
finding is important for two reasons. First, and most important, it sug
gests that the rise in wage inequality in the United States, during the
1980s reflected, in part, a significant change in the structure of the real
hourly wages for specific occupations and was not solely a reflection
of changes in the demographic characteristics of workers or in the sta
bility of their employment. Second, the rise in wage inequality within
each of the 20 metropolitan labor markets in the sample suggests that
the rise in wage inequality seen in national samples was indeed wide
spread and not due mainly to the substantial regional shifts in popu
lation and economic activity that took place during the period.
2. Do local labor markets differ in the extent and pattern of
the rise in wage inequality?
Significant differences did appear. For several metropolitan areas,
the variance of the logarithm of the real hourly wage fell at the end of
the sample period, after rising steadily for several years. Metropoli
tan areas differed in the extent to which the rise in wage inequality
115
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reflected a rise in the 50-25 wage differential or in the 75-50 wage
differential. In several cases, the data suggest that rising inequality
stemmed largely from rising wage differentials among workers earn
ing more than the median wage; in others, wage inequality rose mainly
among workers earning less than the median. There were also interarea differences in the relative importance of sources of wage inequal
ity between and within occupations and in the pattern of trends in
inequality for the four occupational groups. The study used the con
siderable cross-section differences in the sample to test general
hypotheses about the causes of the rise in wage inequality.
3. Have changes in the availability of benefits accompanied
changes in the wage structure?
The AWS reported the prevalence of various benefits offered to
plant and office workers. The analysis of that data (see Chapter 3)
suggests two main conclusions. First, the evidence for office-clerical
workers shows a rise in the amount of time off for holidays and vaca
tions and a rise in the percentage of workers receiving various bene
fits. Second, the results for plant workers are more mixed, but it
appears that the availability of benefits was stable or falling in most
metropolitan areas. These results point to a rise in the relative avail
ability of benefits for office workers.
4. How have the wage returns on skills changed over time?
Chapter 4 examined the changing role of skill requirements in
determining the average hourly wage for specific job titles among the
16 labor markets in the sample for which data are available for both
the late 1970s and late 1980s. Skill requirements were measured by
variables drawn from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and by the
index of the job level in the AWS. A comparison of the results for
the late 1970s and the late 1980s shows a rise in the wage return on
the highest skill levels for specific vocational preparation, general edu
cational development related to language skills, and the skills repre
sented by the index of the job level. By way of contrast, the wage
advantage for workers in jobs requiring higher machine-related job
skills appears to have fallen between the late 1970s and late 1980s.
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The results support the conclusion in the literature that higher returns
on skills—in particular cognitive skill—played an important role in
widening the wage gap between workers holding jobs requiring dif
ferent levels of skill.
5. What is the relative importance of changes in union con
tract coverage and in the minimum wage in explaining
changes in the wage structure?
Chapter 5 set out a model designed to explain changes in the wage
structure across 20 local labor markets from 1974 to 1991. Because
the overall changes seen in the sample could be traced both to changes
in the relative wage across occupations and to changes in the wage
distribution within occupations, the models in Chapter 5 were used for
separate analyses of the roles of market and institutional factors in
shaping the changes. In addition to studying the correlates of the vari
ance in wage rates within occupations, the analysis also focused on
the factors related to changes in the wage differential between the 50th
and 25th percentiles of the wage distribution within occupations.
The results of the analysis in Chapter 5 indicate that both market
and institutional factors were significantly related to all three meas
ures of the local wage structure. The estimated impact of union con
tract coverage and of the minimum wage on the dependent variables
was equivalent to that of the local occupational unemployment rate.
Local occupational labor markets with greater union influence and a
higher minimum wage had a higher average real wage, a smaller wage
variance, and a smaller differential between the median wage and the
wage at the 25th percentile of the distribution. Higher local occupa
tional unemployment rates were associated with lower average real
wages and with a more widely dispersed wage distribution. And shifts
in the job mix toward jobs with higher skill requirements also boosted
the average wage level and reduced wage inequality.
The predicted real wage level and the predicted wage variance for
each local labor market were used to calculate the predicted overall
wage variance for the initial and final years for each market in the sam
ple. The predicted wage variance was very close to the mark for all
20 areas, and the prediction error was small across the 20 areas for
both periods, suggesting that the models captured the primary deter-
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minants of changes in the local wage structure and that the use of a
single model encompassing all four occupations did not seriously dis
tort the estimated parameters. While the results say something about
the relative importance of market and institutional factors in explain
ing changes over time and among areas, the results do not clarify the
relative importance of trade and technology in driving shifts in the
demand for labor.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Although many studies have sought to explain the rise in wage
inequality in the United States during the 1980s, relatively few have
made specific policy recommendations. Summers (1996) pointed out
that no study has gone beyond the conclusion that the existing inequal
ities are "too great" and set out the social consequences of different
degrees of wage inequality. And, as is suggested by the controversy
surrounding Card and Krueger (1996), we lack a clear understanding of
the equity-efficiency trade-offs implied by redistributive programs such
as the minimum wage. The literature discusses several policies for
reducing wage inequality (see Katz 1996). The results reported here
touch on a few of those policies.
Macroeconomic Policy
A macroeconomic policy leading to sustained low unemployment
rates is seen as one way of stimulating the demand for low-skilled work
ers and, through the type of hysteresis effects described by Bartik (1991)
and others, improve their lifetime earnings. The research reported here
finds that wage inequality shows a strong positive response to the unem
ployment rate in the local labor market and points to the possibility of
a significant intermediate-run error-correction adjustment to past rises
in inequality. This plus the evidence of recent reductions in wage
inequality as measured by national indicators, traceable to good macroeconomic performance in recent years (Uchitelle 1997), lends consid
erable support to the argument that macroeconomic policy has an
important role to play in improving wage equality.
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Education and Training
Improved education and training are seen as a way of reducing the
supply of workers for low-skill labor markets and of raising the sup
ply of workers for high-skill markets (Levy 1995). Like many other
studies, the research reported here shows that the wage advantage for
workers in jobs requiring higher skills has risen over time, and that
shifts in the composition of occupations toward jobs requiring higher
skills has a significant equalizing effect on the wage distribution within
occupations. This can be taken as evidence of shortages in the mar
kets for skilled workers and would support a call for more education
and training. One potentially disturbing finding from this study, how
ever, is that the wage advantage for machine-related skills, typically
associated with the most-skilled blue-collar jobs, seems to have fallen
over time. If this should be corroborated by further research, it would
call into question whether educational policies designed to teach such
skills do significantly reduce wage inequality.
Raising the Minimum Wage
There is considerable agreement among economists with the analy
sis presented in the 7997 Economic Report of the President on the equal
izing effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of wages, partic
ularly its effect in improving the relative wages of the poorest wage
earners. The results reported here also support those conclusions. The
minimum wage was negatively correlated with the variance of hourly
real wages and with the 50-25 hourly wage differential over time for
the sample of local occupational labor markets. Given the growing evi
dence that an unchanging nominal minimum wage contributed signifi
cantly to the rise in U.S. wage inequality during the 1980s and given the
strong political opposition to raising the minimum wage because of its
potentially adverse consequences for employment, it would appear
imperative that labor economists attempt to more carefully quantify the
equity and efficiency implications of changing the minimum wage.
Strengthening Collective Bargaining
A number of economists argue that the decline in union member
ship is an important determinant of wage inequality and that any sig-
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nificant policy action to reduce inequality should include measures to
strengthen the role of collective bargaining in the setting of wages (Free
man 1997). The results reported here show collective bargaining cov
erage to have had an important effect in limiting the wage differential
between workers at the 50th and the 25th percentiles of the wage dis
tribution and in reducing wage inequality within occupations. How
ever, there appears to be little support for the changes in labor law
deemed necessary to restore collective bargaining to the levels seen in
the past. On the contrary, most serious discussions of labor law reform
envision changes in legislation that would promote a more cooperative
labor relations climate than that embodied in the amended Wagner Act
of 1935 (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). We have no data about the
potential impact of cooperative labor-management relations on the dis
tribution of wages.
Micro Demand Policy
The studies in the volume edited by Freeman and Gottschalk
(1998) examined the efficacy of various policies designed to increase
the demand for less-skilled workers. There is some evidence that wage
subsidies can stimulate an increase in the employment opportunities
for and raise the wage levels of less-skilled workers. The experience
with such programs in the United States, however, indicates that the
effects are likely to be modest. Direct public employment also adds
to the demand for low-skilled labor, but questions remain about the
long-run effects of such programs on their "graduates." Providing sub
sidies to influence the location of firms is very costly relative to the
number of jobs created, and the benefits of such programs often accrue
to nontargeted members of the population. All such programs face the
criticism that transfer payments are more effective than subsidies in
dealing with the effects of poverty. The experience with such pro
grams in periods of greater governmental intervention in the labor mar
ket are also not very encouraging. Most programs have been short
lived experiments that ended prematurely.
Controlling Immigration
Briggs (1996) argued strongly that the immigration laws should be
amended to limit the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United
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States each year and to give preference to those with higher skills.
Among other benefits, he saw such a policy as reducing the pressure of
increased supply on low-wage labor markets. While one might expect
high rates of immigration to be reflected in local unemployment rates,
particularly for low-skilled workers, our study provides no direct evi
dence on this issue, and there is little evidence in the literature to sup
port this conclusion (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996,1997). However,
given the large influx of immigrants in recent years and their heavy con
centration in a few areas (Clark 1996), the impact of immigration war
rants continued research.

SUMMARY

There are three potentially important contributions from this proj
ect. First, changes in the wage distribution reflect, in part, changes in
the structure of the real wages for specific jobs in local occupational
labor markets. Second, the wage advantage for workers in the mostskilled jobs has risen over time, but the wage response to different
aspects of skill is more complex than is typically seen in human capital
models, where skill means only educational attainment and years of
potential work experience. Third, changes in the distribution of wages
within local labor markets appear to be very responsive in the short run
to changes in local occupational unemployment rates. The wage dis
tribution's responsiveness to market forces also appears to extend to the
intermediate run and to embody a partial self-correction mechanism that
might reflect changes in labor supply and demand in response to an ini
tial rise or fall in wage disparities. The possibility that the sharp rise in
U.S. wage inequality during the 1980s may have been caused in part by
the deep recessions in the early years of that decade and might be par
tially self-correcting deserves further investigation.

7 Addendum:
Atlanta in 1991 and 1996
The end of the Area Wage Survey program in 1991 makes it impos
sible to extend the analysis to the 1990s. Partial information is avail
able, however, for assessing whether the emergence of tight labor mar
kets during the 1990s has acted to brake the rise in wage inequality.
Atlanta serves as a case study of changes in wage inequality from 1991
to 1996.
The Occupational Compensation Survey (which replaced the Area
Wage Survey) continued to report wage distribution data for 20 of the
job titles used in our study, including four from the professionaltechnical group, five from the office-clerical group, five from the
skilled maintenance group, and six from the material movement group.
To compare Atlanta's wage structures in 1991 and 1996, the wage dis
tributions for the 20 jobs were aggregated into revised occupational
groups.
Between 1991 and 1996, improving labor market conditions in
Atlanta led to lower unemployment rates for all four groups. The
unemployment rate for professional-technical workers fell from 2.6
percent in 1991 to 2.1 percent in 1996, from 3.3 percent to 2.5 per
cent for clerical workers, from 6.5 percent to 2.1 percent for skilled
craft workers, and from 6.3 percent to 4.1 percent for transportation,
material moving handlers, cleaners, helpers, and laborers. Other things
being equal, our analysis suggest these falling rates of unemployment
would be expected to raise average wage levels and to lower wage
inequality in local occupational labor markets.
Table 7.1 reports data on these two variables for the re-defined
occupational groups and for workers in all 20 job titles. Falling rates
of unemployment did appear to contribute to rising real wages. The
average log of the real wage rose sharply for the professional-techni
cal group and more modestly for the other three groups. Overall, aver
age real wages rose by about 7 percent for workers in the 20 jobs.
Falling unemployment rates may also have helped to reduce wage
inequality within the technical, clerical, and craft groups. Wage
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Table 7.1

The Wage Structure in Atlanta, 1991 and 1996
Groupa

Professional-technical
1991
1996
Office-clerical
1991
1996
Skilled maintenance
1991
1996
Material movement
1991
1996
Overall
1991
1996

Number
of workers

Mean
ln(real wage)

Variance
ln(real wage)

11,259
7,947

2.1188
2.5833

0.1469
0.1057

14,316
10,689

2.0378
2.0437

0.0741
0.0706

3,827
3,672

2.2519
2.2685

0.0905
0.0779

24,769
26,576

1.7053
1,7412

0.1651
0.1850

54,171
48,884

1.9177
1.9838

0.1727
0.2363

SOURCE: Author's calculation from the 1991 Area Wage Survey data (BLS
Bulletin 3060-14) and 1996 Occupational Compensation Survey data (BLS
Bulletin 3085-25).
a The occupational groups contain fewer job titles than those used in the main
body of this book. The professional-technical jobs are computer operator, com
puter programmer, computer system analyst, and drafter. The office clerical
jobs are accounting clerk, key entry operator, secretary, switchboard reception
ist, and word processor. The skilled maintenance jobs are general maintenance,
maintenance electrician, maintenance machinist, maintenance mechanic, and
motor vehicle mechanic. The material movement jobs are forklift operator,
guard, janitor, order filler, shipping/receiving clerk, and truck driver.

inequality widened within the material movement group, however, as
the real wages for truck drivers rose and those paid to guards, forklift
operators, and shipper/receivers fell. Overall, wage inequality rose
because the higher average real wage for the professional-technical
group increased inequality between groups and because the material
movement group, which shows rising inequality, weighs heavily in the
calculation for average inequality within groups.
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Still, the data suggest that some braking of the rise in wage inequal
ity did accompany falling unemployment in Atlanta during the first
half of the 1990s. Since U.S. unemployment rates fell further and
remained very low into 1999, further research into the impact of tight
labor markets on wage inequality and into comparative study of
inequality trends in the 1980s and 1990s should be high on the agenda
of labor economists.

Appendix A:
Data Sources and Definitions
of Metropolitan Areas
This appendix gives the boundaries for the local labor markets in
the sample and notes the dates for the Area Wage Surveys and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin numbers containing the raw data
for this study. In most cases, the definition of the local labor market
is the same as the corresponding Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Anaheim is limited to Orange County, California, for every year. The AWS
data are for October 1975 (Bulletin 1850-70), October 1978 (Bulletin 202565), October 1981 (Bulletin 3010-57), October 1984 (Bulletin 3025-58), and
September 1988 (Bulletin 3045-43).
Atlanta consists of the following counties in Georgia for 1975 to 1984:
Cherokee, Forsyth, Cobb, Gwinnett, Dekalb, Walton, Rockdale, Newton,
Butts, Henry, Clayton, Fayette, Douglas, and Paulding. Barrow, Coweta, and
Spalding counties were added in 1987. The AWS data are for May 1975
(Bulletin 1850-25), May 1978 (Bulletin 2025-28), May 1981 (Bulletin 301024), May 1984 (Bulletin 3025-18), May 1987 (Bulletin 3040-18), and May
1991 (Bulletin 3060-14).
Baltimore was originally defined to include Maryland's Anne Arundel, Bal
timore, Carroll, Harford, and Howard counties. Queen Annes County was
added in 1987. The AWS data are for August 1975 (Bulletin 1850-62), August
1978 (Bulletin 2025-50), August 1981 (Bulletin 3010-39), August 1984 (Bul
letin 3025-39), September 1987 (Bulletin 3040-33), and September 1991 (Bul
letin 3060-39).
Chicago consists of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will counties
in Illinois. After 1986, the definition was changed dramatically, so this study
does not use post-1986 data for Chicago. The AWS data are for May 1974 (Bul-
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letin 1795-27), May 1977 (Bulletin 1950-14), May 1980 (Bulletin 3000-26),
March 1983 (Bulletin 3020-10), and March 1986 (Bulletin 3035-9).
Cincinnati is defined as Clermont, Hamilton, and Warren counties in Ohio, plus
Dearborn in Indiana, and Boone, Campbell, and Kenton counties in Kentucky
for all years. The AWS data are for February 1974 (Bulletin 1795-16), July
1977 (Bulletin 1950-45), July 1979 (Bulletin 2050-28), July 1982 (Bulletin
3015-32), July 1985 (Bulletin 3030-29), and July 1989 (Bulletin 3050-27).
Cleveland is defined as Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, and Medina counties in
Ohio. The AWS data are for September 1974 (Bulletin 1850-17), Septem
ber 1977 (Bulletin 1950-53), September 1980 (Bulletin 3000-46), September
1983 (Bulletin 3020-46), September 1986 (Bulletin 3035-42), and September
1990 (Bulletin 3055-36).
Detroit includes Lapeer, Livingston, Macomb, Oakland, Wayne, and St. Clair
counties in Michigan for 1976 to 1985 and adds Monroe County in 1989.
The AWS data are for March 1976 (Bulletin 1900-15), March 1979 (Bulletin
2050-7), April 1982 (Bulletin 3015-15), April 1985 (Bulletin 3030-13), and
December 1989 (Bulletin 3050-59).
Houston includes Brazoria, Ft. Bend, Harris, Liberty, and Montgomery coun
ties in Texas for 1974, adds Waller County for 1977 to 1986, and deletes Bra
zoria County in 1990. The AWS data are for April 1974 (Bulletin 1795-22),
August 1977 (Bulletin 1950-48), April 1980 (Bulletin 3000-18), May 1983
(Bulletin 3020-20), April 1986 (Bulletin 3035-20), and April 1990 (Bulletin
3055-17).
Indianapolis consists of the following Indiana counties for 1975 to 1988:
Boone, Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Johnson, Marion, and Shelby. The
AWS data are for October 1975 (Bulletin 1850-66), October 1978 (Bulletin
2025-17), October 1981 (Bulletin 3010-56), October 1984 (Bulletin 302547), and October 1988 (Bulletin 3045-45).
Los Angeles is defined as Los Angeles County, California. The AWS data
are for October 1975 (Bulletin 1850-86), October 1978 (Bulletin 2025-61),
October 1981 (Bulletin 3010-66), October 1984 (Bulletin 3025-65), October
1986 (Bulletin 3035-53), and December 1989 (Bulletin 3050-57).
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Miami is limited to Dade County, Florida. The AWS data are for October
1975 (Bulletin 1850-76), October 1978 (Bulletin 2025-60), October 1981
(Bulletin 3010-53), October 1984 (Bulletin 3025-48), October 1987 (Bulletin
3040-42), and October 1990 (Bulletin 3055-50).
Milwaukee is defined as Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha
counties in Wisconsin. The AWS data are for April 1975 (Bulletin 1850-21),
April 1978 (Bulletin 2025-18), May 1981 (Bulletin 3010-16), May 1984
(Bulletin 3025-21), May 1987 (Bulletin 3040-17), and May 1991 (Bulletin
3060-15).
Minneapolis is defined for 1975 to 1984 as Anoka, Carver, Chisago, Dakota,
Hennepin, Ramsey, Washington, and Wright counties in Minnesota and
St. Croix County in Wisconsin. Isanti County, Minnesota, is added for 1987
and 1991. The AWS data are for January 1975 (Bulletin 1850-20), January
1978 (Bulletin 2025-2), January 1981 (Bulletin 3010-1), January 1984 (Bul
letin 3025-2), February 1987 (Bulletin 3040-5), and February 1991 (Bulletin
3060-7).
Nassau-Suffolk includes Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York. The
AWS data are for June 1975 (Bulletin 1850-39), June 1978 (Bulletin 202533), June 1981 (Bulletin 3010-31), August 1984 (Bulletin 3025-41), and
August 1987 (Bulletin 3040-39).
New York includes Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, Putnam, Richmond,
Rockland, and Westchester counties in New York, and Bergen County in New
Jersey from 1975 to 1985. Bergen County is deleted in 1989. The AWS data
are for May 1975 (Bulletin 1850-45), May 1978 (Bulletin 2025-35), May
1981 (Bulletin 3010-41), May 1985 (Bulletin 3030-32), and June 1989 (Bul
letin 3050-32).
Philadelphia is defined as Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and
Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania, and Burlington, Camden, and Glouces
ter counties in New Jersey. The AWS data are for November 1976 (Bulle
tin 1900-64), November 1979 (Bulletin 2050-57), November 1982 (Bulletin
3015-58), November 1985 (Bulletin 3030-64), and November 1988 (Bulle
tin 3045-57).
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St. Louis includes Franklin, Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis counties in
Missouri and Clinton, Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair counties in Illinois for
1976 to 1985. Jersey County, Illinois, is added in 1989. The AWS data are
for March 1976 (Bulletin 1900-19), March 1979 (Bulletin 2050-13), March
1982 (Bulletin 3015-11), March 1985 (Bulletin 3030-14), and March 1989
(Bulletin 3050-11).
San Diego is limited to San Diego County, California. The AWS data are for
November 1974 (Bulletin 1850-13), November 1977 (Bulletin 1950-73),
November 1980 (Bulletin 3000-71), Decmber 1983 (Bulletin 3020-70), De
cember 1986 (Bulletin 3035-71), and December 1989 (Bulletin 3050-58).
San Jose consists of Santa Clara County, California. The AWS data are for
March 1975 (Bulletin 1850-36), March 1978 (Bulletin 2025-9), March 1981
(Bulletin 3010-10), March 1984 (Bulletin 3025-15), and March 1988 (Bul
letin 3045-13).
Seattle is defined as King and Snohomish counties in Washington. The AWS
data are for January 1974 (Bulletin 1795-17), January 1977 (Bulletin 195012), December 1979 (Bulletin 2050-68), December 1982 (Bulletin 3015-72),
December 1985 (Bulletin 3030-70), and November 1988 (Bulletin 3045-50).

Appendix B:
Wage Distribution Data
The basic data used in this study was taken from tables contained
in the AWS reports. These tables list the number of workers in a spe
cific job title receiving wages in each of 21 wage cells for office-cler
ical and professional-technical workers and in each of 22 wage cells
for skilled maintenance and material movement workers. The AWS
tables group the data for related job titles in a single table but do not
aggregate the number of workers in a given wage cell across job titles.
The data were not available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in
electronic form, which meant creating 444 spreadsheets containing the
data for each occupational group in each metropolitan area for each
period. This spreadsheet data was used to determine an aggregate
wage distribution for each occupational group (note that the AWS
tables do not provide totals across the job titles within each occupa
tion) and then to create 111 spreadsheets, with the aggregate data for
all four occupational groups for each metropolitan area for each year
in the sample. The aggregate data by occupational group and by area
was used in the analyses.
The wages for professional-technical workers and for office-cler
ical workers were reported in the AWS as weekly straight-time earn
ings. The weekly wages for the two groups were divided by the
weighted average of standard weekly hours across the job titles in each
occupational group in order to translate the wage data into hourly earn
ings cells for the workers in the two categories. To calculate means,
medians, and wages at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the wage dis
tribution, workers in all four occupational groups were assigned the
midpoint of the wage range of the cell in which they were reported.
Midpoint wage levels for workers in the lowest and highest cells
in the occupational tables were assigned in three ways. In most tables,
the cells were closed, so the midpoint could be easily determined. In
other tables, the highest and lowest cells were not closed, but foot
notes permitted an estimation of their width and thus the determina
tion of the midpoint. A minority of tables were not closed and did not
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have footnotes to help determine the width of the upper and lower
cells. In those cases it was expedient to assume that those cells had
the same range as the wage cells immediately adjacent in the table.
The median wage was estimated by interpolation, using the fol
lowing formula (Abraham and Houseman 1995):
El + [(0.50 - />,) / (P2 - />,)] X (E2 - £,)
where El is the wage at the lower boundary of the cell containing the
median, E2 is the wage of the upper boundary of that cell, Pl is the
cumulative percentage of workers in the cells below that containing
the median, and P2 is the cumulative share of workers in the cells up
to and containing the median wage. A similar approach was used to
estimate the wage at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the occupational
and the aggregate wage distributions for each area and period. To cal
culate those points in the aggregate distribution, a spreadsheet was used
to rank workers from the four occupational groups by the midpoints
of their wage cells. The variance was calculated as the sum of the
squared deviations of the cell midpoints, from the weighted average
of cell midpoints weighted, in turn, by the fraction of workers in each
cell.

Appendix C:
Unemployment Rates
The data for the occupational unemployment rate are the yearly
averages for 1976 to 1991 and were taken from annual issues of the
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, published by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data show the unemployment
rate by occupation for experienced workers and cover the last full-time
job held for two or more weeks. There are two details to consider in
this Appendix: first, the matching of occupations from the Area Wage
Surveys with those in the Geographic Profile, and second, the method
used to fill in for missing data.
The four occupational groups in the AWS are office-clerical, pro
fessional-technical, skilled maintenance, and material movement
workers. These groups match well with four groups in the Geographic
Profile for 1976 to 1982: clerical workers, professional and technical
workers, craft and kindred workers, and nonfarm laborers. For 1983,
however, the occupational groups were changed in the Geographic
Profile, and the matching groups were then set as follows: data for pro
fessional specialty workers and technicians and related support work
ers were combined to match with the professional-technical group in
the AWS; the administrative support group (including clerical work
ers) was matched with the office-clerical group in the AWS; the pre
cision production, craft, and repair group was matched with the skilled
maintenance worker group in the AWS; and the combined data for the
transportation and material moving group and the handlers, equipment
cleaners, helpers, and laborers group were matched with the AWS
material movement group. Since the data used in this study are not
continuous, no attempt was made to splice statistically the two sets of
occupational unemployment rates. The first set of rates was used for
the years up to 1982 and the second set for the years after 1982.
In a number of cases, the data on the unemployment rate for nonfarm laborers were not published. After 1983, the data for the combined
occupations matched to the material movement group were not pub
lished. Unemployment rates were estimated in those cases. Employ133
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ment in the occupation was calculated from other data published in the
Geographic Profile on the distribution of employment by occupation.
The number of unemployed workers was estimated as follows. First,
the number of unemployed workers (from the occupational data) was
subtracted from the total number of unemployed experienced workers
to get a residual number of unemployed experienced workers for the
community. Second, that residual number was allocated to occupations
for which no data was reported by using the occupational distribution
of the unemployed in the state in which the local labor market is cen
tered. These estimates of unemployed and employed workers made it
possible to calculate rates of occupational unemployment for cases
where such data was not disclosed. A visual comparison of unemploy
ment rates so estimated with those published for other metropolitan
areas in the same year did not reveal the estimated unemployment rates
to be beyond the range of values in the published data.
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38r-39r, 11 Or
years in data set, 16r, 68
Michigan, 32t
See also Detroit, Michigan
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 17
boundaries, 15, 129

152

Subject Index

Milwaukee, Wisconsin (cont.)
holiday/vacation benefits, 47?, 50?
insurance coverage, 48, 49t, 52t
occupational groups in, 24?, 35?,
38?, 40?, Sit
real hourly wages, 28?, 29, 31?,
38?
union contract coverage in, 54t, 55
wage variance, 31?, 33?, 35t, 37,
38?-39?, UOt
years in data set, 16?, 68
Minimum wage
as institutional factor of wage
inequality, 87, 111, 119
impact of, 91, 117
in Los Angeles case study, 98, 99,
105
relative, 101?-102?, 103-108,
106?-107?, 112
RMW, 93?-94?, 97, 112
wage-inequality literature on, 1112
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 16-17, 26
boundaries, 15, 129
holiday/vacation benefits, 46, 47?,
50?
insurance coverage, 49t, 52t
occupational groups in, 24?, 35t,
38?, 40?, 81?
percentile wage differentials, 32,
33?
real hourly wages, 28?, 29, 31?, 38?
union contract coverage in, 54t, 55
wage variance, 3lt, 35t, 37,
38?-39?, U0t
years in data set, 16?, 68
MSA. See Metropolitan statistical area
NAFTA. See North American Free
Trade Agreement
Nassau-Suffolk, New York, 16-17,
54t
boundaries, 15, 129
holiday/vacation benefits, 46, 47?,
50t

insurance coverage, 49t, 52t
occupational groups in, 24?, 35t,
38?, 39, 40t, Sit
percentile wage differentials, 3234, 33t
real hourly wages, 28?, 29, 3lt, 38?
relative wage of occupational
groups in, 37, 39, 40t
wage variance, 3lt, 35t, 37, 38?,
HOt
years in data set, 16?, 68
National Center on the Educational
Quality of the Workforce
(EQW), 10
National Employers Survey (1984),
on computer use and pay, 10
National Longitudinal Study of the
High School Class of 1972,
role of skills on earnings, 5
New York (state), 32?
See also Nassau-Suffolk, New
York; New York, New York
New York, New York, 17
boundaries, 15, 129
holiday/vacation benefits, 41t, 50t
insurance coverage, 49t, 52t, 53
occupational groups in, 24?, 35?,
38f, 40/, 81?
percentile wage differentials,
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78;
real wage level analysis and, 93t,
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103, 105-107, 106;
worker groups affected by, 113,
113n2
Union contract coverage
affecting health coverage
in returns on skill analysis, 66, 68,
lit, 12,16t, 78;
United Kingdom, wages in, 4, 9, 12,
13,72
United States, 72
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 15,
127-131
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